A Manual for Creating Atheist: Strict Rejoinder

At the very heart of MCA rests an unspoken assumption. It is an assumption that Boghossian never mentioned throughout the entire project. And yet, it is so excruciatingly obvious that if the project were going to be a success, this assumption could not remain an assumption. Somewhere along the way, Boghossian had the duty to deal with the one very critical issue that he never bothered to address. That critical issue is basically this: Christian faith is never placed beneath or subjected to the authority of human reason. In case you are wondering, this is the philosophical problem of the criterion. It is a legitimate problem that Boghossian prefers to ignore. According to Christian theism, human reason does not set itself up as the magistrate over faith. Since when is Christian epistemology under any obligation to subject itself to rationalism or empiricism? Neither of these systems is willing to submit to a distinctly Christian epistemology, are they? Boghossian assumes that the Biblical faith of Christian theism is subject to the standards of human reason that he wishes to place upon them. He never bothers to show us why his standards are superior or absolute. Rather than show us how Christian theism must pass the test of his version rationalism or empiricism, or a combination of the two, Boghossian assumes that it is so. He could not be more wrong. Christian theism actually argues that human reason must serve as the minister of faith, not her magistrate. Human reason is in service of Biblical faith, not the other way around. I believe so that I may understand, not I must understand in order to believe. This is Biblical Christianity. This is Christian theism. (Think of Leonidas in 300: this is Sparta!)

In “Loc. 452” Boghossian makes this statement: “If a belief is based on insufficient evidence, then any further conclusions drawn from the belief will at best be of questionable value.” Frist, there are some critical questions that this statement must answer. Second, we want to examine what results when we turn this statement on Boghossian’s claims. From a critical perspective, Boghossian has to distinguish in detail, without ambiguity, what he means by sufficient evidence so that we understand what he means by insufficient evidence. He also needs to help us understand what qualifies as evidence. Finally, it would be helpful for him to provide some understanding of how he defines value in terms of argumentation. What happens when we use this single statement to criticize Boghossian’s view of religion? The answer is really quite simply. Since Boghossian rests the success or failure of his entire project on his belief that the accurate characterization of faith is “pretending to know something you do not know” we are in a sound position to be able to assess the quality of his project and determine if it in point of fact adds value to the conversation. This will not be a small criticism that I will level against Boghossian’s argument.

Boghossian’s appeal to human reason to argue for human reason is viciously circular. One would assert that Christian theism does the very same thing with faith. But this statement does not actually represent the facts, as they exist within Christian theism. Christian theism does not appeal to faith as its final authority. Instead, Christian theism appeals to Scripture as its final authority and its criterion for what qualifies as the only consistent worldview, the only valid epistemology. Scripture sets itself up as the authority to which all human predication must submit. The skeptic may claim this too is circular. In response we say it is not viciously circular because as far as Christian theism is concerned, we are speaking of God’s rightful claim of absoluteness in this case. If God does exist as the ultimate source of all knowledge, then what other source could He appeal to but Himself since he is the highest authority to which appeal could be made? In other words, Christian theism is consistent to appeal to their final resting point, namely God, in support of all human predication. To rest the argument on other grounds would be terribly inconsistent even if some Christians actually do so. Should it surprise anyone that opposing systems would appeal to two different authorities for their criterion of belief, and would actually hold to differing epistemological schemes? Boghossian ignores the problem of the criterion and instead pretends that philosophy has it all figured out and that philosophers are in complete agreement on how human knowledge works. Apparently he is unfamiliar with Michael Williams work on “Problems of Knowledge – a critical introduction to epistemology.” Williams says, “The problem of unity poses the question: is there just one way of acquiring knowledge, or are there several depending on the sort of knowledge in question?” [Williams, Problems of Knowledge, 2] Boghossian does not even acknowledge that there are different kinds of knowledge, and hence, different methods for knowing them. 

This is not a small problem in his project. It is one of the first questions a good Christian thinker will ask if you attempt to engage him/her on the question of Christian theism. The problem of the criterion is a most thorny problem. You see, in order to create a criterion by which beliefs may be justified, you must already have some idea about it before you create it. This is a problem. What you are searching for is something that transcends, a standard that comes from out there somewhere. You are looking for a reliable and dependable judge. But if you create the judge, how objective is that? This is the problem of the criterion that Boghossian ignores entirely. The atheist needs to understand that the Christian thinker will not ignore that problem. The minute you ask us to justify our beliefs, we are going to ask you to justify your idea of justification without appealing to your own idea of justification. But don’t let this dissuade you from engaging Christians. I hope you engage lots of Christians, real ones, the type that actually know how to think well about Christian theism.

The second problem with Boghossian’s project is his insistence on giving faith a philosophical or rational definition as opposed to allowing the faith community to define their own terms. “If facts alone are at stake, on overdose of emotionally tinged language can only be a hindrance and should be regarded with suspicion. Even eloquence should be shunned where information is the sole purpose. For facts are most effectively conveyed when they are stated in a plain and objective manner.” [Engel, With Good Reason, 71] When defining faith Boghossian should have just stuck with the plain facts of how Christian theism defines faith rather than not only assigning to it a wrong definition but an emotionally charged one at that. The common Hebrew words for faith are ‘aman, the act of believing or trusting, batah, the idea of being secure, trust in, hasah, seek or take refuge, shelter, and hesedh, faithfulness, loyalty. [McManis, Biblical Apolgetics, 381-383] There are others but you get the idea. The NT encapsulates the idea of faith in the word, pistis. In Christian theism, faith means laying hold on the promises of God in Christ, relying entirely on the finished work of Christ for salvation, and on the power of the indwelling Holy Spirit of God for daily strength. Faith implies complete reliance on God and full obedience to God. [Morris, Illustrated Bible Dictionary, 498] Given that Boghossian’s aim is to refute faith, and given that his entire definition of faith is categorically false, I could end my review here and conclude with any rational person that Boghossian’s project is an embarrassing failure. But I have a few more things to say.

The third challenge with Boghossian’s project is that it is far too broad. It is an illegitimate practice to lump all the religions of the world into the same category just as much as it is to lump all philosophies and philosophers into the same category. I suppose this move would make the task at hand much easier, but it simply does not work. For example, to compare Mohamed with Christ and radical Islam with Christianity is an ad hominem attempt to polarize the conversation. If a person is familiar with radical Islam and unfamiliar with Christian theism, they would be tempted to think that Christians are also strapping bombs to their chest in certain parts of the world and murdering innocent people all under the guise of religion. This tactic is despicable and reflects the desperation and weakness in Boghossian’s arguments. My experience has been that only the weakest arguments resort to ad hominem. Anyone that knows anything about world religions knows that they tend to be radically different from each other in very basic ways.

Another serious problem with Boghossian’s skepticism is that it contains far too much certainty. He speaks as if philosophy has attained absolutely epistemic certainty when in reality the state of affairs is just the opposite. The consensus necessary to arrive at some of the absolute statements that Boghossian makes simply does not exist. The truth is that rationalists and empiricists do not agree even among themselves on the exact nature, definition, limits, and even value of human knowledge. How is it, then, that Boghossian can lead his readers to believe that philosophy has arrived at uncontroversial views in epistemology and metaphysics?

In addition, Boghossian’s insistence on referring to faith as a virus or mental condition to be cured is one of the most bizarre and extreme ad hominem arguments I have encountered. There is no question that this view of faith represents only a small portion of skeptics and the rest would do well to avoid it and him. Every noetic structure, be they primarily rational, empirical, or something else, at the end of their chain beliefs, arrives at faith. Because we are not omniscient, this reality is impossible to avoid and it is one we cannot afford to ignore. As Boghossian himself boasts, there are a lot of things we simply do not know or understand. Christian theism affirms that God created the world from the beginning. At the same time, Christian theism confesses that it does not know how God could do such a thing. We just don’t know. We also do not know how God could bring us the Scriptures as a product of both man and God Himself. We know He did it, but we do not know how that worked. Quite frankly, it is borderline insane to refer to faith as a virus or mental illness. In addition, for a state employee to encourage professors to punish kids with faith, as part of his strategy to purge faith from society, suggests a totalitarianism that should frighten not only the Christian. It should frighten everyone. What is the next item on Boghossian’s list? What else does he not like about society that makes it less than the perfect society according to his ideas? Seems to me that there was a monster in Europe not that long ago who also thought there were elements in society that made it less than desirable.

