Wednesday, February 12, 2014

Sam Storms on Fallible: Point Nine

Ninth, yet another reason why I believe the cessationist is wrong on this point is the failure to recognize different ways or senses in which God might “reveal” something to us. In Philippians 3:15 he tells the church that “if in anything you think otherwise, God will reveal that also to you.” And in Ephesians 1:17 Paul prays that a “spirit of wisdom and revelation” would be granted to believers. “Once more,” notes Grudem, “it would not be possible to think that every time a believer gained new insight into his privileges as a Christian and reported it to a friend, the actual words of that speech would have been thought to be God’s very words. It would be the report of something God had ‘revealed’ to the Christian, but the report would only come in merely human words” (Grudem, Prophecy, 65). We see two other similar uses of the verb or noun form of “reveal/revelation” in Matthew 11:27 and Romans 1:18.

Storms’ appeal to Philippians 3:15 is simply befuddling. “Let us therefore, as many as are perfect, have this attitude; and if in anything you have a different attitude, God will reveal that also to you; 16. However, let us keep living by that same standard to which we have attained.” Clearly Paul is not talking about the various forms and methods of revelation. He is talking about the godly attitude of pressing toward the mark for the prize of the high calling of God in Christ Jesus. He is talking about spiritual growth. This is the attitude we are to display. Moreover, if we display, or lack this spiritual discipline, God will reveal that to us. How does God do that? He reveals this to us through His word. To content that Paul had our subject in mind when he penned his letter to the Philippians is a complete exegetical failure.

Storms then points us to Eph. 1:17 as if this text provides some shelter for his flimsy view. But once more, we discover that Ephesians 1:17 has no bearing on our discussion. It is quite likely that Paul had in mind the Holy Spirit when he penned this letter, not the human spirit. The phrase ‘the spirit of wisdom and revelation’ could be a reference to the believer’s own spirit (RSV, NAB) to which God’s Spirit imparts understanding of divine realities. However, since the ‘revelation’ word-group always describes a disclosure given by God, Christ, or the Holy Spirit, or is the result of events brought about by them, it is more likely that our phrase is speaking of the Holy Spirit; hence the NIV rendering the Spirit of wisdom and revelation.[1] 

The attached genitives, though parallel to Paul’s practice elsewhere when dealing with the human spirit (Rom 8:15; Gal 6:1; 2 Tim 1:7), involve content (“revelation”) that does not derive from the human spirit (contra Abbott, 28). Neither should the phrase be taken in parallel with the participial clause in the next verse to indicate human capacity, since there the passive voice implies a divine source. Rather, the referent here is the Holy Spirit (Best, 163; Hoehner, 257; cf. 1 Cor 2:12, 14; 12:8).[2]

Hoehner also says, “However, this verse most likely is a reference to the Holy Spirit. [Hoehner, Harold. Ephesians, 257] I recognize that opinions on this text vary. It is for that very reason that Storms should know better than to point to it as supporting his thesis.

From this incredibly weak position, Storms points us to Matt. 11:27: “All things have been handed over to Me by My Father; and no one knows the Son except the Father; nor does anyone know the Father except the Son, and anyone to whom the Son wills to reveal Him.” How does the Son reveal the Father to us? He opens our eyes to the truth of the canonical revelation, God’s word proclaimed, through the gracious work of the Holy Spirit on the human heart. This argument progresses from bad to worse. If Storms has not embarrassed himself enough, he points us to Romans 1:18. This is a text speaking to the force, clarity, and sufficiency of general revelation. It has nothing to say about the subject before us.

At a minimum, Storms has engaged in complete exegetical failure, introduced a couple of red herrings, and is guilty of some of the worse scripture twisting I have witnessed in this area. There is no reason to think that NT prophets or OT prophets received hunches that God was speaking to them similar to modern Pentecostal claims. The idea that biblical prophets ever struggled to know that it was really God speaking to them is foreign to Scripture. God’s prophets knew with certainty that God was moving them to speak and they knew with certainty precisely what God was commanding them to say. There were tingles running along the spine, no gut feeling, no hunches, and no second-guessing in the sense that we see in the Pentecostal churches. Such a perspective understanding is entirely anachronistic.




[1] Peter Thomas O’Brien, The Letter to the Ephesians, The Pillar New Testament Commentary (Grand Rapids, MI: W.B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1999), 131–132.
[2] William J. Larkin, Ephesians: A Handbook on the Greek Text (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2009), 20.

