A Manual for Creating Atheists: Interventions & Strategies (Pt. II)

I left off my review of MCA with Boghossian setting the strategy for separating people from their faith by attempting to undermine their confidence in how they claim to know what they know as opposed to what a person believes exists. I should say that Boghossian’s strategy may work just fine on people who really don’t have the kind of faith that exists in Christian theism, but it will not be effective with genuine believers. I will explain why this is so in a later post.

I now want to spend some time interacting with Boghossian’s assertion that “There’s nothing virtuous about pretending to know things you don’t know or in lending one’s belief to a particular proposition.” In other words, the faithful believe it is impossible to separate faith and morality. Boghossian is attempting to establish the idea that faith is morally neutral. There is essentially nothing right or good about having faith. But Boghossian adds, “or in lending one’s belief to a particular proposition.” [Loc.1388] He continues, “The belief that faith is a virtue and that one should have faith are primary impediments to disabusing people of their faith.” And yet, the belief that faith is a virtue, as well as a gift from God, is a primary element in Christian theism. Boghossian is now striking at one of the heartbeat issues of Christian faith. Saying faith isn’t a virtue doesn’t make it so.

Boghossian claims that by redefining faith and by pointing out that people without faith are just as moral as people with faith he can effectively prove there is nothing virtuous about faith. Boghossian points to the atheist Pat Tillman and to Bill Gates as examples of virtuous men without faith. However, giving your life in battle and donating money to good causes does not make one moral or virtuous. Immoral people are capable of doing good deeds just as moral people are capable of doing immoral things. Christian theism teaches that we are all equally sinners in need of a Savior. In truth, if there is nothing virtuous about believing propositions, then there is nothing virtuous about one being willing to revise their beliefs either. I wonder if Boghossian thinks there is anything good about creating Street Epistemologists to go out and talk people out of their faith. Why is this project such a significant passion for him? What is so virtuous about getting at truth? Should people be attempting to know the truth about reality? If there is nothing virtuous about discovering truth, then why does he make all this fuss? Why not just go about your business and leave off this virtue-less initiative?

Boghossian then discusses a tactic that he employs when he has little time to engage the faithful. He refers to these tactics as two powerful dialectical shortcuts. First he asks, “How could your belief [in x] be wrong?” The second question he asks is, “How would you differentiate your belief from a delusion?” Not for nothing, but I love the Socratic Method. I love critical thinking. The only problem with it is that what works for the atheist also works for the Christian. What every Christian thinker has to remember is that he cannot allow the atheist to establish what counts as evidence or as good reasons for belief. The Christian standard and criteria for belief are fundamentally different from those the atheist uses. That being the case, the answer to Boghossian’s questions is simply this: God would have to not exist in order for me to be wrong. The answer to the second question is that my belief is anchored in the unchanging truth of God’s word. I realize this will not satisfy Boghossian’s standards. But satisfying Boghossian’s standards is not our goal. Our goal is giving an account for the hope that is in us to anyone that asks.

There are a number of problems with Boghossian’s attempts to create a morally neutral idea of faith. Not the least of which is his definition of faith as “pretending to know something you do not know.” He assumes that Christian theists will simply let him get away with this definition. I assure you, we will not. The Christian will always insist on the biblical definition of faith. They most certainly will not permit an atheist to redefine it for them. To think otherwise is simply absurd. Since Boghossian’s redefinition of faith will not hold, his attempt to decouple faith from morality is significantly weakened. The second problem is Boghossian’s reasoning that faith has nothing to do with morality. This argument is patently false and it involves fatally fallacious reasoning. The argument looks like this: Some atheists do moral good. No atheists have faith. Therefore, there is nothing virtuous about faith. As anyone can see, the conclusion does not follow from the premises. From the premises above, all we can conclude is that it is possible to go good deeds even if one has no religious faith. I cannot think of any Christian apologist that would disagree with this statement.

