Peeping Thomists, Classical Foundationalism, and Classical Apologetics

 Thinking Critically & Biblically about the Foundations of Christian Theism

Is belief in God intellectually irresponsible, irrational, and philosophically rash? It seems inescapably true that no belief should be acknowledged as true belief or genuine knowledge unless it is accompanied by sufficient evidence. This raises several questions about the nature of knowledge, true belief, and the notion of sufficient evidence. Much has been made over the difference between belief that God exists and belief in God. Plantinga writes, “So belief in God must be distinguished from the belief that God exists.” I am not convinced that Plantinga is not guilty of overstating the case.

When Christian theism speaks about belief in God, it speaks about belief in a very specific personal being. Christian theism speaks of the self-contained triune God of the Christian Scripture. This is the God that created all that exists. He is the God of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and Moses. He is the God that became flesh in the person of Jesus Christ. He is Lord of heaven and earth, maker of all things and the giver of life. When Christian theism speaks about belief in God, this is the God it has in mind. It follows then that statements about belief in God are statements encompassing existential beliefs. Christian theism is not satisfied to hold God out as a meagre idea or concept. Christianity is not merely a noetic structure by which to organize and make sense of one’s experience. Christian theism is the only rational worldview available to humanity. The other worldview, specifically, the non-Christian worldview is reduced to absurdity when it is subjected to an internal critique of its propositions. This is true regardless of whether or not the non-Christian worldview comes in the form of a militant atheism or a false religion such as Islam.

The issue I am discussing belongs to the branch of philosophy known as epistemology. This branch deals with our theory of knowledge. What does it mean to know something about reality? When we say we know something, we mean, as Halverson says, (1) it is actually the case, (2) we believe that it is actually the case, and (3) we have reasonable grounds for believing it is actually the case. [Halverson, A Concise Introduction to Philosophy, 26] The controversy enters at point 3. I may state the case as it actually is. I may even believe the case as it actually is. But unless I have reasonable grounds for believing the case as it actually is, it cannot be said that I possess true knowledge. My belief may be a lucky guess or based on bad reasoning with the right answer. The controversy in epistemology between Christians, Non-Christians, and various schools of apologetics concerns “reasonable ground.” This is the age-old philosophical problem of the criterion. What do we mean by reasonable ground?

“Many philosophers have endorsed the idea that the strength of one’s belief ought always to be proportional to the strength of the evidence for that belief.” [Plantinga, Reason and Rationality, 24] Many Christian apologists have embraced a variety of these concepts from enlightenment and contemporary philosophies and integrated them into gospel proclamation and Christian apologetics. The problem with the approach at hand is located in the phrase “strength of the evidence.” W.K. Clifford wrote, “To sum up: it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.” [W.K. Clifford, The Ethics of Belief, 183] Of course it would be irresponsible if we did not inquire what sort of evidence could be offered up for this belief. And this is the heartbeat of the issue. Beliefs are supported by evidence, which is based on other beliefs, which are themselves supported by evidence and so on and so forth. The chain of beliefs, sooner or later inevitably attaches to some belief that requires no evidence for its support. This leads us to the question, what is the sort of belief that requires no evidence? For unless we land upon this ground, we never land at all. Skepticism carries the day in light of this infinite regress. Where do beliefs begin? What is the origin of human knowledge? Where is the fountainhead of human predication? How is it possible for inquiry to exist if we are not able to locate the source of human knowledge?

Should we, as Anthony Flew once said, begin the discussion without the assumption of God? Is it ever ethically proper for a Christian theist to pretend, for argument’s sake, that God does not exist? Alvin Plantinga thinks we can and should: “the debate cannot start from the assumption that God exists.” [Plantinga, Reason and Rationality, 26] Is such an assumption necessary to the proclamation and defense of the gospel? Is such an assumption necessary for the defense of Christian theism? Classical apologists answer in the affirmative. I am convinced by Scripture alone that no Christian ever has to submit to this kind of demand. Regrettably, in the name of being rational, and in the name of credibility, and in the name of respectability, classical apologetics, the predominant form of evangelical apologetics, makes such concessions. For the remainder of this post, I will explore why such concessions are not only unnecessary, but actually weaken the Christian apologetic and potentially compromise the gospel. At a minimum, the rationalism that seeps into the discussion brings with it an array of unnecessary confusion because of the glaring inconsistencies it has with sound biblical theology.

Now, the direction in which I am heading is that of classical foundationalism. Thomism is best understood as a version of classical foundationalism. It denies that belief in God is properly basic. “The existence of God, furthermore, is not among the propositions that are properly basic; hence a person is rational in accepting theistic belief only if he has evidence for it.” [Plantinga, Faith and Rationality, 48] Now, foundationalism establishes norms for what qualifies as rational. It is a system that imposes rules and standards around what justifies belief. Any belief that fails to live up to these standards ought to be rejected as irrational. Hence, one can see that sufficient evidence as defined by Thomism or classical foundationalism serves as the ultimate authority for justified true belief. And this standard is unhesitatingly directed toward belief in the existence of God. Such theistic beliefs should only be accepted if they pass the bar of human reason.

As Plantinga points out, classical foundationalism is best understood in comparison with a noetic structure. A noetic structure is a way in which the human mind organizes experience to make sense out of the world. Within that structure there are basic beliefs and non-basic beliefs. Non-basic beliefs are accepted on basic beliefs. Any non-basic belief that does not follow from basic beliefs is deemed irrational. Hence, since belief that God exists is deemed a non-basic belief, it must be tested and shown to follow from some basic belief. According to Aquinas, scientific knowledge of the existence and immateriality, unity, simplicity, and perfection of God is possible. It is possible because, following Aristotle, scientific knowledge is self-evident or basic. Hence, from these basic beliefs, we can know that God exists. In case it is not obvious, we are moving now toward natural theology.

Classical foundationalism then, says that belief in God is not properly basic because the proposition that God exists is not self-evident, or evident to the senses or incorrigible. In other words, belief that God exists is arrived at from other more basic beliefs. Now, we may agree for argument’s sake that properly basic beliefs are beliefs that are self-evident, or evident to the senses or incorrigible. But as Plantinga points out, why do we have to accept the belief that these and only these types of beliefs are properly basic? I have to ask if such a belief itself is self-evident, evident to the senses, or incorrigible. I must confess that I cannot see how it is. From this fact, it seems to me that classical foundationalism rests upon flimsy grounds itself. In other words, it seems to me that classical foundationalism runs the risk of being what Plantinga calls, self-referentially incoherent. We presuppositionalists would say that it is reduced to absurdity when it is subjected to an internal critique.

