Thinking About the Transcendental Argument

We must point out to them that univocal reasoning itself leads to self-contradiction, not only from a theistic point of view, but from a non-theistic point of view as well. It is this that we ought to mean when we say that we must meet our enemy on their own ground. It is this that we ought to mean when we say that we reason from the impossibility of the contrary. [Cornelius Van Til]

Sounds a little intimidating to most Christians and for good reason. Most Christians do not read Van Til. Most Christians do not read philosophy. Most Christians do not read theology. Most Christians hardly read the Bible. In fact, many, many Christians hardly read at all. That is the very sad state of affairs that we are faced with in modern American culture. It must change!

What does Van Til mean by the little phrase “impossibility of the contrary?” Some would contend that Van Til’s argument fails precisely in this very place. They would argue that establishing the impossibility of the contrary is not really the same as showing that the non-Christian worldview is ipso facto untruthful simply on the basis that it is contrary to the Christian worldview. But this response demonstrates a lack of understanding of Van Til on this point. Let me explain what I mean.

Copi tells us that “Two propositions are said to be contraries if they cannot both be true – that is, if the truth of one entails the falsity of the other – but both can be false…Contraries cannot both be true, but unlike contradictories, they can both be false.” [Copi, Introduction to Logic, 177] The problem with applying the traditional square of opposition to Van Til’s transcendental argument is that the rule itself only applies to contingent propositions. Another problem with the claim that Van Til’s “impossibility of the contrary” fails is that the assertion seems to ignore the difference between Boolean and Aristotelian logic and the question of existential import. Can universal propositions have existential import? Whether A and E propositions (universal propositions) have existential import is an issue on which the Aristotelian and Boolean interpretations of propositions differ. [Loci, 190]

The real question here is who decides if universal propositions can have existential import? We must be prepared to answer that question. Christian theism must assert that universal propositions not only can, but some do have existential import. The Christian God is the God that actually exists. That is a universal proposition with existential import. Logic itself cannot settle the dispute and it certainly cannot be the final arbiter of truth in assessing the reliability of Van Til’s transcendental approach.

The accusation that the transcendental argument violates the traditional square of opposition is to subject the argument to the idea of contingency, something Van Til would forcefully, and rightly oppose. What then is Van Til attempting to do in his transcendental method? What does he actually mean, in simple terms, when he says that Christian theism is proved true because of the impossibility of the contrary?

First of all, it has everything to do with relating the facts of reality, as they are known, correctly and with the notion of human autonomy. The transcendental method seeks to demonstrate that unless God is our epistemological starting point in all predication that nothing can be made intelligible in human experience. The transcendental approach simply asks a very basic question: what must be the case in order for the intelligibility of human experience to be the case? It is uncontroversial that human experience is intelligible. But what has to also be the case if that intelligibility is the case?

There are only two options open to us from which to begin to answer this question. One position begins with human autonomy. Man is the ultimate reference point for rationality, for all knowledge from one perspective. The other perspective is that man is derivative of God, a creature, and as a creature his knowledge must also be derivative. In this view, God is the final reference point for knowledge. All facts must be viewed in terms of their relationship to God and His creation of them as facts.

Van Til writes, “The contrary is impossible only if it is self-contradictory when operating on the basis of its own assumptions.” Not only are contradictory claims to Christian theism unable to approach and challenge Christian truth seriously, they cannot even stand themselves up on their own two feet. The non-Christian worldview, in all its stripes, involves internal conflict, that is, self-contradiction. Hence, this alone is enough to place rational human beings in the position of abandoning it. But abandon the non-Christian worldview on purely a rational basis, fallen men do not do. Rather, fallen men hold firmly, in their spiritually dead and ethically depraved fingers, to an irrational outlook. And such behavior can only be explained by the supernatural revelation that is Scripture.

Van Til continues, “We do not really argue ad hominem unless we show that someone’s position involves self-contradiction, and there is no self-contradiction unless one’s reasoning is shown to be directly contradictory of or to lead to conclusions which are contradictory of one’s own assumptions.” How can man be free to gain knowledge in a deterministic system? Additionally, if everything is pure contingency, how could knowledge ever be gained when there can be no relationship between particulars and the general? Christians must be prepared to answer questions, but we must also be prepared to ask them as well.

I will conclude with another point that cannot be over-emphasized in Christian Apologetics. Van Til writes, “The miracle of regeneration has to occur somewhere, and all that we are arguing for is that we must ask where it is that the Holy Spirit will most likely perform this miracle. And then there can be no doubt but that the likelihood is in favor of that place where the non-theist has to some extent seen the emptiness and vanity of his own position.”