I want you to take a different view of Boghossian’s argument. Many Christians do moral good. Many Christians are irrational. Therefore, there is nothing virtuous about rational thinking. Again, the conclusion does not follow from the premises. What Boghossian needs to do is understand the relationship between faith and morality in the Christian worldview. It is evident to this writer that he has not done his homework in this respect. If you are an atheist and you are reading this post, you need to understand that Christianity is a very small religion with very few adherents. Depending on where you live, you may never have encountered an actual Christian. What you have very likely encountered is cultural Christians, or social Christians. These are people who adhere outwardly to some of the teachings of Christianity some of the time. They profess to have faith, but the reality of the case is that they do not. Boghossian’s project is not aimed at biblical Christianity. If it is, I can tell you he misses his mark by a wide margin. Boghossian seems to be aiming at a generic faith, religion in general. You need to understand that true Christians reject the idea of a generic faith. They even reject the notion of theism in general. What Boghossian needs to do is interact with the Christian Scripture if he wants to attack real faith. And this, so far, he has not done.

In order to prove that faith has no virtue, Boghossian needs to understand the Bible’s teaching on the relationship between faith and morality. He needs to know that Christian theism teaches that a lifestyle defined by immorality is a strong indication that a person does not have faith. Conversely, Christian theism teaches that a radical change, to include morality, is the unavoidable consequence of genuine faith. In other words, true faith equals a changed heart and mind. True faith causes a woman to stop lying to her husband, causes a husband to stop cheating on his wife, and causes an unmarried couple to stop sexual activity outside of marriage, just to call out some examples. The kind of faith that Scripture speaks about, true faith, always produces virtuous living wherever it is found. Therefore, there is something virtuous about faith, about trusting in the God who is there.

I am afraid at this point in Boghossian’s project, that the atheist is getting a straw man version of Christianity. Essentially, if you are able to talk someone out of their faith, true Christianity would hold that you have talked them out of something they never really had from the start. Essentially, you are accomplishing nothing, separating men from a shallow mental acceptance of God and not from faith at all.

A Manual for Creating Atheists: Interventions & Strategies (Pt. I)

As we move to chapter four of Boghossian’s project, I think I need to point out to our atheist readers, one very important point that Boghossian has continued to ignore and that you might also think is a flaw in my rebuttal. Christian theism and atheist do not share the same criterion for justification or warrant. So when you read Boghossian’s talk about evidence and warrant, you must understand that I reject Boghossian’s notion that Christian theism must present itself in such a way as to meet his epistemological demands. That is part of our disagreement, and I might add, a critical component that he seems to be happy to ignore. You should know that if you are an atheist who feels as Boghossian does and you take up his charge, when you encounter Christians that refuse to budge in the conversation that it is not due to brain damage, but rather to the fact their criterion for knowledge is radically different from and intensely opposed to yours.

The main thrust of chapter four concerns methods for “deprogramming” the faithful from their religious delusions. Boghossian compares this process to that of a drug intervention. Once again, this tactic produces in the unsuspecting atheist, a false sense of superiority over the faithful. I am always on the lookout for Boghossian’s street epistemologist. The last scientist I encountered was on the verge of rejecting logic so that she could hand on to her empiricism. Atheist, beware, if you are speaking to intelligent and genuine believers who have actually bothered with these subjects, you will be overmatched. However, I encourage you to take up the cause and speak with as many Christians as you can. I will provide a hypothetical interaction with Boghossian at the end of this series so that you can see how a Christian theist should respond to his straw man paradigm.

Boghossian makes a very revealing comment in chapter four: “If you are reading this book you probably already possess attitudes that predispose you to rationality, like a trustfulness of reason.” I said in an earlier post that Boghossian has some faith of his own that he has not discussed in his project. It is here that we are now beginning to see his faith in the power of human reason. We will eventually ask Boghossian to justify his belief in the adequacy of human reason to deal with questions related to the existence of God and any other inquiry into the nature of reality, as far as that goes. We are interested in knowing from Boghossian why he thinks reason is possible in the kind of world he believes exists.