Tuesday, February 11, 2014

Richard Howe's Critical Thoughts on Presuppositionalism: Part 2 of 2

In his second point, Howe says, “He [Van Til] seems to think that unless the nonbeliever correctly links the elements of his knowledge of the world to the Creator of those elements, he has not understood any of those elements at all.” Once again, Howe’s paper would have at least been considered respectable had he fairly represented Van Til and Bahnsen. Being a student of presuppositional apologetics, I can say with absolute confidence that Howe has either, failed to interact with their materials, or he is deliberately misrepresenting them. This is unfortunate, but not surprising. What presuppositionalism says is not that the nonbeliever has no knowledge at all. Rather, it says that he does not know things, as he ought to know them and he ought to know them as being the objects of the creation of the one triune God. Howe criticizes Van Til’s epistemological approach but fails to lay out his method for how humans can and do know anything at all about reality.

Howe leaves me with the impression that what he fails to see, is not that presuppositionalism gets its ontological and epistemological wires crossed, but rather that presuppositionalism accuses classical apologetics of refusing to begin with basic presuppositions and instead, it proceeds to direct arguments that rest upon the very presuppositions it should first call into question. In other words, Classical Apologetics waits until it is too late in the game, if ever, to challenge the basic presuppositions of the non-Christian worldview. “A direct argument is possible between two people who share relevant assumptions.”[1] Howe conveniently ignores this very basic aspect of presuppositionalism, or so it seems. Howe then charges that the only difference between the theist and atheist is in terms of their degree of knowledge. But this is patently false. It is not just a matter of degree. Instead, it is more a matter of quality. The noetic effects of sin have had devastating epistemological consequences from which man cannot recover on his own. In addition, the knowledge that unbelievers do possess of the world around them is revelational in nature and is derived only as a product of God’s common grace. God has not left us entirely ignorant.

Howe argues that unbelievers need a map, his analogy for arguments and proofs, in order to know God exists while Van Til and Bahnsen argue that unbelievers already knows that God is there. “The knowledge that all men have of God because of natural revelation provides the framework or foundation for any other knowledge they are able to attain.”[2] I do not need a map in order to know that Atlanta exists. I knew Atlanta existed long before I ever saw a map of it. I don’t need a map of the universe in order to know that I am on this planet.

Howe then contends that just because man may be estranged from God, it does not follow that he is estranged from reality itself. Howe argues that this reality may serve as a reference point for the non-Christian to find God. I would contend that God is not lost to the non-believer and that is precisely the difference between us. The Psalmists said that even if he makes his bed in hell, God would be there. Additionally, I cannot help but wonder what Howe means when he says reality. Does he think that there is such a thing as reality that does not require human interpretation? Does Howe believe that brute facts exist? Can man’s interpretation of reality actually be neutral? There is no such thing as neutral reality. Brute facts are a myth. Every fact must be interpreted. If every fact must be interpreted, then that interpretation must take place as an act of the human mind. The mind is involved in interpretation. And if the mind is darkened by sin, blind, and ignorant, then how does that not skew one’s interpretation of reality? Does Howe think that it doesn’t? He seems to think precisely that.

The final point I want to address is Howe’s criticism of TAG. Howe argues that the argument from the impossibility of the contrary is not a logically valid way in which to demonstrate the truth of Christian theism. Howe points out that in “Standard categorical logic, while contraries cannot both be true, they can both be false.” Does Howe really think that Van Til or Bahnsen have the traditional square of opposition in mind in their argument for God? The problem with Howe’s analysis is that he understands Presuppositionalism to employ the “impossibility of the contrary” in a very technical sense. This may or may not be the case. Either way, I think Howe is seriously mistaken. Howe is correct when he says that contraries cannot both be true but they both could be false. For instance, one could say that WV will beat Marshall, and another could say that Marshall will beat WV. Both of these statements could be false but they cannot both be true. The game could end in a tie. This is what we mean by contraries. However, there is a problem with understanding Presuppositionalism in this way. A necessarily true proposition cannot possibly be false and so cannot have a contrary, because two propositions can only be contraries if they can both be false.[3] Hence, contraries only apply to contingent propositions.