Defending the Transcendental Argument for God

Kelly James Clark levelled the following criticism against Covenantal Apologetics: “Whenever I read presuppositionalists I almost always think, “Saying it’s so doesn’t make it so.” Saying that Christianity is the criterion of truth (whatever that could mean), that Christian belief is the most certain thing we know, that Christian faith is not defeasible, and that Scripture supports these views, does not make it so. There are few apologetic approaches that are so long on assured proclamations and so short on argument.” [Clark, Five Views On Apologetics, 371]

The charge levelled by Clark, “saying it is so does not make it so,” really depends on one’s view of reality. For the Christian, when God says it is so, it is so. Moreover, if Christian theism is actually true, then it is so whether we say it or not. The central problem with Clark’s criticism is in fact the problem of the criterion. For Christianity, justification begins and ends with God. Knowledge is revelational in nature. Faith provides the basis for all human predication, science, and logic. We do not subject the Christian faith to unbelieving criteria. It is entirely inappropriate for apologists to permit unbelievers to subject Christian faith to the unbelieving criteria of human reason. Christian theism is the only way we can account for the intelligibility of human experience. Contrary to Clark’s criticism, Covenantal Apologetics does a little more than just say it is so. The transcendental argument for God (TAG) destroys all speculations and every pernicious thought raised against the knowledge of Christ. Not only does it demonstrate that the Christian worldview is necessarily true, it refutes the non-Christian worldview in every form it takes by reducing that view to absurdity. TAG accomplished this by refusing to surrender the ultimate authority of Scripture and by performing an internal critique of every competing worldview. It shows that only the Christian worldview provides the precondition of human experience.

Non-Christian reasoning leads to self-contradiction. As Van Til points out in his Survey of Christian Epistemology, this is not only true from a theistic perspective, but from a non-theistic point of view as well. This is exactly what covenantal apologists mean when they say that we must reason from the impossibility of the contrary. What TAG seeks to do is show that it is logically impossible to account for the uniformity of nature (scientific knowledge) and the laws of logic (rational thought) within the non-Christian worldview. TAG takes the most basic assumptions of the non-Christian worldview and subjects those assumptions to a brutal and devastating internal critique.

The non-Christian scientist, for example, claims that the universe was not created. There is no purpose behind or meaning within the universe. It is simply there. But in order for the scientist to do science, she requires uniformity. She needs the laws of science, such as gravity. With these scientific laws in hand, she is free to set about working with the particulars of natural phenomena and work toward scientific discovery. This is how the scientist attains knowledge about the physical universe. The necessary presupposition that is indispensable in order science to work is the uniformity of nature. Without this uniformity, the process of induction collapses.

The scientist relies on the validity of inductive reasoning in order to do science. However, the scientist embraces basic presuppositions about the universe that in no way can account for the uniformity of nature. There is no scientific basis explaining why there is such a relationship between the general and the particular. Without the relationship between the general and the particular, induction becomes impossible. This is a basic problem of science that remains unsolved to this day. Moreover, this is not an ancillary issue for science. It is foundational to the entire field. Hence, one would think that science would have come up with a better answer than the one it presently offers: that’s just the way it is. Carried to its logical end, science becomes impossible if it is true that the universe has no intelligent cause.

Taken on its most basic presupposition, science cannot even account for its most basic claims. Hence, science is unable to provide for an intelligible account for how the scientist knows anything at all. Therefore, science is reduced to absurdity on its own terms. What TAG argues is that the existence of the Christian God is the necessary precondition of such experiences. And it proves this by demonstrating the impossibility of the contrary. [Michael Butler, The Transcendental Argument for God’s Existence, article] In other words, TAG says for science to be possible, God must exist since God is the precondition for all science. Science exists therefore, God exists. 

The transcendental argument observes ordinary human experience and asks, “What must be true in order for that experience to be possible.” In contradistinction to this, classical arguments, such as the one from causality, do not take this form. The causal argument states that there are causes in the world. There cannot be an infinite number of causes. Since there are a finite number of causes in the world, there must be a first cause. The argument concludes that God must be that first cause. TAG states that for causality to be possible, God has to exist since the existence of God is the precondition of causality. Since there is causality, God exists. [From Butler’s article mentioned above]

The wheels upon which TAG moves is simply this: the non-Christian worldview cannot account for the intelligibility of human experience given its most basic presuppositions. If the world is intelligible without reference to God, then Christian theism is false. That is precisely what the unbeliever knows and seeks to demonstrate. We don’t need God in order to possess knowledge about the world is the drumbeat of the unbeliever. When the apologist allows the unbeliever to pretend this is the case, he has no way of recovering his position. The minute he assumes that the unbeliever can make sense of reality without God, he assumes that his position is wrong. TAG refuses to compromise this basic fact and takes a much different approach. First, God created all things to include how we know anything at all. Therefore, knowledge about the universe apart from God is actually impossible. Second, every stripe of the non-Christian worldview fails to survive basic internal critiques. That is to say, their most foundational beliefs cannot rise to their own standards for justified belief. This is the basic and simplified approach of TAG.

Richard Howe thinks that he has found a way around covenantal apologetics via the rules of human language. What Howe fails to see is that TAG would state the argument thus: For language to be possible, God has to exist because God is the precondition of language. Since there is language, God exists. Covenantal apologetics would not concede that language could be accounted for apart from presupposing the existence of God. Again, if language could be accounted for apart from God, Christian theism is proven false. This is because Christian theism argues that God is the necessary precondition of all experience, and because God is the source of all that has come to exist, it is impossible to account for anything at all without presupposing God’s existence. TAG would insist that the non-Christian worldview defend human language within the framework of their own metaphysical and epistemological commitments. This is the very thing the non-Christian worldview, in all its versions, cannot do.