Boghossian instructs the SE to be willing to say to the Christian, “I don’t know.” The SE is informed that they should not worry about that. Well, if the SE approaches the right Christian, they will have the opportunity to say that quite a lot. Moreover, they should be ready to hear answers with which they disagree and reasoning that is fundamentally different from their own. For example, when the Christian says I believe the Bible is God’s word because it claims to be God’s word and on that basis alone I believe it. That kind of reasoning sounds odd to the atheist. But you must think of it from the Christian’s basic belief. If God exists, and He in fact created all that is, and He in fact has spoken to us in the Bible, then it is only reasonable that we take God’s witness of Himself as true. If we attempted to point to something other than God’s own word to show that God’s word is true, we would be saying there is a greater witness to God than God Himself. And if that were actually true, Christianity would be falsified. Now, if you can’t follow that argument, you have more work to do in terms of how you reason. And if you can follow that argument, then you know that breaking through that epistemology is going to take a little more than a small book on creating atheists.

Boghossian says, “Every religious apologist is epistemically debilitated by an extreme form of confirmation bias.” [Loc. 1263] He uses Gary Habermas as an example. Now, here is a critical question from critical thinker: does Dr. Boghossian expect us to believe that he has no bias concerning the claims of the Bible? Has he really found that state of pure objectivity? Boghossian criticizes Habermas for concluding the most outrageous of all claims, specifically, that Jesus indeed rose from the dead. Boghossian has a list of more plausible explanations that Habermas should first believe if he were really objective. But is this a display of pure objectivity? Does not Boghossian bring his own philosophical bias to the discussion? The Romans and Jews wanted to crush Christianity. Could they not have simply hung the rotting corpse of Jesus out for all to see? Or, is it really plausible to believe that the disciples of Jesus stole the corpse and then one by one, were tortured to death for something they knew was a lie? Once we remove Boghossian’s anti-supernatural bias from the equation, the only rational explanation for the empty tomb is that Jesus rose from the dead. Here we have a perfect example of a man engaging in extreme bias while he is in the process of criticizing someone else for being biased. Habermas is only unreasonable because he rejects Boghossian’s basic presuppositions about the possibility of miracles. I think Boghossian calls this doxastic closure.

Boghossian talks about evidence, but then he dismisses the documents of the New Testament out of hand. It is as if they do not exist. You see, what qualifies as evidence is not just an insignificant question. It is at the heartbeat of Boghossian’s project. It is a project that in my opinion is becoming more insubstantial the more we learn about it. Boghossian finally begins to discuss justification. He talks about two primary schools regarding justification for belief (coherentism and foundationalism) and lands on foundationalism.

I agree that a belief structure must rest upon a foundation. In that sense, I am a foundationalist. However, I think Boghossian is wrong when he says that faith is the foundation. It is certainly wrong when it comes to Christian theism. The foundation of Christian theism is Christ Himself. The question is this: can genuine faith in Christ be destroyed by anything, to include naturalistic rationalism? Scripture teaches that it cannot.

Boghossian sees God as the conclusion of a faulty reasoning process. The problem as he sees it is faith. But not all Christian apologist take this approach. In fact, there are many with a high view of Scripture that see God, not as the conclusion of reasoning, but as the necessary precondition for reasoning from the start. In other words, some apologists ask the question, “what else has to be true in order for reason to exist?” The answer is that God is the necessary precondition for both reason and faith. Attempting to destroy either one will do nothing to impede God. If God does not exist, then intelligible experience does not exist (since God is the necessary precondition for intelligible experience). However, intelligible experience does exist. It is not the case that God does not exist. Boghossian seems to be interacting only with those who either, have a false faith or a very thin argument for why they believe.

Boghossian is clearly a foundationalist. Repeatedly he talks about evidence, warrant, and justification. He indicts faith for apparently contributing to the formation of beliefs without the proper justification. While the Christian views Scripture as their epistemic authority, Boghossian contends that human reason is his epistemic authority. Since Boghossian and I are both foundationlists, so to speak, the question remains, why is he a strident atheist while I am a Christian theist? We both believe that a belief structure must have a foundation or an anchor if you will. We both believe in the value of human reason. Our only difference seems to be on the question of faith. The answer to this mystery is not located in our epistemological differences. The answer is ethical. I will address the real reasons for faith in my final review of Boghossian's project.