This is precisely where the conflict between Aristotelian Philosophy collides with Reformed Theology and where Classical Apologetics crashes into Presuppositional Apologetics. The former has embraced a rationalistic epistemology while the latter has adopted a revelational epistemology. Contrary to Norman Geisler’s view that it is impossible for authority to serve as our ultimate criterion for knowledge, Reformed theology affirms that the only way to know God is by way of an ultimate standard that is thoroughly revelational in nature. Geisler contends this is impossible because “it is always possible to ask why we should believe any authority.” [Geisler, Introduction to Philosophy, 105] Paul assured us that just because we could answer back to God that did not mean it is wise to do so. (Rom. 9) I think it is good to remind the reader at this time about the promise of the serpent in the garden. Satan’s assertion was that man could know reality just as God knows reality, independently, self-sufficiently. This was in fact the promise of Satan. Satan promised man he could attain knowledge independently from God.

The reformed theologian approaches epistemology, not with Aristotle’s Metaphysics in his hand, but with a Bible. Bavinck says, “Instead, “implanted theology” was viewed as a natural fitness and inclination implanted in the human mind, enabling it to attain to knowledge of God “apart from any discursive thought and reasoning of the mind,” and to back up this knowledge with an incontrovertibly certain testimony.” [Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, Vol. II, 66] Human knowledge is, according to Scripture, revelational in nature. Moreover, according to Scripture, man does not have to go looking for God. By all accounts, God comes to man as soon as the capacity for rational thought arrives. With reason there is God. When the mind is ready to reason, God is. I think it right to say that God is the one conditioning the mind, preparing each mind for the process of rational thought. Rather than coming in at the end of some reasoning process or scientific or historical investigation, knowledge of God is there from the very beginning.

“There is within the human mind, and indeed by natural instinct, an awareness of divinity. This we take to be beyond controversy. To prevent anyone from taking refuge in the pretense of ignorance, God himself has implanted in all men a certain understanding of his divine majesty.” [Calvin, Institutes, Vol. I, 43] The source of human knowledge is God alone. The method by which mean know is revelational in nature. “But the knowledge of the deity is immutably in all because there is no nation so barbarous upon whom this persuasion of deity does not rest.” [Turretin, Institutes, Vol. I, 7]

Classical Foundationalism and Thomism following it, along with Classical Apologetics, require the existence of uninterpreted brute facts and the possibility of neutrality in order to build their system. Scripture denies that facts can exist apart from their status as being created by God for God’s purpose. Moreover, such facts must be interpreted according to God’s pre-interpretation of them. Any other view of knowledge collides head-on with biblical revelation. “No fact in the world can be interpreted truly except it be seen as created by God.” [Van Til, Survey of Christian Epistemology, 18-22] The entire enterprise then of Classical Foundationalism collapses not only from within but from without, and with it, classical apologetics. If there are no brute facts from the start, then it seems impossible for the foundation to form at all. We all should remember the words of our Lord when he said he that is not with me is against me. Hence, the notion of neutrality is more than a little naïve given Scripture’s description of man as a hostile enemy of God. Neutrality turns out to be another misguided philosophical conjecture that adds little value to the discussion.

In conclusion then, since God is the source of human knowledge and since it is the fear of God that leads to knowledge, God must be seen as the necessary precondition for human predication. The argument is summed up in the form of Modus Tollens, “If human predication, then God. There is no God. Therefore, there is no human predication.” From this argument if we see that even the attempt to deny God presupposes His existence. The minute we begin predication, God is presupposed. This is because God is the necessary precondition for all experience. We show this by demonstrating the impossibility of the contrary.

The God Who Cannot Not Exist

Either God is antecedent to possibility or possibility is antecedent to God. In the former case, God cannot not exist, while in the latter, it is possible that God does not exist. My experience in the area of apologetics is admittedly limited. However, I have had formal training in both classical and presuppositional apologetics. Norman Geisler was my teacher in the classical method while my work in presuppositional apologetics began with interactions with reformed friends and then I took it up as part of my Th.D. work at Tyndale Theological Seminary under Paul Henebury. On the basis of the experience I do have, it is my guess that many if not most apologists engaged in apologetics would not think my opening disjunctive to be anything profound. After all, classical apologetics, with its approach, is very satisfied and even confident that it can show, through rational argumentation and historical evidence that God probably exists. In other words, it is probably the case that the statement “God exists” is probably true. I believe this way of thinking contradicts sound doctrine and compromises the integrity of the gospel message.

My objective for writing this post is to urge you to turn your interest to a very specific question about the approach of Christian apologetics known as the classical method. And that question is simply this: Does the Bible reveal to us God as the kind of God that could not exist? Is the God as described in the Bible the sort of being that as such a being, it is possible for Him not to exist? I intend to demonstrate that the revelation of the characteristics and attributes of God expressed in Holy Scripture are entirely and wholly contradictory to any apologetic method that concludes anything other than the necessary existence of the self-contained triune God of Christian theism. In other words, any system of thought that concludes only that God probably exists, regardless of the degree of that probability, not only fails as an apologetic method, but also betrays the clear teachings of Scripture regarding the nature and attributes of the God who is there. In short, the classical method does not do justice to Christian theism as revealed in divine revelation.

The view that, on the one hand affirms that the revelation of God to man is so objectively clear that it is not rational for men to reject Christian theism, and on the other hand embraces the position that the evidences for the Christian faith are such that Christian theism is only probably true is a glaring contradiction. If it is possible for Christian theism to be false, then it is not irrational to conclude that it is false. The concept of probability in such arguments is the difficulty one encounters when they try to quantify the degree of probability. What does the formula look like when we place the evidence for Christian theism into the algorithm? How can we tell that the calculation gives us at least 50.1%? I have even heard some classical men throw out 90% or 95%. But surely such numbers are arbitrary and without ground. In addition, it is unquestionably incongruent with the revelation of God in Scripture to claim that God’s perfect self-disclosure, His revealed truth, lacks sufficiency of evidence. Regardless of how one slices it, probability, regardless of its degree, falls short of certainty.

Presuppositionalism holds that the non-Christian worldview is at its foundation, irrational. Man is not only cursed spiritually and ethically, but he is also cursed epistemologically. Not only is the natural man ethically and spiritually depraved, his reasoning is depraved. Presuppositional apologetics, consistently derived from a reformed understanding of Scripture leads to the transcendental necessity and epistemic certainty of Christian theism. [Bahnsen, Van Til’s Apologetic, 600]

Is the existence of God only possible?

The biblical version of Christian theism affirms the transcendental necessity and epistemic certainty of the self-contained triune God. God cannot but exist. Any view to the contrary is unequivocally incongruent with biblical theology and therefore sound Christian philosophy. What I have just given you is a statement about the one true God revealed in Scripture. What does an argument for this sort of claim look like? What is available to me as a Christian from the beginning, for me to make this claim, and second, to prove, or defend it. Many, if not most Christian apologists rely on human philosophy to grapple with this question. Moreover, many academic men spread their reliance on philosophy through the academy like a disease. Notice that I said they rely on human philosophy. The starting point for this premise cannot be anything other than Holy Scripture. A Christian epistemology has its epistemic authority anchored in Scripture. Any epistemology that drops its anchor elsewhere is simply not Christian. I am not contending against philosophy as a matter of fact. I am arguing that philosophy is not the primary tool or reference point for Christian truth. That seat can only be occupied by Scripture alone! All philosophizing must be subservient to Scripture, and it must recognize the superiority of the fields of biblical languages, exegesis, and theology. Philosophy must be the product of sound biblical theology.