The final challenge I wish to point out is the lack of coherence in Boghossian’s philosophy, or noetic structure. His system is self-referentially incoherent and I now wish to list the reasons why this is the case. In the first place, Boghossian promotes the idea of creating skeptics. But his own system displays a level of certainty about things that no skeptic could hold. Boghossian pretends that human reason is neutral, that it is simply there. It is as if there is nothing upon which human reason rests, no ground. But this cannot be the case. Even human reason requires a ground. And that ground cannot be its own self. A thing that rests upon its own self is at once absolute and self-sufficient. Human reason has been wrong far too often and admits to far too many limitations for it to be absolute and self-sufficient. “A complete demonstration of each of our beliefs by means of other independent beliefs cannot be given.” [Bahnsen, Always Ready, 198] In order for Boghossian’s system to work, he must supply a set of standards to which all humanity can appeal as absolute and self-sufficient. But this he cannot do, and he does not attempt to do. Perhaps he realizes how irrational such an attempt might be. Boghossian requires neutrality on the subject of God and faith before he can get his project going. However, neutrality on such matters is impossible. Boghossian has an ax to grind and it emerges at the very inception of his project. In fact, it is the catalyst for his project. Boghossian requires the very thing he denies in order to make his project meaningfully intelligible: a certain standard. He criticizes faith for lacking evidence, but cannot provide any evidence for the very logic he uses to make his criticism. He defines faith incorrectly as pretending to know what you do not know and then proceeds himself to do just that! 

Boghossian pretends to know that faith cannot possibly be accompanied with good reason. But when asked to provide justification for his view on justifiability, he is silent. In order for Boghossian’s system to work, it needs to justify itself apart from the nauseating “that’s just the way it is” non-answer answer we hear so often. If you ever hear someone say, that’s just the way it is, you should know that is not a statement of reason, but rather, a statement of faith. It is not biblical faith mind you, but it is the sort of philosophical or rational definition of faith that is often confused for biblical faith. Boghossian’s view is self-referentially incoherent because he insists that faith has no foundation and that this is good reason to rid it of society when his own system also rests ground that also is without a foundation. By the way, faith is actually grounded in God. “The non-Christian rejects the Christian view out of hand as being contradictory. Then when he is asked to furnish a foundation for the law of contradiction, he can offer nothing but the idea of contingency.” [Van Til, A Survey of Christian Epistemology, 204-5]

A Manual for Creating Atheists: Academic Religious Bigotry

It is in chapter eight that Peter Boghossian’s true colors emerge. The level of intolerance and bigotry are that Boghossian displays is not only puzzling for someone who prides himself on being open and not pretending to know things he does not know, it is frightening. Every person of faith and every reasonable atheist should read this chapter and walk away with great concern. One cannot help but wonder if Boghossian will direct his bullying tactics toward those who are perhaps agnostics next because they don’t quite agree with his epistemology or his criteria for justification of beliefs. Every Christian parent should read this book so that he/she can understand the precise nature of this atheistic war on faith. Boghossian says, “Employing universities in the struggle against faith is a cornerstone in the larger strategy to combat faith, promote reason and rationality, and create skeptics. Many university graduates will become the next generation of leaders and policymakers. We need to train educators not just to teach students how to think critically, but also how to nudge attitudes about faith on their downward spiral.” [Loc. 3205]

Public universities use taxpayers funds in order meet their operating costs. Many, many of those taxpayers are people of faith. I wonder if Boghossian realizes that his approach to the “problem of faith” smacks of totalitarianism. He sounds more like a tyrant than a philosophy professor does. It sounds like Boghossian wants to use public policy to crush faith from the public square. Indeed, some philosophers are more dangerous than others are. It is a good thing this one has such a small platform with such an obviously ridiculous method for presenting his case.

Boghossian says, “This one word, “faith,” is the end to rational discourse.” Yet, for eight chapters now, we have waited for some argument for this conclusion and nothing is offered. Boghossian continues to expect us to take his statements at face value. We have already indicated that Boghossian’s definition of faith is spurious. If his definition of faith is spurious and his entire project hinges on that definition, then the entire project is spurious.

Boghossian encourages educators to give faithbased justifications n countenance. He says they should not be taken seriously. He suggests they should be sent back to the Kid’s Table. I must confess this is an over the top pompous jerk.

Boghossian then launches into some more of his Socratic questioning all the while ignoring the obvious fact that the method is a tool that can be just as useful to the theologian as it is to the philosopher, to the faithful just as much as it is to the atheist. For example, Boghossian asks the question if it is possible that some people misconstrue reality. The Christian thinker will ask, what do you mean by reality? Once that question is asked by the Christian thinker, Boghossian will likely never get to his second question. The Christian thinker will press Boghossian on his answer until he reaches the place where it becomes obvious that Boghossian really cannot provide a rational account of his view of reality without also stumbling over several contradictions.

Here is an example of how I would respond to Boghossian using intervention 1 on Loc. 3531.

PB: Should I talk about how people come to knowledge?

ME: No, you should talk about the various ways that people claim to come to knowledge. This is a critical 

thinking class isn’t it, not PB personal platform for creating atheists.

PB: But in the process should I not help my students understand which way is the right way?

ME: So there is only one right way to come to knowledge?

PB: Well, I think reason is the only way to really come to knowledge.

ME: Do you mean the right way as determined by you or by me, or by a thousand other philosophers out there?

PB: Silence

I will skip a review of chapter nine. When people begin comparing faith to the HIV virus, they do not deserve to be taken seriously. I think such behavior should land Boghossian back in his seat at the kiddies table. I will wrap up this serious of posts over the weekend with a final review of Boghossian book and move on.

A Manual for Creating Atheists: Anti-Anti-Apologetics 101 (Part II)

This post should be much shorter because some of the defenses that Boghossian points to really are insufficient and not ones that I would use or teach others to use.

4. My faith is true for me.

This would be one of those defenses that really does not amount to a defense. My advice to Christians is not to use it. If your faith is true, it is true for everyone, not just you.

5. Science can’t explain quantum mechanics.

Boghossian sees this defense as an attempt to undermine reason. His response may reveal a certain level of discomfort. There is no question but that science nor human reason do not have all the answers and are not omniscient. It is for that fact alone that a wise move would be not to rule out ontological or epistemological possibilities on the basis of imperfect processes for discovering truth. Yet, Boghossian does just that. So much for doxastic openness.

6. You have faith in science.

Boghossian says, “Science is the antithesis of faith.” But that is only true if one accepts Boghossian’s attempt to redefine faith. I have already said from the perspective of Christian theism that his attempt fails. There are a number of testimonies from science that Boghossian accepts on the basis of testimony. We all do. Is it reasonable to conduct our own scientific investigation into the claims of science before we accept them as fact? Does not the scientist have an amazing faith in the uniformity and laws of nature? Is the scientist not confident that the law will remain in force, providing the necessary conditions to carry on with her research? And at the same time, has any science been discovered that provides proof for why the laws of nature are what they are? It is simply beyond the ability of science to account for this uniformity. It results in an infinite regress of tests so that the end is never discovered. Faith is unavoidable, even in science. The same is true for reason. What would reason be without laws of logic? Yet, these laws, immaterial in nature, are affirmed and assumed with the greatest of confidence. No one can account for them. They cannot be accounted for logically or empirically. Faith is unavoidable, even for the rationalist.

7. You have faith your partner loves you.

Regardless of Boghossian’s argument here, believing your partner loves you is always a belief based on faith not evidence. Every act of a partner that we interpret as love could be interpreted as one of manipulation. Our choice to interpret it as love is a choice of faith. There is no evidence for love, really, apart from faith. If you have ever been on the wrong end of betrayal, you know this all too well.

8. My faith is beneficial for me.

Boghossian resorts to the folly of introducing the Taliban into this part of the discussion. What a foolish response! Evidence from over 1,200 studies and 400 reviews has shown an association between faith and a number of positive health benefits, including protection from illness, coping with illness, and faster recovery from it. Of the studies reviewed in the definitive analysis, (3) 81% showed benefit and only 4% harm.

