As we move to chapter four of Boghossian’s project, I think
I need to point out to our atheist readers, one very important point that
Boghossian has continued to ignore and that you might also think is a flaw in
my rebuttal. Christian theism and atheist do not share the same criterion for
justification or warrant. So when you read Boghossian’s talk about evidence and
warrant, you must understand that I reject Boghossian’s notion that Christian
theism must present itself in such a way as to meet his epistemological
demands. That is part of our disagreement, and I might add, a critical
component that he seems to be happy to ignore. You should know that if you are
an atheist who feels as Boghossian does and you take up his charge, when you
encounter Christians that refuse to budge in the conversation that it is not
due to brain damage, but rather to the fact their criterion for knowledge is
radically different from and intensely opposed to yours.
The main thrust of chapter four concerns methods for “deprogramming”
the faithful from their religious delusions. Boghossian compares this process
to that of a drug intervention. Once again, this tactic produces in the
unsuspecting atheist, a false sense of superiority over the faithful. I am
always on the lookout for Boghossian’s street epistemologist. The last
scientist I encountered was on the verge of rejecting logic so that she could
hand on to her empiricism. Atheist, beware, if you are speaking to intelligent
and genuine believers who have actually bothered with these subjects, you will
be overmatched. However, I encourage you to take up the cause and speak with as
many Christians as you can. I will provide a hypothetical interaction with
Boghossian at the end of this series so that you can see how a Christian theist
should respond to his straw man paradigm.
Boghossian makes a very revealing comment in chapter four: “If
you are reading this book you probably already possess attitudes that
predispose you to rationality, like a trustfulness of reason.” I said in an
earlier post that Boghossian has some faith of his own that he has not
discussed in his project. It is here that we are now beginning to see his faith
in the power of human reason. We will eventually ask Boghossian to justify his
belief in the adequacy of human reason to deal with questions related to the
existence of God and any other inquiry into the nature of reality, as far as
that goes. We are interested in knowing from Boghossian why he thinks reason is
possible in the kind of world he believes exists.
Boghossian instructs the SE to be willing to say to the
Christian, “I don’t know.” The SE is informed that they should not worry about
that. Well, if the SE approaches the right Christian, they will have the opportunity
to say that quite a lot. Moreover, they should be ready to hear answers with
which they disagree and reasoning that is fundamentally different from their
own. For example, when the Christian says I believe the Bible is God’s word
because it claims to be God’s word and on that basis alone I believe it. That
kind of reasoning sounds odd to the atheist. But you must think of it from the
Christian’s basic belief. If God exists, and He in fact created all that is,
and He in fact has spoken to us in the Bible, then it is only reasonable that
we take God’s witness of Himself as true. If we attempted to point to something
other than God’s own word to show that God’s word is true, we would be saying
there is a greater witness to God than God Himself. And if that were actually true,
Christianity would be falsified. Now, if you can’t follow that argument, you
have more work to do in terms of how you reason. And if you can follow that
argument, then you know that breaking through that epistemology is going to
take a little more than a small book on creating atheists.
Boghossian says, “Every religious apologist is
epistemically debilitated by an extreme form of confirmation bias.” [Loc. 1263]
He uses Gary Habermas as an example. Now, here is a critical question from
critical thinker: does Dr. Boghossian expect us to believe that he has no bias
concerning the claims of the Bible? Has he really found that state of pure
objectivity? Boghossian criticizes Habermas for concluding the most outrageous
of all claims, specifically, that Jesus indeed rose from the dead. Boghossian
has a list of more plausible explanations that Habermas should first believe if
he were really objective. But is this a display of pure objectivity? Does not
Boghossian bring his own philosophical bias to the discussion? The Romans and
Jews wanted to crush Christianity. Could they not have simply hung the rotting
corpse of Jesus out for all to see? Or, is it really plausible to believe that
the disciples of Jesus stole the corpse and then one by one, were tortured to
death for something they knew was a lie? Once we remove Boghossian’s
anti-supernatural bias from the equation, the only rational explanation for the
empty tomb is that Jesus rose from the dead. Here we have a perfect example of
a man engaging in extreme bias while he is in the process of criticizing
someone else for being biased. Habermas is only unreasonable because he rejects
Boghossian’s basic presuppositions about the possibility of miracles. I think
Boghossian calls this doxastic closure.
Boghossian talks about evidence, but then he dismisses the
documents of the New Testament out of hand. It is as if they do not exist. You
see, what qualifies as evidence is not just an insignificant question. It is at
the heartbeat of Boghossian’s project. It is a project that in my opinion is becoming
more insubstantial the more we learn about it. Boghossian finally begins to
discuss justification. He talks about two primary schools regarding
justification for belief (coherentism and foundationalism) and lands on
foundationalism.