When we talk about Christian apologetics and concept of God, we are not speaking in general terms. Classical apologists such as William Lane Craig and Norman Geisler believe that Christians must establish that existence of theism in general before they can begin to provide historical evidence and rational arguments for Christianity. I will avoid the philosophical complexities of this approach and point out that Christian theism does not rest upon the idea of theism in general. We are not seeking to prove Aristotle’s finite unmoved mover. Christian apologetics is not interested in proving that some god exists. Moreover, Christian theism does not hope to establish that Christianity is very probably true. Christian apologetics, if it is consistently Christian, seeks to proclaim and defend that One Triune God of Scripture. Christian apologetics seeks to show that everything has its source in the God of Christian theism.

When Moses was ordered by God to go to the Children of Israel, he wanted to know if they asked him who sent him to them, how he should answer them. This was God’s answer: God said to Moses, “^aI AM WHO I AM”; and He said, “Thus you shall say to the sons of Israel, ‘I AM has sent me to you.’ ” (Ex. 3:14) “Here God gives Moses his mysterious name in three forms: long (I AM WHO I AM), medium (I AM), and short (Heb. Yahweh, translated “Lord”). These are all related to the name Yahweh, which in turn has come relation to the very to be (ehyeh).” [Frame, Systematic Theology, 15] Essential the name has the sense of the “to be/to cause.” The idea is that God is the One Who Is and the One Who Causes.

“First, ancient Egyptians believed in a close relationship between the name of a deity and the deity itself. That is, the name of a god could reveal part of the essential nature of that god. In Egyptian texts that refer to different but important names for the same deity, the names are often associated with particular actions or characteristics, and the words used tend to sound similar to the names with which they are associated.”^[1]

Scripture nowhere entertains the philosophical concept of probability as it relates to the existence of God. God is seen as The One Who Is and Who Causes. In turn, one has to ask, how the concept of probability could even exist and be understood apart from “The One Who Is and Who Causes.” Probability requires the laws of mathematics to exist. And the laws of mathematics require uniformity, and a relationship between the particulars and the general to exist. Such a relationship can only be possible if Christian theism is true. Not only is mathematics possible, it is certain. My son will tell you that he is not probably studying slopes today. He most certainly is studying slopes today. This is the transcendental argument for God. If probability then God. No God, therefore no probability. Another way to state it is: If logic, then God. There is no God. Therefore, no logic. The result is that you cannot argue against God without presupposing God’s existence. In order for the concept of probability to exist, God must exist. In other words, God is the necessary precondition of probability. And if God is antecedent to probability, then probability cannot be applied to God without being reduced to absurdity. It follows exegetically, theologically, logically, and even philosophically, that God cannot not exist.

Is it irrational to refuse to acknowledge God?

The apostle Paul tells us in Romans 1:20 that the non-Christian worldview is without any rational defense. He writes, εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτοὺς ἀναπολογήτους, or, “so that they are without a defense.” This word means the state of being without excuse in a legal sense. [NIDNTT, Vol. II, 139] The requirement for a man to stand in the court and be without any defense whatsoever is that the evidence before the court must be entirely irrefutable and impeccable and this state involves the wholesale culpability of the man that has been charged. If one takes Paul’s entire discourse in Romans 1-3 in context and seriously, it is difficult to see how they could read him differently than driving the point of culpability and guilt home to the Roman Church. Any degree of possibility that God may not actually exist would destroy the force of Paul’s argument. Paul has not said that men do not have good reason for refusing to acknowledge of God. He has not said that their arguments are not very strong for rejecting God. 

The point I want to make is this: if it is possible that God does not exist and it is only probable that Christian theism is true, then there is always a reason and a defense, even if it is not a very strong one, for rejecting the Christian claims that God exists. However, this hypothesis is a direct contradiction of Paul in Romans 1. Philosophy runs head-on into theology and as we say in Jiu Jitsu, it end up getting submitted.

God’s existence is transcendentally necessary. And if God’s existence is transcendentally necessary, then it is indeed the epitome of irrationalism to refuse to acknowledge Him. When Paul says that man is without excuse, he has no defense for his refusal to acknowledge God, he is saying that God has already given man all the evidence that he could ever need to reach the right conclusion. Notice that God is the one that has already given men the evidence. Secondly, notice that men are in possession and of that evidence. They see it, the hear it, and they know it. “There is within the human mind, and indeed by natural instinct, an awareness of divinity. This we take to be beyond controversy. To prevent anyone from taking refuge in the pretense of ignorance, God himself has implanted in all men a certain understanding of his divine majesty.” [Calvin, Institutes, Vol. I, 43]

“Modern philosophy in practically all its schools admits that all its speculations end in mystery. Speaking generally, modern philosophy (and science) is phenomenalistic. It admits that ultimate reality is unknowable to man.” [Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 127]

If there is human predication, then God exists. There is no God. Therefore, there is no human predication. Presuppositional apologetics uses this form of argument known as Modus Tollens to demonstrate that God is the necessary precondition even to argue against God. From this we see that it is exegetically, theologically, logically, and philosophically irrational to refuse to acknowledge God in all that we do.

I made two arguments in this post. I argued that it is biblically immoral and logically fallacious for a Christian apologist to affirm that God only probably exists and that Christian theism is only probably true. In addition, I posited that it is highly irrational for anyone to refuse to acknowledge God in all that they do. My reference point for this argument, the ultimate authority to which I referred was Moses’ encounter with Yahweh in Ex. 3:14 and Paul’s argument to the Roman Church contained in Romans 1-3. From that ultimate authority I employed exegesis, theology, and logic to arrive at my conclusion. It is my conviction that Christian apologetics has an ethical duty to Christ to follow this kind of model for defending Christian theism.

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^[1] John H Walton, Zondervan Illustrated Bible Backgrounds Commentary (Old Testament): Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, Deuteronomy, vol. 1 (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2009), 175.

Sam Storms on Fallible: Point Nine

Ninth, yet another reason why I believe the cessationist is wrong on this point is the failure to recognize different ways or senses in which God might “reveal” something to us. In Philippians 3:15 he tells the church that “if in anything you think otherwise, God will reveal that also to you.” And in Ephesians 1:17 Paul prays that a “spirit of wisdom and revelation” would be granted to believers. “Once more,” notes Grudem, “it would not be possible to think that every time a believer gained new insight into his privileges as a Christian and reported it to a friend, the actual words of that speech would have been thought to be God’s very words. It would be the report of something God had ‘revealed’ to the Christian, but the report would only come in merely human words” (Grudem, Prophecy, 65). We see two other similar uses of the verb or noun form of “reveal/revelation” in Matthew 11:27 and Romans 1:18.