What Boghossian is actually talking about when he talks about a foundation is a noetic structure. “A person’s noetic structure is the set of propositions he believes, together with certain epistemic relations that hold among him and these propositions.” [Plantinga, Faith and Rationality, 48] Now, the foundation of a noetic structure must rest upon something other than the structure. Beliefs about the validity of reason or the laws of logic cannot rest upon the laws of logic. Humans form beliefs on the basis of other, more basic beliefs until we get to our foundational beliefs. These foundational beliefs are beliefs that are self-evident. We do not believe them because of other beliefs. They are self-justifying. They require no evidence or warrant. They are by definition, properly basic beliefs. This is so far, so good where the Christian theist is concerned. But if I were an atheist, I would be getting quite nervous at this point.

A properly basic belief “must be capable of functioning foundationally, capable of bearing its share of the weight of the whole noetic structure.” [Ibid. 55] What then is Boghossian’s view of a properly basic belief. Typically it is just this: a belief is properly basic if it is a) self-evident, or b) incorrigible, or c) evident to the senses. Now, here is the elephant in the room when it comes to foundationalism: foundationalism itself is self-referentially incoherent. In other words, foundationalism is not self-evident, or incorrigible, or obvious to the senses. Foundationalism that rests upon a non-transcendental foundation then collapses upon itself. If the base is this weak, one has to wonder just how weak the rest of the structure could be. The nature of Christian truth is unlike that of logic or mathematics. Boghossian repeatedly fails to represent Christianity as resting on its own foundation. He reasons that faith must rest upon reason when the truth is that in Christian theology, reason rests upon faith. Christian epistemology is not empirical nor rationalistic in nature. On the contrary, a distinctly Christian epistemology it is revelational in nature. “All knowledge of God rests on revelation. Though we can never know God in the full richness of his being, he is known to all people through his revelation in creation, theater of his glory.” [Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, Vol. 2, 53]

Boghossian’s failure to understand the nature of Christian knowledge of God leads to multifarious errors in his criticism and regrettably for his lofty project. Christians do not come to know God on the basis of argumentation and evidence. The starting point for the Christian is Scripture. Our faith rests in the authority and reliability while Boghossian’s faith rests in his own ability to create a noetic structure that can sustain itself without becoming self-referentially incoherent. The type of belief we are talking about when we talk about belief in God is like belief in the self, other minds, and the external world. In none of these areas do we typically have proof or arguments, or need proof or arguments. [Plantinga, Faith and Rationality, 65]

I must apologize for having to review chapter four in two parts. It is by far the longest chapter thus far.

A Manual for Creating Atheist: Defining Faith

In chapter two of his project, Boghossian wastes no time striking at the center of a Christian Epistemology. Specifically, he begins with two distinct definitions of faith: “belief without evidence,” and “pretending to know things you don’t know.” Boghossian believes that faith claims are knowledge claims and that faith is therefore an epistemology. We will come back to this point of view in the analysis section of this post.

Boghossian accuses the faithful of offering vague definitions of faith, which he calls “deepities.” “A deepity is a statement that looks profound but is not. Deepities appear true at one level, but on all other levels are meaningless.” [loc. 265] Boghossian then points to a number of examples of vagueness, one of which is Heb. 11:1. The rest of his examples seem to be arbitrary selections designed only to prop up his straw man approach at this point. Apparently, “faith is a leap over the probabilities.” He says faith is the word one uses when one does not have enough evidence to justify holding a belief.

The second definition of faith, pretending to know things you don’t know, is like someone giving advice about baking cookies who has never been in a kitchen, says Boghossian. Boghossian then inserts a table with commonly heard phrases that believers use about faith and he inserts the phrase “pretending to know things I don’t know” in place of faith in each instance. It truly is a type of brain washing of the atheist. Boghossian pretends to be equipping atheists to help the faithful cure themselves of their faith but what he is actually doing is attempting to find a better way to protect the atheists during their exchanges with the faithful. This tactic is designed to create a cementing of the atheist’s mind. Do not take the individual’s argument seriously. The atheist should view the faithful’s conversation as an incredible and foolish joke from the outset of the conversation. By taking this approach, Boghossian hopes to shield the atheist from genuinely thinking about the statements of the faithful.