In the popular imagination, religion commonly underlies florid mental illness such as psychosis. In reality though, religiosity has been shown to protect against psychosis, and patients who used religion to cope had better insight and were more compliant with medication.

In four out of 86 studies mental health was worse among the religious, typically where there was harsh, judgmental and authoritarian leadership. (12) But compared to the wealth of evidence above, proven harm has been reported rarely, generally in isolated case reports and studies of atypical religious communities. For instance, there have been outbreaks of rubella among the Amish who refused vaccination, and the refusal of Jehovah's Witnesses to receive blood transfusions is well documented. The very unorthodox Christian Scientists may seek medical help late, due to their belief that sickness is illusory, and this can endanger life. Click here for entire article

Boghossian is clearly going against an insurmountable number of large studies on the question of the relationship between faith and health. If he is successful in his mission, the professional medical studies indicate that rather than helping people, he will actually be causing them great harm. How noble is that? And for what: all because he doesn’t like the idea of God.

9. Life has no meaning without faith.

Boghossian’s answer is to once again rely on his illegitimate definition of faith. But this is no answer at all. It is begging the question. Boghossian points to children, the arts, charity, reading, hobbies and other activities to provide meaning in life, but this is exactly backwards. None of these things have meaning apart from meaning in life. Children do not bring meaning. The meaning that is inherently present makes children meaningful. Meaning has not scientific or rational explanation. It is just there, confronting every one of us. What kind of meaning does a tadpole have? Does a frog have more meaning than its tadpoles? Does sperm have any meaning? Does a child have meaning in the mother’s womb? If so, stop murdering them. What is it then that gives a child meaning upon exciting the mother’s womb? These things do not have meaning because we assign it to them through rational or empirical processes. They have meaning apart from our recognizing it or not. They have meaning because they have their source in God. The very reason we cannot deny meaning in life only makes sense if God is there. Why does your blood boil at the very thought of someone claiming that a newborn baby is no more valuable than a roach? Atheism cannot explain that phenomenon. Science cannot explain it. There is no empirical evidence for meaning. There is no logic that can establish meaning. Meaning exists in the area of faith. Without faith, one cannot possible begin to account for meaning in life. All they can do is what Boghossian did: beg the question and avoid the facts.

10. Why take away faith if it helps get people through the day?

If we all exist for about 70-80 years and then we cease to exist, with no purpose for being here, and life really has no intrinsic meaning, how can any noetic structure be superior to any other? How on earth could it really matter what worldview a person adapted? Why would it make a difference? Unless that worldview were going to subject me to pain and misery somehow, like perhaps many forms Islam, why would I even care?

11. Without faith, society would devolve into morality.

It depends on how one defines morality. To reject faith according to the Christian Scriptures is immoral in and of itself. So the answer from the Christian perspective is yes. The problem for faithless living is that there is no logical reason one can offer for following someone else’s moral code. In fact, morality has no logical way to defend itself. Science is of little help as well. Morality, being immaterial, is entirely beyond the science. When we enter the field of ethics, we enter the field of theology or philosophy. Human reason can only account for morality if God truly exists. Otherwise, humanity has no mechanism by which it can make the human experience of morality intelligible. Morality is most certainly in the realm of faith. It is something we all believe is there, but we cannot offer scientific proof for it nor can logic help us account for its undeniable presence either. I realize there have been attempts to provide a biological explanation for morality. But such an experiment, if proven (which it will not be) would do more to destroy the idea of morality rather than affirm it. For instance, the pedophile could not be held accountable for his actions because it was not his fault but rather biological processes in his brain that made him act the way he did. Poppycock! There seems to be no limit to the absurdity that man is willing to go in his attempts to purge God from society.

A Manual for Creating Atheists: Anti-Anti-Apologetics 101

In this chapter, Boghossian attempts to deal with some arguments in defense of faith. He lists Sam Harris’ categories offered in response to critiques of religion: 1) Religion is true; (2) Religion is useful; (3) Atheism is somehow corrosive of society or other values. He then proceeds to list 11 basic defenses of the faith and responds to each. I will evaluate the defense and his response to the defense as well as provide a defense of my own and show how Boghossian’s position cannot withstand a presuppositional critique of his atheism. I cannot help but think about Goliath, the Philistine, and David, a humble shepherd. I can hear his words now: “For who is this uncircumcised Philistine, that he should taunt the armies of the living God?” Perhaps the Christian attitude toward atheists has grown too soft today. Maybe our response to such arrogance and blasphemy should match the seriousness of the sinful arrogance it reflects in the hearts of godless men. After all, we cannot simply agree to disagree in the case of godless attacks against the Christian faith.

1. Why is there something rather than nothing? You have faith that there was no Creator.”

Boghossian’s response to this defense is exceptionally weak. The disjunction is really quite simple: something or nothing. One could just as easily ask, why this something and not a different something? Boghossian retreats to the extremely unlikely view, given the evidence that the universe may have always existed. You have to love it when atheists speak with such confidence about things that just don’t know. In fact, I have never heard an atheist have such confidence in his level of ignorance. Once again I have to say that since Boghossian admits that he does not know, it is very plausible that someone else does know. You cannot have it both ways. You cannot claim ignorance of an event and then pretend to know that other must have the same ignorance of the same event. Such a view is simply absurd. In short, Boghossian does not know why there is something instead of nothing. And despite his answer, it is clear that he exhibits a high degree of faith in his belief, even to the point of contradicting the views of modern science.

2. You can’t prove there is no God.

Boghossian puts forth a straw man by pretending that those who make this argument are making it in this way: “The basic idea is that because you can’t prove that there’s not a God, then God must exist.” And that is exactly not what this argument is getting at and Boghossian ought to know better. What the argument is saying to the atheist that claims there is no such God is basically that they believe something that evidence nor reason can support, namely, that there is no God. They have faith that God is not there, even though they cannot provide evidence or reason for their view. Do people have reasons for their belief that God is there?

Look around the globe and ask this question: why do so many people think that there is some being(s) that transcend humanity? That so many people believe this does not make it true, but surely it provides some reason for thinking it could be true. Why do many people claim to believe God is there and to have actually encountered God, why should this evidence be summarily dismissed? What is the basis for precluding it as reasonable evidence? Could it be that Boghossian is guilty of the same doxastic closure that he levels against people of faith? My point is simply aimed at what is reasonable. Boghossian uses the illustration of blue men living inside Venus. He should know better. We have no reason to think there are blue men living inside Venus. However, if the greater population of the world actually believed this and there were millions of people claiming to have experienced blue men living inside Venus, could we say with confidence that it is all poppycock? My point is simply that atheists do not hesitate to equivocate on this question. We all know that you cannot prove a universal negative. Why do we think Boghossian was so careful in how he defined atheism? It was not so long ago that atheism was not defined in this way. Why did they change how atheism is defined? The answer is simply that they kept getting clobbered in debate after debate until they realized they could not defend their claims. It stands to reason then that they softened the definition up quite a bit.

Boghossian then boasts that no one has been able to provide an answer to his question concerning the necessary evidence to convince someone that God does not exist. This is likely because the person to whom he was speaking was not an apologist, or was not a theologian, or he was not a philosopher, or he simply had not thought about it along those lines. It is certainly not because there is no good answer which is of course the implication. If Boghossian could prove to me that intelligibility does not exist, then I suppose I might be willing to accept his argument that there is no God. In addition, if Boghossian could demonstrate for me that rationality does not exist, I may accept his hypothesis that there is no God. If anyone has ever responded like this to Boghossian’s challenge, I promise you we would never know about it. If Boghossian could show me how humans do not actually know anything at all, in reality, then I would likely accept Boghossian’s view that there is no God. Or, if Boghossian could prove to me that belief in God is actually irrational, really truly irrational, then I would accept his view that God does not exist. Of course we understand that Boghossian can show how belief in God is irrational according to his presuppositions. What I want him to do is to show that such belief is irrational regardless of what set of basic beliefs one brings to the discussion. I want Boghossian to show that belief in God is irrational regardless of one's presuppositions. Boghossian needs to show us that there is no conceivable way whatever to make belief in God reasonable. After all, that is what he is claiming. If he is claiming that belief in God is unreasonable given his definition of reason, then perhaps he needs to tell us why his definition of reason is superior to all others and how he knows this is the case. This he cannot do and he knows it.