Storms’ appeal to Philippians 3:15 is simply befuddling. “Let us therefore, as many as are perfect, have this attitude; and if in anything you have a different attitude, God will reveal that also to you; 16. However, let us keep living by that same standard to which we have attained.” Clearly Paul is not talking about the various forms and methods of revelation. He is talking about the godly attitude of pressing toward the mark for the prize of the high calling of God in Christ Jesus. He is talking about spiritual growth. This is the attitude we are to display. Moreover, if we display, or lack this spiritual discipline, God will reveal that to us. How does God do that? He reveals this to us through His word. To content that Paul had our subject in mind when he penned his letter to the Philippians is a complete exegetical failure.

Storms then points us to Eph. 1:17 as if this text provides some shelter for his flimsy view. But once more, we discover that Ephesians 1:17 has no bearing on our discussion. It is quite likely that Paul had in mind the Holy Spirit when he penned this letter, not the human spirit. The phrase ‘the spirit of wisdom and revelation’ could be a reference to the believer’s own spirit (RSV, NAB) to which God’s Spirit imparts understanding of divine realities. However, since the ‘revelation’ word-group always describes a disclosure given by God, Christ, or the Holy Spirit, or is the result of events brought about by them, it is more likely that our phrase is speaking of the Holy Spirit; hence the NIV rendering the Spirit of wisdom and revelation.^[1] 

The attached genitives, though parallel to Paul’s practice elsewhere when dealing with the human spirit (Rom 8:15; Gal 6:1; 2 Tim 1:7), involve content (“revelation”) that does not derive from the human spirit (contra Abbott, 28). Neither should the phrase be taken in parallel with the participial clause in the next verse to indicate human capacity, since there the passive voice implies a divine source. Rather, the referent here is the Holy Spirit (Best, 163; Hoehner, 257; cf. 1 Cor 2:12, 14; 12:8).^[2]

Hoehner also says, “However, this verse most likely is a reference to the Holy Spirit. [Hoehner, Harold. Ephesians, 257] I recognize that opinions on this text vary. It is for that very reason that Storms should know better than to point to it as supporting his thesis.

From this incredibly weak position, Storms points us to Matt. 11:27: “All things have been handed over to Me by My Father; and no one knows the Son except the Father; nor does anyone know the Father except the Son, and anyone to whom the Son wills to reveal Him.” How does the Son reveal the Father to us? He opens our eyes to the truth of the canonical revelation, God’s word proclaimed, through the gracious work of the Holy Spirit on the human heart. This argument progresses from bad to worse. If Storms has not embarrassed himself enough, he points us to Romans 1:18. This is a text speaking to the force, clarity, and sufficiency of general revelation. It has nothing to say about the subject before us.

At a minimum, Storms has engaged in complete exegetical failure, introduced a couple of red herrings, and is guilty of some of the worse scripture twisting I have witnessed in this area. There is no reason to think that NT prophets or OT prophets received hunches that God was speaking to them similar to modern Pentecostal claims. The idea that biblical prophets ever struggled to know that it was really God speaking to them is foreign to Scripture. God’s prophets knew with certainty that God was moving them to speak and they knew with certainty precisely what God was commanding them to say. There were tingles running along the spine, no gut feeling, no hunches, and no second-guessing in the sense that we see in the Pentecostal churches. Such a perspective understanding is entirely anachronistic.

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^[1] Peter Thomas O’Brien, The Letter to the Ephesians, The Pillar New Testament Commentary (Grand Rapids, MI: W.B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1999), 131–132.

^[2] William J. Larkin, Ephesians: A Handbook on the Greek Text (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2009), 20.

Richard Howe's Critical Thoughts on Presuppositionalism: Part 2 of 2

In his second point, Howe says, “He [Van Til] seems to think that unless the nonbeliever correctly links the elements of his knowledge of the world to the Creator of those elements, he has not understood any of those elements at all.” Once again, Howe’s paper would have at least been considered respectable had he fairly represented Van Til and Bahnsen. Being a student of presuppositional apologetics, I can say with absolute confidence that Howe has either, failed to interact with their materials, or he is deliberately misrepresenting them. This is unfortunate, but not surprising. What presuppositionalism says is not that the nonbeliever has no knowledge at all. Rather, it says that he does not know things, as he ought to know them and he ought to know them as being the objects of the creation of the one triune God. Howe criticizes Van Til’s epistemological approach but fails to lay out his method for how humans can and do know anything at all about reality.

Howe leaves me with the impression that what he fails to see, is not that presuppositionalism gets its ontological and epistemological wires crossed, but rather that presuppositionalism accuses classical apologetics of refusing to begin with basic presuppositions and instead, it proceeds to direct arguments that rest upon the very presuppositions it should first call into question. In other words, Classical Apologetics waits until it is too late in the game, if ever, to challenge the basic presuppositions of the non-Christian worldview. “A direct argument is possible between two people who share relevant assumptions.”[1] Howe conveniently ignores this very basic aspect of presuppositionalism, or so it seems. Howe then charges that the only difference between the theist and atheist is in terms of their degree of knowledge. But this is patently false. It is not just a matter of degree. Instead, it is more a matter of quality. The noetic effects of sin have had devastating epistemological consequences from which man cannot recover on his own. In addition, the knowledge that unbelievers do possess of the world around them is revelational in nature and is derived only as a product of God’s common grace. God has not left us entirely ignorant.

Howe argues that unbelievers need a map, his analogy for arguments and proofs, in order to know God exists while Van Til and Bahnsen argue that unbelievers already knows that God is there. “The knowledge that all men have of God because of natural revelation provides the framework or foundation for any other knowledge they are able to attain.”[2] I do not need a map in order to know that Atlanta exists. I knew Atlanta existed long before I ever saw a map of it. I don’t need a map of the universe in order to know that I am on this planet.

Howe then contends that just because man may be estranged from God, it does not follow that he is estranged from reality itself. Howe argues that this reality may serve as a reference point for the non-Christian to find God. I would contend that God is not lost to the non-believer and that is precisely the difference between us. The Psalmists said that even if he makes his bed in hell, God would be there. Additionally, I cannot help but wonder what Howe means when he says reality. Does he think that there is such a thing as reality that does not require human interpretation? Does Howe believe that brute facts exist? Can man’s interpretation of reality actually be neutral? There is no such thing as neutral reality. Brute facts are a myth. Every fact must be interpreted. If every fact must be interpreted, then that interpretation must take place as an act of the human mind. The mind is involved in interpretation. And if the mind is darkened by sin, blind, and ignorant, then how does that not skew one’s interpretation of reality? Does Howe think that it doesn’t? He seems to think precisely that.