If necessarily true statements cannot be false, then this begs the question, what is a necessarily true statement? A necessarily true statement is true by definition. All circles are round. All squares have four sides. These are necessarily true statements. What does Presuppositionalism mean when it says that Christian theism is true because of the impossibility of the contrary? “The presuppositional challenge to the unbeliever is guided by the premise that only the Christian worldview provides the philosophical preconditions necessary for man’s reasoning and knowledge in any field whatever…Any position contrary to Christian theism, therefore, must be seen as philosophically impossible.”[4] The impossibility of the contrary refers to the impossibility of making human experience intelligible, to include reasoning and doing philosophy. That human beings experience and that we reason are necessary truths. You cannot deny them without engaging in them. That God exists is also a necessary truth. You cannot deny Him without affirming Him. This is the crux of presuppositional apologetics. Therefore, Howe is simply mistaken in his accusation that presuppositionalism commits this logical blunder.

The final objection I wish to address is Howe’s assertion that Presuppositionalism only works if the laws of logic are antecedent to Christianity. Howe contends that if presuppositionalism argues that the truth of Christian theism must be presupposed in order for the laws of logic to be valid, then one cannot use the laws of logic to show Christianity to be true. This line of argument is based on Howe’s misunderstanding of how presuppositionalism traverses along the apologetic map. Presuppositionalism does not call upon the laws of logic to prove that Christian theism is true. Presuppositionalism calls upon Christian theism to explain why the laws of logic work the way they do. Secondly, presuppositionalism indeed calls upon and makes swift use of the laws of logic in its dismantling of the non-Christian worldview in all its appearances, reducing it to absurdity in all its renderings. Howe is attempting to place presuppositionalism in a simple dilemma. But it is a false dilemma. We take the one horn of the dilemma and respond that we do not rely on the laws of logic in order to establish the truth of Christian theism. Rather than the laws of logic being antecedent to Christian theism, presuppositionalism contends that God is antecedent to the laws of logic.

In summary then it seems to me that Howe does not quite understand the nature of Presuppositionalism. If he understood the nature of this approach, he would not have expected presuppositional apologists to assume they are mistaken for argument’s sake. While he never came out directly and made this request, the general tone and overall thrust of his criticism certainly carries that force. Presuppositional apologetics indeed argues that God is necessary in order for one to deny His existence. One cannot even begin to talk about the non-existence of God without presupposing the God that is necessary to the very experience they intend to drawn upon in order to deny Him. If the non-Christian worldview cannot demonstrate how it can make the connection between the general and the particular, it cannot even find the entrance ramp for philosophical discussion, let alone defend its truth claims. Classical apologists, like Richard Howe, ignore this critically important component of the apologetic discussion. Only Christian theism can make sense of the relationship between the general and the particular. Unless we presuppose the truth of Christian theism, human experience is wholly unintelligible.



[1]. Greg L. Bahnsen, Van Til's Apologetic: Readings & Analysis (Phillipsburgm NJ: P&R Publishing, 1998), 485.
[2]. Ibid., 181.
[3]. Irving M. Copi, Carl Cohen, and Kenneth McMahon, Introduction to Logic (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2011), 177.
[4]. Bahnsen, Van Til's Apologetic: Readings & Analysis, 5-6.

Sunday, February 9, 2014

Richard Howe's Critical Thoughts on Presuppositionalism: Part 1 of 2


Howe begins his remarks by claiming that Van Til denied any intellectual common ground between the believer and the unbeliever. Supposedly, Van Til believed that to assume such common ground, de facto denies the God of Christianity. However, in his project on The Defense of the Faith, Van Til wrote, “Only by this finding the point of contact in man’s sense of deity that lies underneath his own conception of self-consciousness as ultimate can we be both true to Scripture and effective in reasoning with the natural man. Man, knowing God, refuses to keep God in remembrance (Rom. 1:28).”[1] 

Clearly, Van Til thought there was a point of contact in which we can not only reason with the unbeliever, but also reason effectively with him. Greg Bahnsen, in addressing this misunderstanding of presuppositionalism said, “All men have in common the world created by God, controlled by God, and constantly revealing God. In this case, any area of life or any fact can be used as a point of contact. The denial of neutrality secures, rather than destroys, commonality.”[2] 

This is simply reminding us of what Paul said nearly two-thousand years ago to the Roman Church; “all men know God.” All men willingly pervert the truth of God that they clearly possess. All men are culpable for the knowledge of God they have been given. In other words, the knowledge that God exists is inescapable. There is no need to try to prove to anyone that God exists because God has already proven it to every man. It is indelibly stamped upon the conscience of man. In addition, man has been wired to see it everywhere he turns in creation. Paul said that God is so clearly seen by the non-Christian that they have no apologetic for their non-Christian worldview. This is the common ground upon which both the believer and the unbeliever stand. However, the unbeliever’s willful suppression of this knowledge clearly demonstrates that while the ground is common, it is far from neutral. It is one thing to stand upon the same ground, but quite another to admit that we stand upon the same ground. It is one thing to presuppose God and yet altogether another thing to admit such presuppositions. I may deny that I believe in the laws of mathematics while offering 8 reasons for why I do so. This is a fine, but significant distinction that Howe fails to acknowledge in his critique.