Boghossian then attempts to essentially annihilate the meaning of faith by ripping central components of its meaning away. It seems the author views faith as purely epistemological in nature. But this would be more closely aligned with a philosophical or purely intellectual and even a rationalistic understanding of faith than a theological one. Clearly, Boghossian’s understanding of Christian theism is terribly insufficient to the task he sets out to accomplish. It is a philosophical howler to criticize a view that you do not even understand. For the Christian reading this post, you should take solace in the fact that no godless philosopher, atheist or otherwise, really understands Christian theism. The core ingredient to understanding biblical Christianity is the illuminating work of God the Holy Spirit coupled with the gift of biblical faith. Absent that work, a genuine understanding of Christian theism and its principles and concepts is impossible.

Boghossian defines “atheist” as one who “believes there is insufficient evidence to warrant belief in a divine, supernatural creator of the universe.” As I interact with the author, I will ask questions about these kind of statements. A critical thinker would ask, what would be sufficient evidence? Additionally, what qualifies as evidence? Again, what does Boghossian mean by warrant? If we turn the guns on this belief, we would ask if there is sufficient evidence to warrant the belief that all beliefs should have sufficient evidence in order to be warranted or justified? What evidence could Boghossian provide for the belief that beliefs should come with sufficient evidence? How could the atheist justify such an epistemological structure and then unify that structure with his belief that the universe is a product of chance, a grand accident of accidents?

Boghossian defines an agnostic as one who believes there is not sufficient evidence for the existence of God but who says it is logically impossible to make a definite conclusion, so the agnostic just doesn’t know. This is fair enough as far as a definition goes.

Boghossian claims that, “Faith is an epistemology.” [Loc. 423] The critical task of philosophy is to question truth claims whenever they are put forth. We cannot fault Boghossian for any questions he might ask, so long as they are genuine questions. However, Boghossian has invited the faithful into this discussion. And the faithful are not trained philosophers per se. We are theologians. As theologians, our philosophizing is always theological. Now, the task of the theologian is fundamentally different from the task of the philosopher even if there is a great deal that we have in common. “The task of dogmatic theology, in the final analysis, is nothing other than a scientific exposition of religious truth grounded in sacred Scripture.” [Bavinck, Dogmatics, V. 1, 26.] What Bavinck means by scientific is nothing more than a disciplined inquiry into the revelation that is Sacred Scripture. He is emphasizing a studious process or methodology that for our culture has long been abandoned outside the academy. What the Christian must always guard against is what Bavinck said earlier in his work: “Neither the subjection of dogmatics to philosophical presuppositions nor the dualistic separation of confessional theology from the scientific study of religion is acceptable.” [Ibid. 25] Boghossian does not appear to be asking questions as much as he is making dogmatic affirmations. What is remarkable is that he is making such assertions about a subject in which he is not a specialist: theology. When it comes to the nature and definition of faith, we must turn to the theologian for our education. He is in a much better place to tell us what this word means and how it relates to the field of human knowledge.

Boghossian pushes the conversation of faith as epistemology to a place of confusion. He calls faith a method and a process people use to understand reality. This is a thoroughly rationalistic perspective of faith. Now, it is certainly true that Scripture asserts that we understand by faith, that the world was created by the very words of God. In other words, faith is the instrument by which we arrive at our knowledge that the world was created by the very words of God. However, faith is not, strictly speaking, an epistemology. Faith is closer to the idea of trusting God’s word to accurately inform us. We may ask if it is possible to think of the role of faith as providing the necessary preconditions for epistemology to get going in certain respects. At any rate, faith is far more than Boghossian seems to consider thus far in his project.

Boghossian writes, “Knowledge claims purport to be objective because they assert a truth about the world. Subjective claims are not knowledge claims and do not assert a truth about the world; rather, they are statements about one’s own unique, situated, subjective, personal experiences or preferences.” [Loc. 422] If knowledge is justified true belief or warranted belief, then it follows that subjective claims can be knowledge claims so long as they rise to the level of warranted belief. For instance, my belief that I had a dream last night about the Browns winning the Super Bowl is a knowledge claim even if it is an insignificant one. Boghossian’s reduction of knowledge claims to external, objective claims seems to be driven more by his not so obscure agenda than by anything else. His definition of knowledge precludes the possibility of experiential knowledge and we know that such a scenario is utterly absurd. I know that I love my wife and kids. But according to Boghossian, such knowledge really isn’t knowledge at all. Knowledge claims are more than just propositions about the world.