3. I don’t have enough faith to be an atheist

What Boghossian fails to understand in this defense is once again, it is not really talking about faith in the non-existence of God. It is aiming at the faith an atheist has in their particular belief system. Take naturalism for example. The naturalist exhibits great faith in their view that there is nothing outside the physical universe. They claim that all knowledge comes through the senses. But on that basis alone, they should not be able to make any claims about the non-physical, yet they do. The have a belief about the nature of reality that cannot be supported by their own epistemology. This fact does not stop them from believing. They violate their own criteria for knowledge, as does atheism.

Boghossian introduces a concept with which you may or may not be familiar. This is the concept of the divinitatis sensum, or, sense of the divine. Boghossian picks on Alvin Plantinga’s description of this, which is unfortunate. It was John Calvin that first coined its usage and the basis for it is in the Christian Scripture, Romans 1:19, “because that which is known about God is evident within them; for God made it evident to them.” Christian theism argues that the knowledge of God comes from within and without. Christian theism argues that the evidence for God is unambiguous. God confronts every human in every part of the planet. There is no human that has not to one extent or another, never encountered the idea of God. His presence is everywhere. This fact explains why men like Boghossian, Harris, Hitchens, and Dawkins do what they do. They resent the idea of God. The only explanation for why atheists hate the idea of God so much is the Christian Scripture. Otherwise, why would they care, given that they live in a chance universe and are the products of arbitrary movements of a universe that no one can understand, here today, gone tomorrow.

You see, Boghossian continues to ask Christian theism to give up its criteria for justified beliefs in order to accept his own. Or, at a minimum, he seems to want Christian theism to subject its criteria to his criteria at the trial court. This is precisely what Christian theism cannot do. The different between atheism and Christian theism is entirely about our differing criteria, it is about epistemic authority. The Christian theist defaults to Scripture while the atheist defaults to autonomous human reason. Christian theism would cease to be Christian theism if it yielded to Boghossian's request. Perhaps other religions will comply and perhaps those who profess Christianity but whose beliefs are inconsistent or not truly reflective of Christian Scripture will comply. But Christian theism will stand firm and like Leonidas will reply: "This is Christianity!"

I will attempt to post part two tomorrow. I have been on holiday for the last two weeks and this has afforded my some luxury that I typically do not have. Hence, my posts have been more steady than usual.

A Manual for Creating Atheists: After the Fall – Filling the Void

Chapter 6 in MCA purports to be a chapter designed to help the faithful (unfaithful actually) who have come to the self-realization that they really didn’t have faith after all, fill the void left when they confess what has already been the case for some time. In other words, these faithless individuals are trying to figure out how to exchange one delusion for another delusion. They want to replace their old delusion, the one where they thought they had faith with a new delusion, one where they now think they don’t believe that God actually exists. Both of these beliefs, the former and the current, are delusions of different kinds. What is very interesting to me is that Boghossian includes an email from one of these individuals asking for help now that he has decided he does not believe that God exists. In the same paragraph he says the following: “I just stopped believing in God. It’s an unbelievable feeling…I just feel lost. Anything you can suggest will help.” I don’t know about you, but it certainly seems to me that this individual made an emotional decision, not a rational one. After all, if he had really examined the evidence, weighed all the facts, looked at the voluminous research available on the question of God, it seems the last thing he would have felt is “lost.”

Does Boghossian offer this man any answers? Yes, he does. He offers him the answer that we just don’t know. Stop searching for answers, for purpose, for meaning. Accept the ignorance that comes with atheism. Learn to embrace it. The real meaning in life is there is no meaning and if there were, we really could never find it out to begin with. There is no real purpose in life so stop searching for it. Gee Pete; thanks for the help…I think. What a nightmare!  

Boghossian wants us to be free to wonder. What he fails to realize is that skepticism is not a necessary precondition for wonder. Christian theism is filled with wonder because it is filled with the infinite God. Has Boghossian ever thought about why the idea of wonder is so attractive, so inviting, so fascinating? In a world of chance, where human existence is arbitrary, how could wonder ever exist or how could we ever make sense out of it? How could wonder ever be intelligible under the atheist's scheme for reality? We love wonder because we are finite. We know there is more to reality than we can imagine. God created us to wonder. Wonder is wired into the human person by the Creator. God is the only plausible explanation for wonder. God must be true in order for wonder to be meaningfully intelligible. Wonder is not something that can be explained empirically. It is not something that the laws of logic can speak to. But it is there, despite the lack of empirical evidence and despite our inability to make a rationally compelling argument for it. It exists and we know it exists despite our inability to adequately account for it upon empirical or rational grounds. Additionally, we are not being irrational for our "belief" that wonder exists. I cannot help but wonder how Boghossian accounts for the existence and intelligibility of wonder.

Boghossian asks, “What comfort does reality-based reasoning offer someone suffering in this life or perhaps even facing death?” His answer is startling: “I don’t know.” If we are all just accidents, here by chance for a few years and then gone, why does any of this matter, really? When it is all said and done, why not let people live with their delusions? Boghossian says that it harms us. But does it really? What does the medical research say about those who have some sort of faith? There is no indication at all that there is psychological harm to the typical person of faith so long as they are not militants looking for 70 virgins when they get to heaven. In fact, the medical research indicates just the opposite: faith is healthy. It makes a positive contribution to our emotional, psychological, and even physical lives. Boghossian offers a life of reason, but also of despair. He offers a life of doxastic openness but one without significance. He promises a life of truth, but one that has many more questions than it has answers. Sounds like a really good deal to me.

Boghossian seems to be very specific in the types of things he thinks people need to be okay “not knowing.” I wonder how one would fare on one of his exams if they just wrote down, “I don’t know.” What Boghossian does not want people to know is if God exists or does not exist. He does not want them to know if morality transcends human opinion. He does not want them to know that Jesus Christ is the Savior of humanity. But he is perfectly fine with people not knowing what happens when they die. He is fine with people not knowing if life, or suffering or pleasure really has meaning. He is fine with philosophers not being able to explain how they can rely on the validity of induction even if no one can provide any evidence for it or provide a rational case for its adequate defense. Boghossian seems perfectly fine in assuming that the human mind exists, and that there is a real external world about which we can truly know certain things. But when it comes to God, when it comes to faith, when it comes to questions that transcend human limitations, Boghossian insists that we must be okay not knowing.

The howler in all of this is that if there really is that much that Boghossian and his atheist friends do not know, then how is it that he can so confidently dismiss faith, or God, or life beyond death. Since there is much he does not know, how can he confidently affirm that no one else can know either? Isn’t it possible that there is an epistemological method that others have discovered about which Boghossian is still unaware? If it is not possible, I fail to see how a logical case can be made against it. It seems such a case would require an all-knowing agent. What is Boghossian’s rational basis for not only saying he does not know, but for also insisting that no one else can know either, since he has already confessed to so many other things he is fine not knowing? He offers none. If Boghossian were consistent with his “doxastic openness” it seems to me that he would be perfectly fine to say, “I don’t know how that person knows that God exists, but I am fine not knowing that.” Boghossian’s doxastic closure to the possibility that others actually know something that he does not is inconsistent with his basic doctrine at best and smacks of hypocrisy at worse. Boghossian’s entire noetic structure is self-referentially incoherent. I hope that you, the reader, can see the obvious gaps in his arguments at this point. It will only become more and more obvious that MCA does nothing of the sort.

A Manual for Creating Atheists: Socrates Meets Paul

Chapter five of MCA takes the reader through the strategies and stages of how to use the Socratic Method to separate the faithful from their faith. Now, I am a huge proponent of the Socratic Method, even if I am not a huge fan of Socrates. Moreover, I think that every Christian could benefit from reading this chapter because they will learn something about the method as well as how to use it in evangelism and apologetics. In addition, it gives us great insight into minds like Boghossian so that we can better understand how they think.

The Socratic Method is fine as far as it goes but like any other method, it is easily integrated into a person’s system of beliefs, or their noetic structure if you will. This structure is fundamentally and radically different for Christian theism than it is for empiricism, rationalism, or existentialism. As Herman Bavinck writes, 

“The revelation of God in Christ does not seek support or justification from men. It posits and maintains itself in high majesty. Its authority is not only normative but also causative. It fights for its own triumph. It conquers for itself the hearts of men. It makes itself irresistible.”^[1] 

The very point of contention here is that Christian epistemology transcends human reason and experience. It only begs the question for Boghossian to insist on subjecting the faithful to an epistemology they do not regard to begin with. Nevertheless, I think my interaction with this chapter should be fun and entertaining, if not a little stimulating.