The final point I want to address is Howe’s criticism of TAG. Howe argues that the argument from the impossibility of the contrary is not a logically valid way in which to demonstrate the truth of Christian theism. Howe points out that in “Standard categorical logic, while contraries cannot both be true, they can both be false.” Does Howe really think that Van Til or Bahnsen have the traditional square of opposition in mind in their argument for God? The problem with Howe’s analysis is that he understands Presuppositionalism to employ the “impossibility of the contrary” in a very technical sense. This may or may not be the case. Either way, I think Howe is seriously mistaken. Howe is correct when he says that contraries cannot both be true but they both could be false. For instance, one could say that WV will beat Marshall, and another could say that Marshall will beat WV. Both of these statements could be false but they cannot both be true. The game could end in a tie. This is what we mean by contraries. However, there is a problem with understanding Presuppositionalism in this way. A necessarily true proposition cannot possibly be false and so cannot have a contrary, because two propositions can only be contraries if they can both be false.[3] Hence, contraries only apply to contingent propositions.

If necessarily true statements cannot be false, then this begs the question, what is a necessarily true statement? A necessarily true statement is true by definition. All circles are round. All squares have four sides. These are necessarily true statements. What does Presuppositionalism mean when it says that Christian theism is true because of the impossibility of the contrary? “The presuppositional challenge to the unbeliever is guided by the premise that only the Christian worldview provides the philosophical preconditions necessary for man’s reasoning and knowledge in any field whatever…Any position contrary to Christian theism, therefore, must be seen as philosophically impossible.”[4] The impossibility of the contrary refers to the impossibility of making human experience intelligible, to include reasoning and doing philosophy. That human beings experience and that we reason are necessary truths. You cannot deny them without engaging in them. That God exists is also a necessary truth. You cannot deny Him without affirming Him. This is the crux of presuppositional apologetics. Therefore, Howe is simply mistaken in his accusation that presuppositionalism commits this logical blunder.

The final objection I wish to address is Howe’s assertion that Presuppositionalism only works if the laws of logic are antecedent to Christianity. Howe contends that if presuppositionalism argues that the truth of Christian theism must be presupposed in order for the laws of logic to be valid, then one cannot use the laws of logic to show Christianity to be true. This line of argument is based on Howe’s misunderstanding of how presuppositionalism traverses along the apologetic map. Presuppositionalism does not call upon the laws of logic to prove that Christian theism is true. Presuppositionalism calls upon Christian theism to explain why the laws of logic work the way they do. Secondly, presuppositionalism indeed calls upon and makes swift use of the laws of logic in its dismantling of the non-Christian worldview in all its appearances, reducing it to absurdity in all its renderings. Howe is attempting to place presuppositionalism in a simple dilemma. But it is a false dilemma. We take the one horn of the dilemma and respond that we do not rely on the laws of logic in order to establish the truth of Christian theism. Rather than the laws of logic being antecedent to Christian theism, presuppositionalism contends that God is antecedent to the laws of logic.

In summary then it seems to me that Howe does not quite understand the nature of Presuppositionalism. If he understood the nature of this approach, he would not have expected presuppositional apologists to assume they are mistaken for argument’s sake. While he never came out directly and made this request, the general tone and overall thrust of his criticism certainly carries that force. Presuppositional apologetics indeed argues that God is necessary in order for one to deny His existence. One cannot even begin to talk about the non-existence of God without presupposing the God that is necessary to the very experience they intend to drawn upon in order to deny Him. If the non-Christian worldview cannot demonstrate how it can make the connection between the general and the particular, it cannot even find the entrance ramp for philosophical discussion, let alone defend its truth claims. Classical apologists, like Richard Howe, ignore this critically important component of the apologetic discussion. Only Christian theism can make sense of the relationship between the general and the particular. Unless we presuppose the truth of Christian theism, human experience is wholly unintelligible.

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[1]. Greg L. Bahnsen, Van Til's Apologetic: Readings & Analysis (Phillipsburgm NJ: P&R Publishing, 1998), 485.

[2]. Ibid., 181.

[3]. Irving M. Copi, Carl Cohen, and Kenneth McMahon, Introduction to Logic (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2011), 177.

[4]. Bahnsen, Van Til's Apologetic: Readings & Analysis, 5-6.

Richard Howe's Critical Thoughts on Presuppositionalism: Part 1 of 2

Howe begins his remarks by claiming that Van Til denied any intellectual common ground between the believer and the unbeliever. Supposedly, Van Til believed that to assume such common ground, de facto denies the God of Christianity. However, in his project on The Defense of the Faith, Van Til wrote, “Only by this finding the point of contact in man’s sense of deity that lies underneath his own conception of self-consciousness as ultimate can we be both true to Scripture and effective in reasoning with the natural man. Man, knowing God, refuses to keep God in remembrance (Rom. 1:28).”[1] 

Clearly, Van Til thought there was a point of contact in which we can not only reason with the unbeliever, but also reason effectively with him. Greg Bahnsen, in addressing this misunderstanding of presuppositionalism said, “All men have in common the world created by God, controlled by God, and constantly revealing God. In this case, any area of life or any fact can be used as a point of contact. The denial of neutrality secures, rather than destroys, commonality.”[2] 

This is simply reminding us of what Paul said nearly two-thousand years ago to the Roman Church; “all men know God.” All men willingly pervert the truth of God that they clearly possess. All men are culpable for the knowledge of God they have been given. In other words, the knowledge that God exists is inescapable. There is no need to try to prove to anyone that God exists because God has already proven it to every man. It is indelibly stamped upon the conscience of man. In addition, man has been wired to see it everywhere he turns in creation. Paul said that God is so clearly seen by the non-Christian that they have no apologetic for their non-Christian worldview. This is the common ground upon which both the believer and the unbeliever stand. However, the unbeliever’s willful suppression of this knowledge clearly demonstrates that while the ground is common, it is far from neutral. It is one thing to stand upon the same ground, but quite another to admit that we stand upon the same ground. It is one thing to presuppose God and yet altogether another thing to admit such presuppositions. I may deny that I believe in the laws of mathematics while offering 8 reasons for why I do so. This is a fine, but significant distinction that Howe fails to acknowledge in his critique.

Transcendental Argument for God or Logic?

First, Howe contends that Van Til and Bahnsen offer more of a transcendental argument for the necessity and unavoidability of the laws of logic itself rather than a transcendental argument for the necessity and unavoidability of Trinitarian theism. Howe then points out the unavoidable use of logic. He argues that you have to use logic in order to refute it and that is simply not possible. Hence, logic is inescapable. Howe goes on to say that while it is clear to him how logic is transcendentally necessary, it is not clear to him how God is transcendentally necessary. Howe pointedly remarks that it is not clear to him how God is transcendentally necessary in order for there to be an argument against God.