Transcendental Argument for God or Logic?

First, Howe contends that Van Til and Bahnsen offer more of a transcendental argument for the necessity and unavoidability of the laws of logic itself rather than a transcendental argument for the necessity and unavoidability of Trinitarian theism. Howe then points out the unavoidable use of logic. He argues that you have to use logic in order to refute it and that is simply not possible. Hence, logic is inescapable. Howe goes on to say that while it is clear to him how logic is transcendentally necessary, it is not clear to him how God is transcendentally necessary. Howe pointedly remarks that it is not clear to him how God is transcendentally necessary in order for there to be an argument against God.

The presuppositional claim is that without God, human experience, to include the laws of logic would be unintelligible. To claim that God is the necessary precondition for intelligibility is to claim that God must be posited in order to make sense of any experience whatsoever. In order for the laws of logic to have any meaning of any kind, God necessarily exists. In other words, Howe fails to understand that God is the necessary precondition for the laws of logic. Rather than use the laws of logic to prove God’s existence, presuppositionalism seeks to show that God is the reason that the laws of logic work in the first place. The point that presuppositionalism drives home is simply that within their own worldview, a universe of chance, of autonomous human reason, the unbeliever cannot give an account for the laws of logic. The particular and the general have no logical connection under such conditions. How could anything be transcendentally necessary unless there is God who is Himself transcendentally necessary? As Michael Butler points out, TAG starts with human experience; such things as science, love, rationality and moral duties. It then asserts that the existence of the Christian God is the necessary precondition of such experiences. Finally, it proves this indirectly by demonstrating the impossibility of the contrary.[3] We may conclude then that when Howe states that he has yet to encounter where Van Til or Bahnsen make this argument, that it demonstrates he is not as conversant in their respective materials as he thinks he is.

Van Til explains: “A truly transcendental argument takes any fact of experience which it wishes to investigate, and tries to determine what the presuppositions of such a fact must be, in order to make it what it is.”[4] The reason that Howe can see the transcendental necessity of logic but not God is telling. Perhaps Howe relies more on human logic to derive his philosophy than he does on the existence of God. Because God cannot be proved in the manner in which classical apologists claim, it follows that any god that is proved by this method is a god who is something other than the self-contained ontological trinity of Scripture.[5] And that god is not God. The God we know is the self-contained ontological trinity of Scripture. This is the God that gives us the reason for the hope that is in us. To be sure, the classical two-step approach is a derivative of Aristotle rather than Paul, or John, or Peter. Scripture is entirely unaware of such reasoning.

Howe then posits that the presuppositional approach confuses the order of being with the order of knowing. Van Til and Bahnsen have apparently confused ontological necessity with epistemology. Howe uses the city of Atlanta and a map of Atlanta as an analogy to drive home his point. He says, “The presuppositionalist is wrong to think that if an argument leads one to a belief in the existence of God, this God cannot be the God of Christianity.”[6] This is precisely the very question in dispute. Howe talks about the priority of epistemology and metaphysics when what he should be considering is the divine revelation of Romans one, which denies that which his philosophy wants to grant. To be specific, Howe thinks that the sinful mind can rightly read the spiritual map that leads to a right belief in the triune God. Paul categorically denies this position in Romans 1, 8, and 1 Cor. 2:14. Moreover, while there may be small similarities between the existence of God and knowing how to get to God and the existence of the city of Atlanta and knowing how to get to Atlanta, the differences for purposes of this conversation are significant. God is not a physical entity, limited by space and time. People once knew how to get from one place to another prior to the existence of maps. Most people in fact, can find Atlanta without a map. In addition, the epistemic authority of the Christian is Scripture and Scripture says that men do not need to be informed about how to find the belief that God exists because God has built such belief in them via the sensus divinitatis. Howe’s analogy that he borrowed from Packer turns out to be a false analogy in the end.