As Boghossian moves to “Actual Socratic Interventions” he makes this startling statement: “Sometimes, even after years of treatment, the faith virus is not separated from its host.” [Loc. 1977] I must confess that is virtually impossible for me to take someone with this kind of attitude toward the conversation seriously. What Boghossian has not acknowledged so far in this project is the fact that most people hold beliefs that are true knowledge and yet if challenged would not be able to justify them. And that especially would not be able to justify them with a philosophy professor. Mr. Boghossian provides several examples of what he calls “interventions” in this chapter. They basically amount to a philosophy professor intellectually bullying ordinary every day folks that do not have the time to sit around and think up strategies for tripping people up as he apparently does. While he might find these things self-amusing, I think most fair-minded educators would find it reprehensible.

For his first victim, he picks a young man that has apparently just converted to Christianity. He is new to the Christian faith. So new that he is in no way ready to engage the sort of questions that Boghossian will ask him. Boghossian asks, “How do you know the thing you felt was caused by Jesus?” The trained Christian might reply something like this, “Because Scripture describes this for me in exactly the same way I experienced it. I once hated Christ and loved sin. Now, I love the Lord and hate sin.”

Boghossian’s next question is a straw man because he treats religious truth as if it is entirely experiential. It is not. He basically says that all religions do the very same thing. The Christian might answer: “With all due respect, that is patently false. Only Christianity provides the basis for my experience. There is nothing like the gospel, sin, and redemption in Buddhism, Islam, or Mormonism. In fact, you may think that all religions are fundamentally the same and only superficially different but the truth is they are only superficially the same and fundamentally different. If you spent more time studying Christian theism and less time studying Socrates and philosophy, you might have known this.”

Boghossian’s next question: “So what do you think accounts for the fact that different people have religious experiences that they’re convinced are true?” The Christian might answer: “In Matthew 7 and 24 Jesus warned His disciples about false religions. Then again, Paul warned about false gospels in Galatians 1, and he also warned about false teachers in 2 Corinthians 11. Additionally, Paul informs us about a fascinating phenomenon in 2 Thessalonians 2:11 called in the Greek, a ἐνέργειαν πλάνης (energeian planes). God allows men who do not love the truth of His revelation to fall into delusion.” Note to the Christian: if you are ever approached in this way, you should not look at it as an opportunity to flex your knowledge or to make Christianity look incredibly rational. You may be incredibly intelligent and Christianity certainly is rational. However, your goal is to give as much of the gospel as you can in the exchange even if it appears that your interlocutor isn’t listening. Always remember this clear statement from Paul: “For the word of the cross is foolishness to those who are perishing, but to us who are being saved it is the power of God.” (1 Cor. 1:18) Give them the word. Do not get caught up in philosophical conjectures and speculation. Paul said this about secular philosophy: “See to it that no one takes you captive through philosophy and empty deception, according to the tradition of men, according to the elementary principles of the world, rather than according to Christ.” (Col. 2:8) Secular philosophy is a natural enemy of Christian faith. It is the attempt to discover truth about the world apart from trusting in God’s own self-disclosure. It is an outright refusal to trust in God’s revelation in nature and in Scripture.

Boghossian then asks the faithful to consider that their conversion might not be caused by what they think. The Christian might answer, “That is a good question and one that Christians ask themselves all the time. 1 Jn. 4:1 commands Christians to be critical thinkers, to test every claim against Scripture and so that is how we know that a claim or an experience is either true or false. Tell me something Mr. Boghossian, how do you know that human reason is as reliable as you claim it is?”

The next intervention that Boghossian describes is not reflective of genuine Christian theism at all. Christians do not hold onto their faith because it gives them comfort. According to Christian theism, faith is a gift from God. (Eph. 2:8-10) It is the necessary result of divine regeneration. The role of God in the process of Christian conversion is completely absent in Boghossian’s assessment. It truly is something that he does not and cannot understand. Christians are kept by the power of God because it is God’s good pleasure to keep them. That is how He works in us and through us. (1 Peter 1:5) Nothing can separate the genuine Christian from their faith. (Rom. 8:32-39) If you are an atheist, and you really want to engage genuine Christians, you should read these texts if for no other reason so that you might at least attempt to understand what Christians believe. If you really want a challenge, try talking a true Christian out of their faith.

Boghossian’s tactics are more than a little distasteful. It is the typical atheist rudeness and arrogance that always seems to find its way into these discussions. He compares the comfort of faith with the comfort of slave owners. The Christian might answer, “Are you suggesting there is a relationship between having faith and being a slave owner? Do you think these two behaviors are moral equivalents? Earlier you said there was nothing virtuous about faith or about not having faith. Do you think there is anything virtuous about owning slaves or not owning slaves?” This forces Boghossian to explain why he thinks this is a good analogy. He could have easily picked an analogy that was uncontroversial. He chose this one for a very specific reason. Why did Boghossian make the decision to use this analogy? Here, we turn the tables on the philosopher and subject him to some of his own Socratic medicine.

Boghossian then asks, “Are the beliefs in your faith true?” The Christian would certainly answer without hesitation: “yes, they are most certainly true. Scripture teaches that God created the universe and all that is in it, including humanity. Man rebelled and came under God’s curse. This curse extends to the areas of philosophy that seem to fully occupy your time. Epistemologically, man is doomed to contort the knowledge of God he has, so long as he is unregenerate. Ontologically, man is separated from God, in a most wretched condition and doomed for damnation. Ethically, man is hostile to God, totally depraved and unable of doing anything that commends him to his Creator. But God sent His only Son to redeem man, despite the fact that he is unworthy. Now, faith in God’s Son leads to life, leads to hope, leads to meaning, purpose, and dignity. Through Christ, man be in a right position with God, he can know the truth he desperate seeks, and he is capable now of pleasing the one for whom He was made.” As Christians, we are commanded to give an account for the hope that is in us to all that might ask. Boghossian is asking and we need to answer. However, we do not need to concern ourselves with providing Boghossian an answer with which he will be satisfied. That is not the mandate of Christian apologetics and evangelism. 

Boghossian wants Christians to submit their beliefs to his unregenerate criteria for justification. This is exactly what we cannot do. We cannot accommodate Boghossian and let him continue to pretend to possess true knowledge apart from God. In our answers, we appeal to the epistemic authority of Christian theism: Scripture. We do this repeatedly until it sounds like a broken record. However, sooner or later, it will be Boghossian’s turn to sit in our chair and provide justification for his view of justifiability. And there is where we shall demonstrate that Boghossian’s own beliefs are not internally consistent. In fact, we will move to show that Boghossian’s claims are self-referentially incoherent. His basic presuppositions do not comport with his noetic structure.

Just a quick comment about Boghossians questions concerning Jesus and His death. The line of questioning is incredibly silly. Boghossian asks if Jesus was clever. The Christian might respond: “Jesus was fully God and fully man. Being fully God, He was omniscient. But as a man, he was the wisest this earth has seen.” Boghossian then asks if I would consider Him a greater man for having made that sacrifice (death). The Christian might answer: “no.” “God’s works are amazing because they are the works of God. Nothing God does can increase His greatness. God is infinitely great.” Next question. Boghossian then implies that Jesus had to be clever to pull off the sacrifice. Could Jesus have not made the sacrifice? The Christian would answer: “no.” “The death of Christ was decreed in eternity past, in every single detail and God providentially works His decrees with utmost efficacy. There is no contingency in the divine decree. Therefore, there was no possibility that Christ would not carry out His work on the cross.”

At the end of the day, the Socratic Method is a tool of a tool. It is a tool of reason, which is also a tool. Reason is the tool of the human intellect. It is not independent of human predication. The disposition of a person’s intellect will determine how they use the tool of reason. This fact explains the volume of disagreement among the various schools of philosophy. On the one hand, secular philosophy denies design while on the other hand seeking to unify the particular with the general. The philosophy of the metaphysics of chance is entirely powerless to produce unity in reality. The problem disagreement between Christian theism and godless atheism is that we have two different epistemic courts of appeal. The final authority for Christian theism is God speaking in Scripture while the final authority for philosophers like Peter Boghossian is their own autonomous reasoning. The Christian appeal is to an authority that they believe transcends all of humanity and creation, while Boghossian and his atheist friends appeal to a product of their own invention. This explains why they have such difficulties like, for instance, making the meaning in life, well, sound meaningful. That is just one of a long list of difficulties the atheist worldview has trouble explaining.