The presuppositional claim is that without God, human experience, to include the laws of logic would be unintelligible. To claim that God is the necessary precondition for intelligibility is to claim that God must be posited in order to make sense of any experience whatsoever. In order for the laws of logic to have any meaning of any kind, God necessarily exists. In other words, Howe fails to understand that God is the necessary precondition for the laws of logic. Rather than use the laws of logic to prove God’s existence, presuppositionalism seeks to show that God is the reason that the laws of logic work in the first place. The point that presuppositionalism drives home is simply that within their own worldview, a universe of chance, of autonomous human reason, the unbeliever cannot give an account for the laws of logic. The particular and the general have no logical connection under such conditions. How could anything be transcendentally necessary unless there is God who is Himself transcendentally necessary? As Michael Butler points out, TAG starts with human experience; such things as science, love, rationality and moral duties. It then asserts that the existence of the Christian God is the necessary precondition of such experiences. Finally, it proves this indirectly by demonstrating the impossibility of the contrary.[3] We may conclude then that when Howe states that he has yet to encounter where Van Til or Bahnsen make this argument, that it demonstrates he is not as conversant in their respective materials as he thinks he is.

Van Til explains: “A truly transcendental argument takes any fact of experience which it wishes to investigate, and tries to determine what the presuppositions of such a fact must be, in order to make it what it is.”[4] The reason that Howe can see the transcendental necessity of logic but not God is telling. Perhaps Howe relies more on human logic to derive his philosophy than he does on the existence of God. Because God cannot be proved in the manner in which classical apologists claim, it follows that any god that is proved by this method is a god who is something other than the self-contained ontological trinity of Scripture.[5] And that god is not God. The God we know is the self-contained ontological trinity of Scripture. This is the God that gives us the reason for the hope that is in us. To be sure, the classical two-step approach is a derivative of Aristotle rather than Paul, or John, or Peter. Scripture is entirely unaware of such reasoning.

Howe then posits that the presuppositional approach confuses the order of being with the order of knowing. Van Til and Bahnsen have apparently confused ontological necessity with epistemology. Howe uses the city of Atlanta and a map of Atlanta as an analogy to drive home his point. He says, “The presuppositionalist is wrong to think that if an argument leads one to a belief in the existence of God, this God cannot be the God of Christianity.”[6] This is precisely the very question in dispute. Howe talks about the priority of epistemology and metaphysics when what he should be considering is the divine revelation of Romans one, which denies that which his philosophy wants to grant. To be specific, Howe thinks that the sinful mind can rightly read the spiritual map that leads to a right belief in the triune God. Paul categorically denies this position in Romans 1, 8, and 1 Cor. 2:14. Moreover, while there may be small similarities between the existence of God and knowing how to get to God and the existence of the city of Atlanta and knowing how to get to Atlanta, the differences for purposes of this conversation are significant. God is not a physical entity, limited by space and time. People once knew how to get from one place to another prior to the existence of maps. Most people in fact, can find Atlanta without a map. In addition, the epistemic authority of the Christian is Scripture and Scripture says that men do not need to be informed about how to find the belief that God exists because God has built such belief in them via the sensus divinitatis. Howe’s analogy that he borrowed from Packer turns out to be a false analogy in the end.

Howe states, “Presuppositionalists mistakenly assume that to have the argument first in the order of knowing is to tacitly deny that God is first in the order of being.” That is not at all why presuppositionalists argue in the manner in which they do. I think what Van Til and Bahnsen are saying is this: “The anti-theistic conception of the self-contradictory presupposes the theistic conception of the self-contradictory for its operation.” The beauty of the transcendental argument is that if framed properly, it is not defeasible. The elements required to argue for the non-existence of God necessarily presuppose His existence. Belief of any kind presupposes God. Howe gave a good demonstration of this when he showed the transcendental necessity of logic. Howe does not seem to realize that if God cannot be shown to be transcendentally necessary, then Christian theism cannot be proven true. The problem in Howe’s approach and the reason for his view on this point is his view that we can only reach degrees of probability in our argument for God.

Part 2 to follow in a couple of days.

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[1]. Cornelius Van Til, The Defense of the Faith (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing, 1955), 95.

[2]. Greg L. Bahnsen, Always Ready (Nacogdoches, TX: Covenant Media Foundation, 1996), 43.

[3]. Michael R. Butler, “The Transcendental Argument for God's Existence.”

[4]. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 2.

[5]. Ibid. (paraphrase)

[6]. Richard Howe, Some Brief Critical Thoughts on Presuppositionalism.

Sam Storms on Fallible Prophecy: Point 8

Eighth, in conjunction with the previous point, I should also mention that the prophetic warning of Agabus, though correct in speaking of the persecution Paul would endure should he go to Jerusalem, was wrong on two points: (a) it was the Romans who bound Paul, not the Jews (Acts 21:33; 22:29); and (b) far from the Jews delivering Paul into the hands of the Gentiles, he had to be forcibly rescued from them (Acts 21:31-36). Those who insist that the NT gift is no less infallible than its OT counterpart are faced with accounting for this mixture of truth and error. To this point I have only heard that we continuationsts are being "overly pedantic" or are guilty of "precisionism." Yet it appears that the strict standards applied under the OT are now conveniently stretched in the NT under the pressure of a passage that doesn't fit the cessationist theory. Might it not rather be that NT prophecy is occasionally fallible, and therefore to be carefully judged (1 Cor. 14:29; 1 Thess. 5:19-22)? Some have objected to this reading and insist that Paul’s report in Acts 28:17 of what took place in Acts 21 is essentially the same as prophesied by Agabus. But Paul’s point in 28:17 is simply that he was transferred from Roman custody in Jerusalem into Roman custody in Caesarea. In other words, Acts 28:17 is his description of his transfer “out of” Jerusalem into the Roman judicial system at Caesarea (as found in Acts 23:12-35), and is not a description of the events associated with the mob scene in Acts 21:27-36. Agabus cannot so easily let off the hook.

Was Agabus wrong in his prophecy? Did the Jews bind Paul in Jerusalem? Acts 21:30 says the Jews grabbed hold of Paul and dragged him out of the Temple. Then in Acts 22:30, the commander who stopped the Jews from killing Paul brought him before the Sanhedrin. As Roman citizen, the only recourse the Jews would have, would be to hand Paul over to the Roman courts. After Paul’s appearance before the Sanhedrin, about 40 Jews took an oath to eat nothing until they had killed Paul. Their plot was foiled and Paul’s long journey to Rome was underway.

There are prophecies from OT Scripture that were fulfilled in stages and some still are. One has to look no further than Joel 2 and Acts 2 to recognize that prophecy is fulfilled according to God’s timetable and that there may be gaps and means by which God accomplishes His work. Storms costs himself tremendous credibility on this point. When Storms says that Paul’s words in Acts 28:17 are not linked to Agabus’ prophecy in 21:11, it is an obvious case of special pleading. Storms wants unwarranted precision in the supposedly failed prophecy scenario and tremendous generality in this instance. Paul says that he was delivered as a prisoner from Jerusalem into the hands of the Romans. This is exceptionally close to Agabus’ prophecy. It is unlikely Paul was giving a detailed historical accounting of how he got to Rome. Rather, he was recounting the inception of what brought him there their city. It is simply amazing the lengths to which these men will go in order to support a view that is simply unsupportable.