Howe states, “Presuppositionalists mistakenly assume that to have the argument first in the order of knowing is to tacitly deny that God is first in the order of being.” That is not at all why presuppositionalists argue in the manner in which they do. I think what Van Til and Bahnsen are saying is this: “The anti-theistic conception of the self-contradictory presupposes the theistic conception of the self-contradictory for its operation.” The beauty of the transcendental argument is that if framed properly, it is not defeasible. The elements required to argue for the non-existence of God necessarily presuppose His existence. Belief of any kind presupposes God. Howe gave a good demonstration of this when he showed the transcendental necessity of logic. Howe does not seem to realize that if God cannot be shown to be transcendentally necessary, then Christian theism cannot be proven true. The problem in Howe’s approach and the reason for his view on this point is his view that we can only reach degrees of probability in our argument for God.

Part 2 to follow in a couple of days.

[1]. Cornelius Van Til, The Defense of the Faith (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing, 1955), 95.
[2]. Greg L. Bahnsen, Always Ready (Nacogdoches, TX: Covenant Media Foundation, 1996), 43.
[3]. Michael R. Butler, “The Transcendental Argument for God's Existence.”
[4]. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 2.
[5]. Ibid. (paraphrase)
[6]. Richard Howe, Some Brief Critical Thoughts on Presuppositionalism.

Saturday, February 8, 2014

Sam Storms on Fallible Prophecy: Point 8


Eighth, in conjunction with the previous point, I should also mention that the prophetic warning of Agabus, though correct in speaking of the persecution Paul would endure should he go to Jerusalem, was wrong on two points: (a) it was the Romans who bound Paul, not the Jews (Acts 21:33; 22:29); and (b) far from the Jews delivering Paul into the hands of the Gentiles, he had to be forcibly rescued from them (Acts 21:31-36). Those who insist that the NT gift is no less infallible than its OT counterpart are faced with accounting for this mixture of truth and error. To this point I have only heard that we continuationsts are being "overly pedantic" or are guilty of "precisionism." Yet it appears that the strict standards applied under the OT are now conveniently stretched in the NT under the pressure of a passage that doesn't fit the cessationist theory. Might it not rather be that NT prophecy is occasionally fallible, and therefore to be carefully judged (1 Cor. 14:29; 1 Thess. 5:19-22)? Some have objected to this reading and insist that Paul’s report in Acts 28:17 of what took place in Acts 21 is essentially the same as prophesied by Agabus. But Paul’s point in 28:17 is simply that he was transferred from Roman custody in Jerusalem into Roman custody in Caesarea. In other words, Acts 28:17 is his description of his transfer “out of” Jerusalem into the Roman judicial system at Caesarea (as found in Acts 23:12-35), and is not a description of the events associated with the mob scene in Acts 21:27-36. Agabus cannot so easily let off the hook.

Was Agabus wrong in his prophecy? Did the Jews bind Paul in Jerusalem? Acts 21:30 says the Jews grabbed hold of Paul and dragged him out of the Temple. Then in Acts 22:30, the commander who stopped the Jews from killing Paul brought him before the Sanhedrin. As Roman citizen, the only recourse the Jews would have, would be to hand Paul over to the Roman courts. After Paul’s appearance before the Sanhedrin, about 40 Jews took an oath to eat nothing until they had killed Paul. Their plot was foiled and Paul’s long journey to Rome was underway.

There are prophecies from OT Scripture that were fulfilled in stages and some still are. One has to look no further than Joel 2 and Acts 2 to recognize that prophecy is fulfilled according to God’s timetable and that there may be gaps and means by which God accomplishes His work. Storms costs himself tremendous credibility on this point. When Storms says that Paul’s words in Acts 28:17 are not linked to Agabus’ prophecy in 21:11, it is an obvious case of special pleading. Storms wants unwarranted precision in the supposedly failed prophecy scenario and tremendous generality in this instance. Paul says that he was delivered as a prisoner from Jerusalem into the hands of the Romans. This is exceptionally close to Agabus’ prophecy. It is unlikely Paul was giving a detailed historical accounting of how he got to Rome. Rather, he was recounting the inception of what brought him there their city. It is simply amazing the lengths to which these men will go in order to support a view that is simply unsupportable.