Going back to 1 Cor. 1:18 where Paul informs the Christian that the gospel is considered foolish by the philosopher, by the debater, by the lawyer, by the wise and mighty for the most part, we should be used to men like Boghossian. Scripture told us long before they did that they would consider the Christian message moronic. And so they do. Boghossian is one very small proof for the credibility of Scripture. Scripture says men like him will consider the message of Christ moronic. How many pages have been filled with men like Dawkins, Harris, Hitchens, and Boghossian attempting to convince us that Christianity is moronic? New Flash Dr. Boghossian: you are one example for why we should believe the Scripture.

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^[1] Cornelius Van Til, A Christian Theory of Knowledge. (The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company: Phillipsburg, NJ, 1969).

A Manual for Creating Atheists: Interventions & Strategies (Pt. II)

I left off my review of MCA with Boghossian setting the strategy for separating people from their faith by attempting to undermine their confidence in how they claim to know what they know as opposed to what a person believes exists. I should say that Boghossian’s strategy may work just fine on people who really don’t have the kind of faith that exists in Christian theism, but it will not be effective with genuine believers. I will explain why this is so in a later post.

I now want to spend some time interacting with Boghossian’s assertion that “There’s nothing virtuous about pretending to know things you don’t know or in lending one’s belief to a particular proposition.” In other words, the faithful believe it is impossible to separate faith and morality. Boghossian is attempting to establish the idea that faith is morally neutral. There is essentially nothing right or good about having faith. But Boghossian adds, “or in lending one’s belief to a particular proposition.” [Loc.1388] He continues, “The belief that faith is a virtue and that one should have faith are primary impediments to disabusing people of their faith.” And yet, the belief that faith is a virtue, as well as a gift from God, is a primary element in Christian theism. Boghossian is now striking at one of the heartbeat issues of Christian faith. Saying faith isn’t a virtue doesn’t make it so.

Boghossian claims that by redefining faith and by pointing out that people without faith are just as moral as people with faith he can effectively prove there is nothing virtuous about faith. Boghossian points to the atheist Pat Tillman and to Bill Gates as examples of virtuous men without faith. However, giving your life in battle and donating money to good causes does not make one moral or virtuous. Immoral people are capable of doing good deeds just as moral people are capable of doing immoral things. Christian theism teaches that we are all equally sinners in need of a Savior. In truth, if there is nothing virtuous about believing propositions, then there is nothing virtuous about one being willing to revise their beliefs either. I wonder if Boghossian thinks there is anything good about creating Street Epistemologists to go out and talk people out of their faith. Why is this project such a significant passion for him? What is so virtuous about getting at truth? Should people be attempting to know the truth about reality? If there is nothing virtuous about discovering truth, then why does he make all this fuss? Why not just go about your business and leave off this virtue-less initiative?

Boghossian then discusses a tactic that he employs when he has little time to engage the faithful. He refers to these tactics as two powerful dialectical shortcuts. First he asks, “How could your belief [in x] be wrong?” The second question he asks is, “How would you differentiate your belief from a delusion?” Not for nothing, but I love the Socratic Method. I love critical thinking. The only problem with it is that what works for the atheist also works for the Christian. What every Christian thinker has to remember is that he cannot allow the atheist to establish what counts as evidence or as good reasons for belief. The Christian standard and criteria for belief are fundamentally different from those the atheist uses. That being the case, the answer to Boghossian’s questions is simply this: God would have to not exist in order for me to be wrong. The answer to the second question is that my belief is anchored in the unchanging truth of God’s word. I realize this will not satisfy Boghossian’s standards. But satisfying Boghossian’s standards is not our goal. Our goal is giving an account for the hope that is in us to anyone that asks.

There are a number of problems with Boghossian’s attempts to create a morally neutral idea of faith. Not the least of which is his definition of faith as “pretending to know something you do not know.” He assumes that Christian theists will simply let him get away with this definition. I assure you, we will not. The Christian will always insist on the biblical definition of faith. They most certainly will not permit an atheist to redefine it for them. To think otherwise is simply absurd. Since Boghossian’s redefinition of faith will not hold, his attempt to decouple faith from morality is significantly weakened. The second problem is Boghossian’s reasoning that faith has nothing to do with morality. This argument is patently false and it involves fatally fallacious reasoning. The argument looks like this: Some atheists do moral good. No atheists have faith. Therefore, there is nothing virtuous about faith. As anyone can see, the conclusion does not follow from the premises. From the premises above, all we can conclude is that it is possible to go good deeds even if one has no religious faith. I cannot think of any Christian apologist that would disagree with this statement.

I want you to take a different view of Boghossian’s argument. Many Christians do moral good. Many Christians are irrational. Therefore, there is nothing virtuous about rational thinking. Again, the conclusion does not follow from the premises. What Boghossian needs to do is understand the relationship between faith and morality in the Christian worldview. It is evident to this writer that he has not done his homework in this respect. If you are an atheist and you are reading this post, you need to understand that Christianity is a very small religion with very few adherents. Depending on where you live, you may never have encountered an actual Christian. What you have very likely encountered is cultural Christians, or social Christians. These are people who adhere outwardly to some of the teachings of Christianity some of the time. They profess to have faith, but the reality of the case is that they do not. Boghossian’s project is not aimed at biblical Christianity. If it is, I can tell you he misses his mark by a wide margin. Boghossian seems to be aiming at a generic faith, religion in general. You need to understand that true Christians reject the idea of a generic faith. They even reject the notion of theism in general. What Boghossian needs to do is interact with the Christian Scripture if he wants to attack real faith. And this, so far, he has not done.

In order to prove that faith has no virtue, Boghossian needs to understand the Bible’s teaching on the relationship between faith and morality. He needs to know that Christian theism teaches that a lifestyle defined by immorality is a strong indication that a person does not have faith. Conversely, Christian theism teaches that a radical change, to include morality, is the unavoidable consequence of genuine faith. In other words, true faith equals a changed heart and mind. True faith causes a woman to stop lying to her husband, causes a husband to stop cheating on his wife, and causes an unmarried couple to stop sexual activity outside of marriage, just to call out some examples. The kind of faith that Scripture speaks about, true faith, always produces virtuous living wherever it is found. Therefore, there is something virtuous about faith, about trusting in the God who is there.

I am afraid at this point in Boghossian’s project, that the atheist is getting a straw man version of Christianity. Essentially, if you are able to talk someone out of their faith, true Christianity would hold that you have talked them out of something they never really had from the start. Essentially, you are accomplishing nothing, separating men from a shallow mental acceptance of God and not from faith at all.

A Manual for Creating Atheists: Interventions & Strategies (Pt. I)

As we move to chapter four of Boghossian’s project, I think I need to point out to our atheist readers, one very important point that Boghossian has continued to ignore and that you might also think is a flaw in my rebuttal. Christian theism and atheist do not share the same criterion for justification or warrant. So when you read Boghossian’s talk about evidence and warrant, you must understand that I reject Boghossian’s notion that Christian theism must present itself in such a way as to meet his epistemological demands. That is part of our disagreement, and I might add, a critical component that he seems to be happy to ignore. You should know that if you are an atheist who feels as Boghossian does and you take up his charge, when you encounter Christians that refuse to budge in the conversation that it is not due to brain damage, but rather to the fact their criterion for knowledge is radically different from and intensely opposed to yours.

The main thrust of chapter four concerns methods for “deprogramming” the faithful from their religious delusions. Boghossian compares this process to that of a drug intervention. Once again, this tactic produces in the unsuspecting atheist, a false sense of superiority over the faithful. I am always on the lookout for Boghossian’s street epistemologist. The last scientist I encountered was on the verge of rejecting logic so that she could hand on to her empiricism. Atheist, beware, if you are speaking to intelligent and genuine believers who have actually bothered with these subjects, you will be overmatched. However, I encourage you to take up the cause and speak with as many Christians as you can. I will provide a hypothetical interaction with Boghossian at the end of this series so that you can see how a Christian theist should respond to his straw man paradigm.