Boghossian says that faith claims about the world are knowledge claims about the world. I wholeheartedly agree. Boghossian then asserts that the knowledge claims of faith are unreliable because there are so many different faiths and these faiths have serious disagreements about the state of affairs that has obtained. However, one has to wonder how disagreements among differing faiths proves that faith is unreliable as an epistemological method any more than disagreements among atheists about epistemological methodology means their respective methods are unreliable. If rationalists can disagree without compromising rationalism, then so too can faiths. Boghossian writes, “If a belief is based on insufficient evidence, then any further conclusions drawn from the belief will at best be of questionable value.” [Loc. 440] I believe he is right. Indeed, before I am finished evaluating Boghossian’s project, I shall subject his basic beliefs to this belief to see if his own system can withstand his own scrutiny. This is the process that presuppositional apologetics employs to show the unbeliever the internal contradictions of his own system. After all, the difference between us comes down to warrant. What do we mean by the expression, “insufficient evidence?” If we can pinpoint the meaning of this expression, we can then pinpoint our difference. Is it as simple as faith? I think the answer might be yes and no. I will come back to this point as I work through Boghossian’s project.

Boghossian writes, “faith claims have no way to be corrected, altered, revised, or modified.” Surely he is not correct. In this respect, there is a way for just such a process within Christian theism, which is the sort of faith that I defend. In concluding the chapter on faith, Boghossian writes, “The only way to figure out which claims about the world are likely true, and which are likely false, is through reason and evidence. There is no other way.” [Loc. 456]

The Christian Rejoinder

Before you read this section, I would encourage you to go back to the beginning of this post and read it again. The goal of this section is to respond to the major claims put forth by Boghossian’s second chapter on faith and to provide you with a method for interacting with the atheist or street epistemologist (hereafter SE).

We first have to ask the SE to justify his definition of faith. Remember, the SE defines faith as “belief without evidence” and as “claiming to know things you do not know.” The first point is that the Christian is not interested in defending “religious belief” or “generic faith.” The Christian theist is only interested in discussing the faith of Christian theism and no other. Unless you make this distinction, your defense of “faith” and “religious belief” is sure to stumble. We are not interested in a generic conversation about religion. We are interested in giving an account for the hope that is in us. We are interested in giving the gospel of Jesus Christ. By it, we know that blind eyes are opened, and true knowledge is imparted to the sinner. We must avoid the temptation to wax philosophical even though we know a thing or two about the discipline. Our focus must be on the gospel, that gospel which alone possesses the capability to do what we are seeking to do in the grand scheme of things: persuade the sinner to believe the gospel and to embrace the Christ of the gospel.

This is a good time to contradict Boghossian’s perspective and definitions of faith. Bruce Malina writes, “In American culture, faith has a strong intellectual character. It is an act of the mind. Because this culture is so strongly rational, faith takes on the further nuance that a person believes something or someone merely on a word of authority, even – perhaps even especially – when the evidence doesn’t necessarily add up.” [Malina, Bruce. Handbook of Biblical Social Values, 75] The NIDNTT defines faith as “the trust a man may place in men or the gods, credibility, credit in business, guarantee, proof, or to trust something or someone.” [Michel, NIDNTT, 594] Louw-Nida inform us that faith is “to believe to the extent of complete trust and reliance—‘to believe in, to have confidence in, to have faith in, to trust, faith, trust.” S.S. Taylor writes, “The biblical concept of faith/faithfulness stands at the heart of the relationship between the God of the Bible and his people, a relationship which, in its essential bi-polarity, is intensely personal, dynamic, and multiform.” [Taylor, New Dictionary of Biblical Theology, 488] Returning to Malina, “In sum, faith primarily means personal loyalty, personal commitment to another person, fidelity and the solidarity that comes from such faithfulness.” [Malina, Handbood, 74] Having challenged Boghossian’s definition of faith, and having offered a theological understanding of the term, and having established the limits of our discussion to involve a discussion of Christian theism, we are now in a better position to speak with him concerning the hope that is in us. It is absolutely critical that the Christian engage in critical thinking from the start, taking nothing for granted, and remembering exactly that their calling in this situation is both high and holy. The next question the Christian asks Boghossian concerns his belief in the principle of justification. 