This was a short reply because point 10 looks to be more complex at least in the sense that it raises some additional sub-points that will make it a longer reply. I thought it best not to attempt to join the two. In case you do not see me around on FB, I have left the farm. My FB days are over. In the end, it seems that it is one huge waste of my time. You can always request my email address and I am happy to correspond where time permits.

Thursday, February 6, 2014

Sam Storms on Fallible Prophecy: Points 6 and 7


Sixth, related to the above is 1 Corinthians 14:37-38, where Paul writes: “If anyone thinks that he is a prophet or spiritual, he should acknowledge that the things I am writing to you are a command of the Lord. If anyone does not recognize this, he is not recognized.” Paul is clearly claiming a divine authority for his words that he is just as obviously denying to the Corinthians. “According to Paul, the words of the prophets at Corinth were not and could not have been sufficiently authoritative to show Paul to be wrong” (Grudem, 68).

And yet Paul believed the prophecy at Corinth to be a good and helpful gift of God, for he immediately thereafter exhorts the Corinthians once again to “earnestly desire to prophesy” (v. 39)! Paul obviously believed that the spiritual gift of congregational prophecy that operated at a lower level of authority than did the apostolic, canonical, expression of it was still extremely valuable to the church.

First all, Paul is not directing his comments to the ideal of prophecy, or the content of prophecy. Nor is Paul directing his comments at the authority of prophetic words. In addition, Paul is not directing these comments at prophecy alone. His comments here are directed at everything he has just said. It is a solemn warning by the apostle that people that ignore his words are ignoring the commandment of the Lord. The closest thing we can say about how this command relates to prophecy is that it concerns the format and order for how it was to proceed in the ancient Corinthian Church. In addition, this command also applied to the use of the gift of languages or tongues in that Church. The truth is that this chapter is completely disregarded by nearly every Pentecostal church in existence. I can say without hesitation or exaggeration that I never witnessed a Pentecostal church or pastor that actually submitted to these plain teachings given to Corinth. Pentecostals and Charismatics claim that this does not apply to the supernatural “prayer language.” And in so doing, they reduce Paul’s commands to meaningless nonsense and logical absurdities. Storm and Grudem are simply wrong that Paul’s instructions place his command over the actual content of first-century prophetic utterances. It does nothing of the sort.

Seventh, although I don’t have space to provide an extensive exegetical explanation of Acts 21, I believe we see in this narrative a perfect example of how people (the disciples at Tyre) could prophesy by the Spirit and yet not do so infallibly or at a level equal to Scripture. Their misguided, but sincere, application of this revelation was to tell Paul ("through the Spirit," v. 4) not to go to Jerusalem, counsel which he directly disobeyed (cf. Acts 20:22).

There is nothing in the text to lead us to believe that these individuals were prophesying to Paul by the Lord, not to go to Jerusalem. If we look at Acts 20:23, Paul says the Holy Spirit is testifying to him in every city that bonds and afflictions await him. We see this played out in 21:4. These men knew by the Spirit, what was waiting for Paul in Jerusalem. They did not want this for Paul and tried to persuade him not to go near Jerusalem. However, just a few verses later, we see a different kind of event. We see Agabus prophesying that the Jews will certainly be responsible for his eventual captivity and the response of the brethren is the same as v. 4. They beg Paul not to go. Nowhere does God warn Paul directly not to go. After all, the Holy Spirit has told him all along what is going to happen to him. To understand this as the Holy Spirit commanding him not to go is simply wrong. There is no language in the text that demonstrates that Paul received any commands from the Lord that he disobeyed.

The Spirit’s role is best seen as informing them of those coming hardships for the apostle. Their very natural reaction was to urge him not to go. Their failure to deter him only heightens the emphasis on Paul’s firm conviction that God was leading him to Jerusalem and had a purpose for him there.[1]

The fact is that the prophecy given by Agabus was realized. Everything the Spirit warned Paul about concerning his future actually came to pass. There was no false-prophecy as some like to claim. There was no disobedience on Paul’s part as others wish to claim. Paul was told that he was going into bonds and that great suffering awaited him. It happened just as God told Paul it would happen. If only modern Charismatics and Pentecostals experienced the same phenomena the ancient Church experienced, perhaps this conversation would be more stimulating. As it stands, what we see are men like Grudem and Storms stretching the text beyond its exegetical limits in order to read it through the modern, Charismatic grid. Thus far, Storms has failed to establish the validity of a single one of his points. He has three more opportunities to gain some traction.