This was a short reply because point 10 looks to be more complex at least in the sense that it raises some additional sub-points that will make it a longer reply. I thought it best not to attempt to join the two. In case you do not see me around on FB, I have left the farm. My FB days are over. In the end, it seems that it is one huge waste of my time. You can always request my email address and I am happy to correspond where time permits.

Sam Storms on Fallible Prophecy: Points 6 and 7

Sixth, related to the above is 1 Corinthians 14:37-38, where Paul writes: “If anyone thinks that he is a prophet or spiritual, he should acknowledge that the things I am writing to you are a command of the Lord. If anyone does not recognize this, he is not recognized.” Paul is clearly claiming a divine authority for his words that he is just as obviously denying to the Corinthians. “According to Paul, the words of the prophets at Corinth were not and could not have been sufficiently authoritative to show Paul to be wrong” (Grudem, 68).

And yet Paul believed the prophecy at Corinth to be a good and helpful gift of God, for he immediately thereafter exhorts the Corinthians once again to “earnestly desire to prophesy” (v. 39)! Paul obviously believed that the spiritual gift of congregational prophecy that operated at a lower level of authority than did the apostolic, canonical, expression of it was still extremely valuable to the church.

First all, Paul is not directing his comments to the ideal of prophecy, or the content of prophecy. Nor is Paul directing his comments at the authority of prophetic words. In addition, Paul is not directing these comments at prophecy alone. His comments here are directed at everything he has just said. It is a solemn warning by the apostle that people that ignore his words are ignoring the commandment of the Lord. The closest thing we can say about how this command relates to prophecy is that it concerns the format and order for how it was to proceed in the ancient Corinthian Church. In addition, this command also applied to the use of the gift of languages or tongues in that Church. The truth is that this chapter is completely disregarded by nearly every Pentecostal church in existence. I can say without hesitation or exaggeration that I never witnessed a Pentecostal church or pastor that actually submitted to these plain teachings given to Corinth. Pentecostals and Charismatics claim that this does not apply to the supernatural “prayer language.” And in so doing, they reduce Paul’s commands to meaningless nonsense and logical absurdities. Storm and Grudem are simply wrong that Paul’s instructions place his command over the actual content of first-century prophetic utterances. It does nothing of the sort.

Seventh, although I don’t have space to provide an extensive exegetical explanation of Acts 21, I believe we see in this narrative a perfect example of how people (the disciples at Tyre) could prophesy by the Spirit and yet not do so infallibly or at a level equal to Scripture. Their misguided, but sincere, application of this revelation was to tell Paul ("through the Spirit," v. 4) not to go to Jerusalem, counsel which he directly disobeyed (cf. Acts 20:22).

There is nothing in the text to lead us to believe that these individuals were prophesying to Paul by the Lord, not to go to Jerusalem. If we look at Acts 20:23, Paul says the Holy Spirit is testifying to him in every city that bonds and afflictions await him. We see this played out in 21:4. These men knew by the Spirit, what was waiting for Paul in Jerusalem. They did not want this for Paul and tried to persuade him not to go near Jerusalem. However, just a few verses later, we see a different kind of event. We see Agabus prophesying that the Jews will certainly be responsible for his eventual captivity and the response of the brethren is the same as v. 4. They beg Paul not to go. Nowhere does God warn Paul directly not to go. After all, the Holy Spirit has told him all along what is going to happen to him. To understand this as the Holy Spirit commanding him not to go is simply wrong. There is no language in the text that demonstrates that Paul received any commands from the Lord that he disobeyed.

The Spirit’s role is best seen as informing them of those coming hardships for the apostle. Their very natural reaction was to urge him not to go. Their failure to deter him only heightens the emphasis on Paul’s firm conviction that God was leading him to Jerusalem and had a purpose for him there.^[1]

The fact is that the prophecy given by Agabus was realized. Everything the Spirit warned Paul about concerning his future actually came to pass. There was no false-prophecy as some like to claim. There was no disobedience on Paul’s part as others wish to claim. Paul was told that he was going into bonds and that great suffering awaited him. It happened just as God told Paul it would happen. If only modern Charismatics and Pentecostals experienced the same phenomena the ancient Church experienced, perhaps this conversation would be more stimulating. As it stands, what we see are men like Grudem and Storms stretching the text beyond its exegetical limits in order to read it through the modern, Charismatic grid. Thus far, Storms has failed to establish the validity of a single one of his points. He has three more opportunities to gain some traction.

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^[1] John B. Polhill, Acts, vol. 26, The New American Commentary (Nashville: Broadman & Holman Publishers, 1995), 433.

Sam Storms on Infallible Prophecy: Point Number Five

Fifth, yet another statement in 1 Corinthians 14 confirms this understanding of NT prophecy. In v. 36 Paul asks, “Or was it from you that the word of God came?” He doesn’t say, “Did the word of God originate with (or “first go forth from”) you,” as some have suggested. Let’s not forget that the “word of God” didn’t originate with Paul either!

Rather, Paul’s statement is designed to prevent them from making up guidelines for public worship, based on an alleged prophetic word, contrary to what he has just stated. His point is that a Scripture quality, authoritative “word of God” has not, in fact, been forthcoming from the Corinthian prophets. Paul does not deny that they have truly prophesied, but he denies that their “words” were equal in authority to his own. Such “words” were in fact of a lesser authority.

In order to make sure we continue to focus on the subject, I want to remind you that the issue at stake here is the quality of NT prophecy. Sam Storms and other non-cessationists claim that it is of a lessor quality or authority than either OT prophecy or the teachings of the apostles that eventually became encapsulated in Scripture. Mr. Storms is working through ten points that he believes supports his argument. In reviewing his argument, I am searching for any implication in the text, properly interpreted of course, that lends support to Storms’ argument.

In his fifth point, Storms claims that 1 Cor. 14:36 lends support to his view that NT prophecy is of a lessor authority or quality than canonical Scripture. It reads as follows, ἢ ἀφʼ ὑμῶν ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ ἐξῆλθεν, ἢ εἰς ὑμᾶς μόνους κατήντησεν; The literal translation is; “Or from you the word of God went out, or to you only has it come?” Paul uses the spatial frame “from you” to draw extra attention to the tone of his argument.

Storms has opened up a real can or worms in this section. If Paul is referring to prophecy when he uses the phrase, ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ, then Storms seems to have shot his own foot. This phrase is always used of the authoritative word of God. It appears 11 times in NA28 and in every single case there is nothing to distinguish it from itself. Everywhere it appears it appears as the authoritative communication from the one triune God.

So then, what was Paul actually getting at with this question? Was Paul actually dealing with the authoritative nature of NT prophecy? Can we really interact with this verse through such a contemporary lens? If we knew nothing about modern, contemporary claims of prophetic utterances, would we even be looking at the text from Storms’ perspective? I find it difficult to believe that we can honestly answer that question in the affirmative. It seems that Storms continues to interpret 1 Corinthians 14 through the lens of modern Charismatic experience.