Boghossian makes a very revealing comment in chapter four: “If you are reading this book you probably already possess attitudes that predispose you to rationality, like a trustfulness of reason.” I said in an earlier post that Boghossian has some faith of his own that he has not discussed in his project. It is here that we are now beginning to see his faith in the power of human reason. We will eventually ask Boghossian to justify his belief in the adequacy of human reason to deal with questions related to the existence of God and any other inquiry into the nature of reality, as far as that goes. We are interested in knowing from Boghossian why he thinks reason is possible in the kind of world he believes exists.

Boghossian instructs the SE to be willing to say to the Christian, “I don’t know.” The SE is informed that they should not worry about that. Well, if the SE approaches the right Christian, they will have the opportunity to say that quite a lot. Moreover, they should be ready to hear answers with which they disagree and reasoning that is fundamentally different from their own. For example, when the Christian says I believe the Bible is God’s word because it claims to be God’s word and on that basis alone I believe it. That kind of reasoning sounds odd to the atheist. But you must think of it from the Christian’s basic belief. If God exists, and He in fact created all that is, and He in fact has spoken to us in the Bible, then it is only reasonable that we take God’s witness of Himself as true. If we attempted to point to something other than God’s own word to show that God’s word is true, we would be saying there is a greater witness to God than God Himself. And if that were actually true, Christianity would be falsified. Now, if you can’t follow that argument, you have more work to do in terms of how you reason. And if you can follow that argument, then you know that breaking through that epistemology is going to take a little more than a small book on creating atheists.

Boghossian says, “Every religious apologist is epistemically debilitated by an extreme form of confirmation bias.” [Loc. 1263] He uses Gary Habermas as an example. Now, here is a critical question from critical thinker: does Dr. Boghossian expect us to believe that he has no bias concerning the claims of the Bible? Has he really found that state of pure objectivity? Boghossian criticizes Habermas for concluding the most outrageous of all claims, specifically, that Jesus indeed rose from the dead. Boghossian has a list of more plausible explanations that Habermas should first believe if he were really objective. But is this a display of pure objectivity? Does not Boghossian bring his own philosophical bias to the discussion? The Romans and Jews wanted to crush Christianity. Could they not have simply hung the rotting corpse of Jesus out for all to see? Or, is it really plausible to believe that the disciples of Jesus stole the corpse and then one by one, were tortured to death for something they knew was a lie? Once we remove Boghossian’s anti-supernatural bias from the equation, the only rational explanation for the empty tomb is that Jesus rose from the dead. Here we have a perfect example of a man engaging in extreme bias while he is in the process of criticizing someone else for being biased. Habermas is only unreasonable because he rejects Boghossian’s basic presuppositions about the possibility of miracles. I think Boghossian calls this doxastic closure.

Boghossian talks about evidence, but then he dismisses the documents of the New Testament out of hand. It is as if they do not exist. You see, what qualifies as evidence is not just an insignificant question. It is at the heartbeat of Boghossian’s project. It is a project that in my opinion is becoming more insubstantial the more we learn about it. Boghossian finally begins to discuss justification. He talks about two primary schools regarding justification for belief (coherentism and foundationalism) and lands on foundationalism.

I agree that a belief structure must rest upon a foundation. In that sense, I am a foundationalist. However, I think Boghossian is wrong when he says that faith is the foundation. It is certainly wrong when it comes to Christian theism. The foundation of Christian theism is Christ Himself. The question is this: can genuine faith in Christ be destroyed by anything, to include naturalistic rationalism? Scripture teaches that it cannot.

Boghossian sees God as the conclusion of a faulty reasoning process. The problem as he sees it is faith. But not all Christian apologist take this approach. In fact, there are many with a high view of Scripture that see God, not as the conclusion of reasoning, but as the necessary precondition for reasoning from the start. In other words, some apologists ask the question, “what else has to be true in order for reason to exist?” The answer is that God is the necessary precondition for both reason and faith. Attempting to destroy either one will do nothing to impede God. If God does not exist, then intelligible experience does not exist (since God is the necessary precondition for intelligible experience). However, intelligible experience does exist. It is not the case that God does not exist. Boghossian seems to be interacting only with those who either, have a false faith or a very thin argument for why they believe.

Boghossian is clearly a foundationalist. Repeatedly he talks about evidence, warrant, and justification. He indicts faith for apparently contributing to the formation of beliefs without the proper justification. While the Christian views Scripture as their epistemic authority, Boghossian contends that human reason is his epistemic authority. Since Boghossian and I are both foundationlists, so to speak, the question remains, why is he a strident atheist while I am a Christian theist? We both believe that a belief structure must have a foundation or an anchor if you will. We both believe in the value of human reason. Our only difference seems to be on the question of faith. The answer to this mystery is not located in our epistemological differences. The answer is ethical. I will address the real reasons for faith in my final review of Boghossian's project.

What Boghossian is actually talking about when he talks about a foundation is a noetic structure. “A person’s noetic structure is the set of propositions he believes, together with certain epistemic relations that hold among him and these propositions.” [Plantinga, Faith and Rationality, 48] Now, the foundation of a noetic structure must rest upon something other than the structure. Beliefs about the validity of reason or the laws of logic cannot rest upon the laws of logic. Humans form beliefs on the basis of other, more basic beliefs until we get to our foundational beliefs. These foundational beliefs are beliefs that are self-evident. We do not believe them because of other beliefs. They are self-justifying. They require no evidence or warrant. They are by definition, properly basic beliefs. This is so far, so good where the Christian theist is concerned. But if I were an atheist, I would be getting quite nervous at this point.

A properly basic belief “must be capable of functioning foundationally, capable of bearing its share of the weight of the whole noetic structure.” [Ibid. 55] What then is Boghossian’s view of a properly basic belief. Typically it is just this: a belief is properly basic if it is a) self-evident, or b) incorrigible, or c) evident to the senses. Now, here is the elephant in the room when it comes to foundationalism: foundationalism itself is self-referentially incoherent. In other words, foundationalism is not self-evident, or incorrigible, or obvious to the senses. Foundationalism that rests upon a non-transcendental foundation then collapses upon itself. If the base is this weak, one has to wonder just how weak the rest of the structure could be. The nature of Christian truth is unlike that of logic or mathematics. Boghossian repeatedly fails to represent Christianity as resting on its own foundation. He reasons that faith must rest upon reason when the truth is that in Christian theology, reason rests upon faith. Christian epistemology is not empirical nor rationalistic in nature. On the contrary, a distinctly Christian epistemology it is revelational in nature. “All knowledge of God rests on revelation. Though we can never know God in the full richness of his being, he is known to all people through his revelation in creation, theater of his glory.” [Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, Vol. 2, 53]

Boghossian’s failure to understand the nature of Christian knowledge of God leads to multifarious errors in his criticism and regrettably for his lofty project. Christians do not come to know God on the basis of argumentation and evidence. The starting point for the Christian is Scripture. Our faith rests in the authority and reliability while Boghossian’s faith rests in his own ability to create a noetic structure that can sustain itself without becoming self-referentially incoherent. The type of belief we are talking about when we talk about belief in God is like belief in the self, other minds, and the external world. In none of these areas do we typically have proof or arguments, or need proof or arguments. [Plantinga, Faith and Rationality, 65]

I must apologize for having to review chapter four in two parts. It is by far the longest chapter thus far.

A Manual for Creating Atheists: A Reliable Epistemology

Chapter three of “A Manual for Creating Atheists” is truly a very difficult chapter for intelligent people of faith to read. This is not because it offers some profound intellectual challenge to faith. Rather, it is because  Boghossian waxes extremely insulting in the chapter. However, the Christian must resist the temptation to be drawn into Boghossian's unkind ad hominem. Instead, we must critically examine the truthfulness of his propositions, all the while pointing out his philosophical bias, his wild conjectures, and his unproven philosophical assumptions.

Boghossian begins this chapter by setting a priori knowledge and analytic statements over against synthetic statements and a posteriori knowledge. This is an old argument between rationalists and empiricists and one that will likely never be settled. Specifically, he attacks certainty. He writes, “Certainty is an enemy of truth: examination and reexamination are allies of truth.” One cannot help but wonder how knowledge advances or progresses if it has no foundation upon which to advance. I shall return to this criticism later in the post.