[1] John B. Polhill, Acts, vol. 26, The New American Commentary (Nashville: Broadman & Holman Publishers, 1995), 433.

Sunday, February 2, 2014

Sam Storms on Infallible Prophecy: Point Number Five


Fifth, yet another statement in 1 Corinthians 14 confirms this understanding of NT prophecy. In v. 36 Paul asks, “Or was it from you that the word of God came?” He doesn’t say, “Did the word of God originate with (or “first go forth from”) you,” as some have suggested. Let’s not forget that the “word of God” didn’t originate with Paul either!

Rather, Paul’s statement is designed to prevent them from making up guidelines for public worship, based on an alleged prophetic word, contrary to what he has just stated. His point is that a Scripture quality, authoritative “word of God” has not, in fact, been forthcoming from the Corinthian prophets. Paul does not deny that they have truly prophesied, but he denies that their “words” were equal in authority to his own. Such “words” were in fact of a lesser authority.

In order to make sure we continue to focus on the subject, I want to remind you that the issue at stake here is the quality of NT prophecy. Sam Storms and other non-cessationists claim that it is of a lessor quality or authority than either OT prophecy or the teachings of the apostles that eventually became encapsulated in Scripture. Mr. Storms is working through ten points that he believes supports his argument. In reviewing his argument, I am searching for any implication in the text, properly interpreted of course, that lends support to Storms’ argument.

In his fifth point, Storms claims that 1 Cor. 14:36 lends support to his view that NT prophecy is of a lessor authority or quality than canonical Scripture. It reads as follows, ἢ ἀφʼ ὑμῶν ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ ἐξῆλθεν, ἢ εἰς ὑμᾶς μόνους κατήντησεν; The literal translation is; “Or from you the word of God went out, or to you only has it come?” Paul uses the spatial frame “from you” to draw extra attention to the tone of his argument.
Storms has opened up a real can or worms in this section. If Paul is referring to prophecy when he uses the phrase, ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ, then Storms seems to have shot his own foot. This phrase is always used of the authoritative word of God. It appears 11 times in NA28 and in every single case there is nothing to distinguish it from itself. Everywhere it appears it appears as the authoritative communication from the one triune God.

So then, what was Paul actually getting at with this question? Was Paul actually dealing with the authoritative nature of NT prophecy? Can we really interact with this verse through such a contemporary lens? If we knew nothing about modern, contemporary claims of prophetic utterances, would we even be looking at the text from Storms’ perspective? I find it difficult to believe that we can honestly answer that question in the affirmative. It seems that Storms continues to interpret 1 Corinthians 14 through the lens of modern Charismatic experience.

Even if the Corinthian believers were not prophesying and were only preaching the Word of God and teaching it, could Paul have said the very same thing to them? I think we can easily answer in the affirmative. The Corinthian believers were not in sole possession of the Word of God. God’s word had gone out to the universal church, and the Corinthian believers did not have the corner on the market of divine truth. Like every other community, the Corinthian group must submit to apostolic authority.
“As TEV makes clear, the two halves of this verse balance one another; the Christian message neither began nor ended in Corinth. The implication is that the Corinthians have no right to decide independently of other Christian communities how Christians should believe.”[1]

“The balance for the Corinthian Christians is that they are one of a number of churches that now stretch across the cities of the eastern Roman empire. They may live in one of the most important cities of the province, but they need to learn humility.”[2]

“Witherington offers two useful observations on v. 36. First, he perceives the point of Paul’s rhetorical questions to lie in the scenario that “it appears the Corinthians are trying to make up their own rules, and perhaps thinking their own word is sufficient or authoritative or even the word of God for themselves.”[3]

“Who do they think they are anyway? is the implication; has God given them a special word that allows them both to reject Paul’s instructions, on the one hand, and be so out of touch with the other churches, on the other?”[4]

There is no connection at all between 1 Cor. 14:36 with the present argument put forth by Storms. There is no reason to think that Paul is concerned to help the Corinthians understand that their local prophetic utterances are somehow less authoritative than Scripture. What Paul is concerned with is the autonomous desires of this community and their spiritual pride, which emerges throughout the letter. Storms’ fifth point does absolutely nothing to advance his case and lends not an ounce of support to his contention that there is a difference between the prophetic Word of God coming through prophets and the canonical Word of God encapsulated in Scripture.