Even if the Corinthian believers were not prophesying and were only preaching the Word of God and teaching it, could Paul have said the very same thing to them? I think we can easily answer in the affirmative. The Corinthian believers were not in sole possession of the Word of God. God’s word had gone out to the universal church, and the Corinthian believers did not have the corner on the market of divine truth. Like every other community, the Corinthian group must submit to apostolic authority.

“As TEV makes clear, the two halves of this verse balance one another; the Christian message neither began nor ended in Corinth. The implication is that the Corinthians have no right to decide independently of other Christian communities how Christians should believe.”^[1]

“The balance for the Corinthian Christians is that they are one of a number of churches that now stretch across the cities of the eastern Roman empire. They may live in one of the most important cities of the province, but they need to learn humility.”^[2]

“Witherington offers two useful observations on v. 36. First, he perceives the point of Paul’s rhetorical questions to lie in the scenario that “it appears the Corinthians are trying to make up their own rules, and perhaps thinking their own word is sufficient or authoritative or even the word of God for themselves.”^[3]

“Who do they think they are anyway? is the implication; has God given them a special word that allows them both to reject Paul’s instructions, on the one hand, and be so out of touch with the other churches, on the other?”[4]

There is no connection at all between 1 Cor. 14:36 with the present argument put forth by Storms. There is no reason to think that Paul is concerned to help the Corinthians understand that their local prophetic utterances are somehow less authoritative than Scripture. What Paul is concerned with is the autonomous desires of this community and their spiritual pride, which emerges throughout the letter. Storms’ fifth point does absolutely nothing to advance his case and lends not an ounce of support to his contention that there is a difference between the prophetic Word of God coming through prophets and the canonical Word of God encapsulated in Scripture.

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^[1] Paul Ellingworth, Howard Hatton, and Paul Ellingworth, A Handbook on Paul’s First Letter to the Corinthians, UBS Handbook Series (New York: United Bible Societies, 1995), 326.

^[2] Clinton E. Arnold, Zondervan Illustrated Bible Backgrounds Commentary: Romans to Philemon., vol. 3 (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2002), 174.

^[3] Anthony C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians: a Commentary on the Greek Text, New International Greek Testament Commentary (Grand Rapids, MI: W.B. Eerdmans, 2000), 1161.

[4] Gordon D. Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1987), 710.

Sam Storms on Fallible Prophecy: Points 3 & 4

Third, although I realize that cessationists have a different understanding of 1 Corinthians 14:29, I believe Paul is saying here much the same thing as he said in 1 Thessalonians 5:19-22. “Weigh” (diakrino) what is said by the prophets. That is to say, sift the word and identify what is of God and what is the human and thus fallible admixture. I find it difficult to believe that Paul would have commanded this sort of assessment if all prophetic words were by definition inerrant Scripture quality revelation from God. See more here.

The general thrust of Storms’ entire argument is that he considers Paul to have modern Charismatic prophecy in view. In other words, Storms is simply assuming that his view that ancient prophecy was the same as modern prophecy is correct. But the descriptions we read in Scripture and the phenomenon we see among Charismatics are remarkably different. Modern Charismatic prophecy and prophets simply just start speaking at the slightest hint of an emotional sensation. They have no idea what is going to come out of their mouths. The rational mind is entirely suspended and replaced with a radical, mystical sensation and they just begin to prophesy.

Second, there is no indication in this text that the prophets are prophesying. Storms simply assumes this to be the case. There is no reason for this assumption other than his desire to grasp for something to prove his case. Paul informs the Church to have the prophets speak, one at a time, and then that their sermon is to be judged for its faithfulness to the truth they have received from the apostles and their associates.

Third, there is no indication in this context that Paul is dealing with the more narrow use of prophecy. Rather, it seems clear that he is dealing with preaching, proclaiming, teaching, and exhorting. He uses the words μανθάνω (manthano) and παρακαλέω (parakaleo) which means to learn and to be encouraged. There is no indicating that he has forth telling the future in mind whatsoever. In addition, how could anyone ever judge whether new revelation was right or wrong unless he or she compared it to what had already been revealed. How could we know that predictive personal prophecy was from God? If the event were not going to happen for years, we would simply have to wait. We could not scrutinize or examine it for years to come. However, if these speeches were objective truth claims, then the ability to examine them in light of previously given revelation would be possible.

Fourth, in 1 Corinthians 14:30-31 Paul writes: “If a revelation is made to another sitting there, let the first be silent. For you can all prophesy one by one, so that all may learn and all be encouraged.” Paul appears to be indifferent toward the possibility that the first prophecy might be lost and never heard by the church.

Storms again assumes that this revelation that has been revealed to someone takes the shape of modern claims. There is no reason to think this is the case. The ancient form of revelation seems radically different from modern claims. In modern Pentecostalism, the experience is one of a radically heightened emotion. This does not at all come into view when one examines the more detailed accounts of revelation in Scripture.

The emphasis in this text is clearly on the order of the service and the avoidance of confusion. Apparently, when the first prophet was speaking, or even perhaps prophesying, a second would just jump in and begin to do his thing as well. Paul’s concern about order and his point out that God is a God of order indicates that the typical ancient patter was not being honored. The idea that the first prophet could not resume when the second prophet had finished, and that such a position by Paul indicated some sort of disregard for the authority of the prophetic words being uttered is sheer conjecture. Paul’s point that the Spirit of the prophets are subject to the prophets contradicts Storms assertion directly.

Finally, Sorms’ view that subjecting ancient prophecy to scrutiny makes is less than the Word of God encapsulated in Scripture is just plain wrong. In order to illustrate why I think this is the case, we may turn to other sections of Scripture that indicate clear why I think this to be the case. Acts 17:11 is a perfect example for this discussion and it alone is sufficient to demonstrate my assertion. Luke tells us that the Jews at Berea were more noble minded than the Jews at Thessalonica because they scrutinized Paul’s gospel proclamation by examining his arguments in light of the Old Testament revelation. The idea that we do not judge the assertions and claims of men when they say they speak for God is utterly ridiculous. Even the proclamations and arguments of Paul were judged according to prior revelation. This did not make those words any less authoritative at all. Is simply means that God is a rational God and He has not left us without a standard by which we can know when He is speaking and when He is not.

Storms’ argument cannot see the forest for the trees. He enters the conversation with a bias against the cessationist position. I was saved in the Pentecostal churches. I was a licensed minister in the Church of God in Cleveland, TN. I come to this subject with both an experiential and theological perspective. I know what Pentecostal prophecy looks like. I have experienced the experience they claim is God revealing things to them. It is highly subjective and arbitrary. It is driven by pure emotion. Angels are not standing in front of them talking to them. God is not appearing to them in dreams. They have dreams that they claim are from God but the truth is they could just as much be from Papa John’s Pizza. There is no way to really tell. When we compare modern claims with ancient facts, the two are remarkably different. Give me Scripture, give me grace to understand it, give me grace to live it and I shall know Him and the power of His resurrection. Then and only then will my soul be satisfied!