When Boghossian says that beliefs based on insufficient evidence produce other beliefs that are of questionable value, we have to focus on this principle of justification. The basic problem with justification is that it is not self-justifying. If every belief requires sufficient evidence, then where is the evidence for this belief? In the end, and at bottom, the Christian will eventually hear the retort, “well, that is just the way things are.” Seriously then, the principle of justification cannot survive its own demands. When it is asked to provide sufficient evidence for itself, there is nothing but silence. If you use this question on an atheist that understands your question, I promise you the initial look on their face will be priceless. If absurdity has not entered the conversation by this time, fasten your seatbelt because it is about to begin.

Finally, Boghossian’s accusation that faith provides for no self-corrective feature is simply not true. Apparently, Boghossian is unfamiliar with Christian theism’s view of the authoritative and corrective nature of Scripture. It is against the standard and teaching of Scripture that our beliefs are measured. At the end of this chapter, Boghossian provides a picture perfect view of viciously circular reasoning. He informs us that the only way to get at truth is through evidence and reason. And of course he knows this is true because of reason and evidence. In other words, the proof for reason is reason and the proof for evidence is evidence. But as far as it goes, where is the evidence that evidence is the best way to establish truth? Where is the reason for reason? These are both synthetic statements (statements about the word) that Boghossian claims to know a priori. How is it possible to insist on evidence for such a priori knowledge since such knowledge by nature, exists apart from human experience? We will come back to this concept of knowledge later in our interactions I am sure. It is enough to say that there are different types of truth claims, different ways of knowing, and different kinds of evidence about which we must all be aware as we provide answers to those who ask us to provide an account for the hope that is in us.

A Manual for Creating Atheists: A Presuppositionalist Responds

Chapter One

Street Epistemology

Over the next several posts, I intend to deliver a critical response to the claims made in the new book, “A Manual for Creating Atheists.” I will begin with the first chapter on Street Epistemology and weave my way through all nine chapters. Since one of the central principles of the book is that Christian faith is antithetical to critical thinking, I will undoubtedly be subjecting the claims of this project to some critical examination of my own. My central proposition is that only Christian theism as a worldview can provide the necessary preconditions to make this atheistic project possible from the start. In other words, the only reason that such a project on atheism could possibly exist is because the state of affairs are what Christian theism says they are. Before the atheist can even get started on their own quest to subject the believer to a fusillade of critical questions, the believer should turn the tables on them. My aim is to not only refute the claims made in this book, but also to help you interact with the scenarios in kind of a role-play methodology, if you will. The game that the atheist is taught to play in the book presupposes that which atheism itself cannot possibly justify, namely, knowledge apart from God. Since we know the atheist will be asking leading questions, we will challenge the basis for the presupposition behind the question before we answer it. In other words, there is a presupposition that serves as the basis for a leading question. And every one of those presuppositions rests upon some ground. We answer a question with a question in an attempt to identify and then annihilate that ground. We engage in the tactic of meta-questioning. We challenge the very basis of the question to begin with and the knowledge it presupposes.

When Peter told us to be ready to give an answer to anyone that asked us to give an account for the hope that is in us, he was not implying that we had to prove to the unbeliever, through rational argumentation, that the reason for the hope that is in us must meet the demands of unbelieving standards. We have no such obligation. The atheist may demand it but Scripture does not! Our command is to provide the atheist with a biblically faithful answer, not one that comports with the unbelieving demands of godless criteria. In addition, we must also keep in mind, as my pastor would say, that we are to avoid casting our perils before the swine. This is a very ominous command and one that Christians would do well to integrate in their evangelism.