Boghossian asserts that, “Faith taints or at worse removes our curiosity about the world.” Seemingly, faith leads to certainty about facts of the world and such certainty allays curiosity. Boghossian thinks, “Faith immutably alters the starting conditions for inquiry by uprooting a hunger to know and sowing a warrantless confidence.” The author of this project speaks with the strangest level of confidence for a man that thinks such confidence is the enemy of knowledge and truth. It is odd to read someone criticize the idea of certainty with such a high degree of, well, certainty.

Boghossian then makes this very puzzling statement, “Once we understand that we don’t possess knowledge, we have a basis to go forward in a life of examination, wonder, and critical reflection.” This statement would be humorous if it wasn’t so disturbing. The critical thinker has to wonder what the basis of our examination and critical thinking might be if we are all ignorant of it. How can one know that we have any basis at all for the pursuit of knowledge? How can one understand that they are knowledge-less? To understand implies a degree of knowledge. And to have adequate understanding to know that exploration is needed and desirable seems like a healthy degree of knowledge. Apparently Boghossian hasn’t the foggiest notion that knowledge depends upon knowledge, and so too does the very notion of examination, wonder, and critical reflection. The necessary precondition for knowledge is knowledge. I must confess that I find Boghossian’s line of reasoning here utterly absurd. At a minimum, knowing that one does not know is knowing. What then is the basis for that knowledge? Boghossian will eventually be forced to disclose his own foundation of beliefs and it is there that we shall find his faith.

From here, the author makes an ethical statement, which is also quite puzzling given his epistemological proclivity: “Wonder, curiosity, honest self-reflection, sincerity, and the desire to know are a solid basis for a life worth living.” I cannot help but ask how Boghossian knows that there is such a thing as “a life worth living.” What does “a life worth living actually look like?” Additionally, is there only one “life worth living” or are there more? Furthermore, what justification can he provide for such a sweeping and universal claim? I wonder if there isn’t an element of faith somewhere in Boghossian’s own worldview. Indeed, if it can be shown that such is the case, the implications for Boghossian’s project could turn out to more than just a little hysterical. After all, his entire thesis, the unreliability of faith as an epistemological method, would rest upon the very thing he so desperately wants to avoid: faith.

The goal of the Street Epistemologist is to “help people destroy foundational beliefs, flimsy assumptions, faulty epistemologies, and ultimately faith.” We cannot tell if Boghossian is speaking of the notion of foundationalism or if he means specific beliefs. As far as it goes, everyone enters this discussion with foundational beliefs. They are impossible to destroy. They can only be replaced with competing foundational beliefs. In addition, I intend to show that every epistemological position is, at bottom, a faith position. The only different is the object in which the faith is placed.

As we move through this particularly offensive, closed-minded, and arrogant chapter, the author once against makes one more outlandish statement about faith: “After all, faith is by definition the belief in something regardless or even in spite of the evidence.” The idea is that Christian faith has absolutely no evidence to offer and in fact, it exists in spite of the evidence against it. Boghossian then points to the Gervais & Norenzyan 2012 study that supposedly concludes that analytic thinking promotes religious disbelief. What Boghossian does not tell us is that most of the subjects in that study came from a liberal Canadian university, hence, highly underrepresenting the typical North American population. Suffice it to say that the study to which Boghossian refers is a real howler.

Boghossian spends a lot of time on what he calls “Doxastic Closure.” This is what happens when a person holds to a belief that is resistant to revision, supposedly regardless of the evidence. Boghossian says, “This puts people in a type of bubble that filters out ideologically disagreeable data and opinions.” I wonder if “doxastic closure” is the same thing as dismissing the reliability of faith as an epistemology from the start, because it does not meet one’s ideas of their criteria for justification.

Boghossian tell us that doxastic openness is a willingness and ability to revise beliefs. One has to wonder what sort of evidence Boghossian would need in order to justify a belief. Suppose someone asks him to be open to changing his criteria for justification, how do we think he might respond? Boghossian’s view of his ability to be purely objective about these matters seems more than a little naive.

I could continue my review of chapter three, but I will stop with one more Boghossian assertion that is nothing short of outrageous. He writes, “This section will unpack two primary reasons for this appearance of failure: either (1) an interlocutor’s brain is neurologically damaged, or (2) you’re actually succeeding.” He continues, “In Short, if someone is suffering from a brain-based faith delusion your work will be futile.” If Boghossian means for people to take his project serious, then he should leave aside such insulting conjectures and ad hominem and explain to his atheist colleagues that it could be due to the fact that their arguments rest upon a hopeless irrationalism, are not supported by the evidence, and most of all, contradict the truth of God revealed in Scripture, which is actually why intelligent Christians reject them. One has to do more than link together a bunch of ad hominem statements if they hope to persuade others of the validity concerning their point of view.  

The Christian response to Boghossian then is to ask him to justify the certainty with which he condemns certainty. Boghossian claims that certainty is an enemy of the truth and about this he seems to be quite certain. Boghossian’s whole enterprise seems to be that faith aims for certainty. His argument goes something like this: examination and reexamination are allies of truth. Certainty endangers examination. Without examination truth is endangered. Faith produces certainty. Therefore, faith endangers truth. But one has to ask why truth ceases to be truth once we become certain of it. I am certain that 2+2 = 4. I do not need to examine the equation again. I do not need to reexamine the equation again. I am certain it is true. Boghossian tells us that truth is threatened by certainty, but he fails to illustrate for us just why he thinks this is the case.

Boghossian’s claim that faith removes our curiosity about the world is manifestly misleading. The fact that Christian theism asserts that there are some things, about which we can be certain, does nothing to quell intellectual adventure or curiosity about the many things we do not and even cannot be certain about. It does not follow that certainty about the existence of God leads to certainty about all of reality. The fact of God’s existence does nothing to eliminate mystery, adventure, or curiosity of all of the facts of God’s universe and of the revelation of Himself both in nature and in Scripture. Apparently Boghossian is unfamiliar with the voluminous materials and documents produced by theologians over the centuries, all designed to inform, to question, to wonder, and to search for the truth.

Boghossian implies that he believes there is a life worth living. This implies that life has value, worth, and meaning. It also implies that not just any life has value, worth, and meaning, but rather, a specific kind of life. Moreover, without saying so, it implies that there is at least one kind of life that is not worth living. Now, apparently, the life worth living is a life filled with wonder, curiosity, honest self-reflection, sincerity, and the desire to know. But why isn’t a life filled with certainty, apathy, insensitive selfishness, insincerity, and epistemological disinterest? In addition, why isn’t the life that mixes these traits worth living? Are there more than one lives worth living? Why this life and not that life? Boghossian opens Pandora’s Box and closing it is not a task I would desire.

Over and over again Boghossian claims that faith is based on a lack of evidence. Or he tells us that faith is unreliable and unreasonable all because of its apparent lack of evidence. What Boghossian has not done so far is tell us what type of evidence he means. One man is convicted for murder because there were two credible eyewitnesses that saw him do it. Another man is convicted of murder because of the forensic evidence gathered at the scene and his inability to provide a legitimate alibi. What exactly constitutes evidence? This is the problem of the criterion. If Boghossian is going to assert that faith is not rational, then the burden of proof is on him. And such proof must begin with what he means when he uses such terms as evidence, reasonable, justification, warrant, and rational. We know that self-evident propositions exist. They do not require evidence to be rational. We do not require justification in order to believe them. And we know that other propositions are not self-evident. Boghossian needs to explain to us sooner rather than later, precisely what is the nature of these propositions that require warrant and exactly what that warrant must look like in order to be rational.

The problem so far with Boghossian’s epistemology is that it is guilty of epistemic circularity. Epistemic circularity is a malady from which an argument for the reliability of a faculty or source of belief suffers when one of its premises is such that my acceptance of that premise originates in the operation of the very faculty or source of belief in question. [Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, 119] When Boghossian asks us to accept his standard for what is rational in order to determine what is rationally justifiable, he is asking us to accept what is essentially an epistemologically circular argument. Epistemic circularity is only curable in Christian theism where the source of all knowledge is transcendent. On to chapter four.