I agree that a belief structure must rest upon a foundation.
In that sense, I am a foundationalist. However, I think Boghossian is wrong
when he says that faith is the foundation. It is certainly wrong when it comes
to Christian theism. The foundation of Christian theism is Christ Himself. The
question is this: can genuine faith in Christ be destroyed by anything, to
include naturalistic rationalism? Scripture teaches that it cannot.
Boghossian sees God as the conclusion of a faulty reasoning
process. The problem as he sees it is faith. But not all Christian apologist
take this approach. In fact, there are many with a high view of Scripture that
see God, not as the conclusion of reasoning, but as the necessary precondition
for reasoning from the start. In other words, some apologists ask the question,
“what else has to be true in order for reason to exist?” The answer is that God
is the necessary precondition for both reason and faith. Attempting to destroy
either one will do nothing to impede God. If God does not exist, then
intelligible experience does not exist (since God is the necessary precondition
for intelligible experience). However, intelligible experience does exist. It
is not the case that God does not exist. Boghossian seems to be interacting
only with those who either, have a false faith or a very thin argument for why
they believe.
Boghossian is clearly a foundationalist. Repeatedly he talks
about evidence, warrant, and justification. He indicts faith for apparently
contributing to the formation of beliefs without the proper justification.
While the Christian views Scripture as their epistemic authority, Boghossian
contends that human reason is his epistemic authority. Since Boghossian and I
are both foundationlists, so to speak, the question remains, why is he a strident atheist while I am
a Christian theist? We both believe that a belief structure must have a
foundation or an anchor if you will. We both believe in the value of human reason. Our only difference
seems to be on the question of faith. The answer to this mystery is not located in our epistemological differences. The answer is ethical. I will address the real reasons for faith in my final review of Boghossian's project.
What Boghossian is actually talking about when he talks
about a foundation is a noetic structure. “A person’s noetic structure is the
set of propositions he believes, together with certain epistemic relations that
hold among him and these propositions.” [Plantinga, Faith and Rationality, 48]
Now, the foundation of a noetic structure must rest upon something other than
the structure. Beliefs about the validity of reason or the laws of logic cannot
rest upon the laws of logic. Humans form beliefs on the basis of other, more
basic beliefs until we get to our foundational beliefs. These foundational
beliefs are beliefs that are self-evident. We do not believe them because of
other beliefs. They are self-justifying. They require no evidence or warrant.
They are by definition, properly basic beliefs. This is so far, so good where
the Christian theist is concerned. But if I were an atheist, I would be getting
quite nervous at this point.
A properly basic belief “must be capable of functioning
foundationally, capable of bearing its share of the weight of the whole noetic
structure.” [Ibid. 55] What then is Boghossian’s view of a properly basic belief.
Typically it is just this: a belief is properly basic if it is a) self-evident,
or b) incorrigible, or c) evident to the senses. Now, here is the elephant in
the room when it comes to foundationalism: foundationalism itself is
self-referentially incoherent. In other words, foundationalism is not
self-evident, or incorrigible, or obvious to the senses. Foundationalism that
rests upon a non-transcendental foundation then collapses upon itself. If the
base is this weak, one has to wonder just how weak the rest of the structure
could be. The nature of Christian truth is unlike that of logic or mathematics.
Boghossian repeatedly fails to represent Christianity as resting on its own
foundation. He reasons that faith must rest upon reason when the truth is that
in Christian theology, reason rests upon faith. Christian epistemology is not empirical
nor rationalistic in nature. On the contrary, a distinctly Christian epistemology
it is revelational in nature. “All knowledge of God rests on revelation. Though
we can never know God in the full richness of his being, he is known to all
people through his revelation in creation, theater of his glory.” [Bavinck,
Reformed Dogmatics, Vol. 2, 53]
Boghossian’s failure to understand the nature of Christian
knowledge of God leads to multifarious errors in his criticism and regrettably
for his lofty project. Christians do not come to know God on the basis of
argumentation and evidence. The starting point for the Christian is Scripture.
Our faith rests in the authority and reliability while Boghossian’s faith rests
in his own ability to create a noetic structure that can sustain itself without
becoming self-referentially incoherent. The type of belief we are talking about
when we talk about belief in God is like belief in the self, other minds, and
the external world. In none of these areas do we typically have proof or
arguments, or need proof or arguments. [Plantinga, Faith and Rationality, 65]
I must apologize for having to review chapter four in two
parts. It is by far the longest chapter thus far.
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