The Christian must take the Street Epistemologist to the epistemological woodshed, and remind him that justification remains the central difference between us rather than the lack of sound argumentation or evidences. You see, the atheist demands justification for every belief. The presupposition is that every belief is ‘justifiable.’ However, what happens when we subject the idea of justifiability to the process of critical thinking? We have to ask what kind of statement is the statement that “justifiability is a necessary component for rational belief.” And we conclude that such a statement is a belief. Moreover, since such a statement is a belief, it seems right, for the sake of consistency, that it also must come under the ‘justifiability’ requirements the same as any other belief. However, if the atheist says that justifiability is self-justifying, we must then ask how they offer justification for the belief that some beliefs are self-justifying. You see, a self-justifying belief does not require evidences or sound argumentation. Self-justifying beliefs are uncontroversial and obvious to human thought. An example is the belief in other minds. I realize that for many Christians, this line of reasoning may sound like a foreign language, but it really isn’t as difficult as it seems. It is only difficult because you may not be used to some of the language or the pattern of thought that is being employed. I encourage you to stick with it and in time it will become second nature.

Human beings form beliefs on the basis of other beliefs. However, sooner or later, we run out of beliefs that justify our other beliefs. I view it like the chain that runs from the ship to the anchor. There has to be an end somewhere along this chain of beliefs. Otherwise, we could never have made our way to even the idea of belief. The concept of belief simply would not exist. In case you are thinking about the consequences of such a state of affairs, you should be thinking that in such a scenario meaning would be impossible. That is the point. Along this chain of beliefs, we eventually get to the anchor. You see, a worldview is a system of beliefs that are eventually anchored to something or nothing at all. The anchor is analogous to self-justifying beliefs. These beliefs are the end of the chain. They do not rely on other beliefs for justification.

“A Manual for Creating Atheists (MCA hereafter) offers practical solutions to the problems of faith and religion through the creation of Street Epistemologists – legions of people who view interactions with the faithful as clinical interventions designed to disabuse them of their faith.” (Ibid. Loc. 216, KE) The arrogance of intellectual autonomy is apparent at the outset of the project. From the beginning, it is difficult to take the writer seriously. The first chapter seems more like an encouraging sermon, a pep-rally if you will with Boghossian as the cheerleader, to fellow atheists, attempting to convince them they really do have the upper hand.

Chapter one of MCA begins with a discussion about the kind of atheist and the method the author seeks to create. He calls this kind of atheist a Street Epistemologist. It is supposed to be a direct, blunt, straight-talking atheist that can bring a sharp, articulate tone to the conversation with the faithful who are really sick and in need of clinical intervention. There is a humanistic tone of compassion emanating from the rank arrogance of it all. The language really would be humorous if it wasn’t so blasphemous.

Boghossian, the author, tells us “Street Epistemology harkens back to the values of the ancient philosophers – individuals who were tough-minded, plain-speaking, known for self-defense, committed to truth, unyielding in the face of danger, fearless in calling out falsehoods, contradictions, inconsistencies, and nonsense.” (MCA, 187) These are characteristics that are very admirable indeed. I hold them in high esteem along with the author. However, the challenge we will put to the atheist repeatedly will be to account for such values in a universe of pure chance, where there is no rational or scientific justification for connecting these particulars with the general. There is no basis for induction in a chance universe. In a world of chance, tough-minded is nothing more than one way to behave no different from weak-minded. To move from us to ought is beyond the reach of justification. The “Street Epistemologist” is going to have to show how reason, or science or experience can provide any rational ground for why some behaviors are admirable and worthy of honor while others ought to be avoided.

The idea of the Street Epistemologist is a mixture of an intellectual MMA tough-guy who at the same time, after he bashes your faith to smithereens, opens his satchel and applies the ointment of reason, science, and evidence to make it all better. This tough guy atheist operates with a moral code, a set of values from within. So we begin our journey with the god-hating blasphemer, Peter Boghossian, to see exactly how tough and how smart he really is. 

Mr. Boghossian, can you please provide justification for your view that all beliefs ought to be justifiable?

Atheist Street Epistemologist

Faithful Christian