[1] Paul Ellingworth, Howard Hatton, and Paul Ellingworth, A Handbook on Paul’s First Letter to the Corinthians, UBS Handbook Series (New York: United Bible Societies, 1995), 326.
[2] Clinton E. Arnold, Zondervan Illustrated Bible Backgrounds Commentary: Romans to Philemon., vol. 3 (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2002), 174.
[3] Anthony C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians: a Commentary on the Greek Text, New International Greek Testament Commentary (Grand Rapids, MI: W.B. Eerdmans, 2000), 1161.
[4] Gordon D. Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1987), 710.

Saturday, February 1, 2014

Sam Storms on Fallible Prophecy: Points 3 & 4


Third, although I realize that cessationists have a different understanding of 1 Corinthians 14:29, I believe Paul is saying here much the same thing as he said in 1 Thessalonians 5:19-22. “Weigh” (diakrino) what is said by the prophets. That is to say, sift the word and identify what is of God and what is the human and thus fallible admixture. I find it difficult to believe that Paul would have commanded this sort of assessment if all prophetic words were by definition inerrant Scripture quality revelation from God. See more here.

The general thrust of Storms’ entire argument is that he considers Paul to have modern Charismatic prophecy in view. In other words, Storms is simply assuming that his view that ancient prophecy was the same as modern prophecy is correct. But the descriptions we read in Scripture and the phenomenon we see among Charismatics are remarkably different. Modern Charismatic prophecy and prophets simply just start speaking at the slightest hint of an emotional sensation. They have no idea what is going to come out of their mouths. The rational mind is entirely suspended and replaced with a radical, mystical sensation and they just begin to prophesy.

Second, there is no indication in this text that the prophets are prophesying. Storms simply assumes this to be the case. There is no reason for this assumption other than his desire to grasp for something to prove his case. Paul informs the Church to have the prophets speak, one at a time, and then that their sermon is to be judged for its faithfulness to the truth they have received from the apostles and their associates.

Third, there is no indication in this context that Paul is dealing with the more narrow use of prophecy. Rather, it seems clear that he is dealing with preaching, proclaiming, teaching, and exhorting. He uses the words μανθάνω (manthano) and παρακαλέω (parakaleo) which means to learn and to be encouraged. There is no indicating that he has forth telling the future in mind whatsoever. In addition, how could anyone ever judge whether new revelation was right or wrong unless he or she compared it to what had already been revealed. How could we know that predictive personal prophecy was from God? If the event were not going to happen for years, we would simply have to wait. We could not scrutinize or examine it for years to come. However, if these speeches were objective truth claims, then the ability to examine them in light of previously given revelation would be possible.

Fourth, in 1 Corinthians 14:30-31 Paul writes: “If a revelation is made to another sitting there, let the first be silent. For you can all prophesy one by one, so that all may learn and all be encouraged.” Paul appears to be indifferent toward the possibility that the first prophecy might be lost and never heard by the church.

Storms again assumes that this revelation that has been revealed to someone takes the shape of modern claims. There is no reason to think this is the case. The ancient form of revelation seems radically different from modern claims. In modern Pentecostalism, the experience is one of a radically heightened emotion. This does not at all come into view when one examines the more detailed accounts of revelation in Scripture.

The emphasis in this text is clearly on the order of the service and the avoidance of confusion. Apparently, when the first prophet was speaking, or even perhaps prophesying, a second would just jump in and begin to do his thing as well. Paul’s concern about order and his point out that God is a God of order indicates that the typical ancient patter was not being honored. The idea that the first prophet could not resume when the second prophet had finished, and that such a position by Paul indicated some sort of disregard for the authority of the prophetic words being uttered is sheer conjecture. Paul’s point that the Spirit of the prophets are subject to the prophets contradicts Storms assertion directly.

Finally, Sorms’ view that subjecting ancient prophecy to scrutiny makes is less than the Word of God encapsulated in Scripture is just plain wrong. In order to illustrate why I think this is the case, we may turn to other sections of Scripture that indicate clear why I think this to be the case. Acts 17:11 is a perfect example for this discussion and it alone is sufficient to demonstrate my assertion. Luke tells us that the Jews at Berea were more noble minded than the Jews at Thessalonica because they scrutinized Paul’s gospel proclamation by examining his arguments in light of the Old Testament revelation. The idea that we do not judge the assertions and claims of men when they say they speak for God is utterly ridiculous. Even the proclamations and arguments of Paul were judged according to prior revelation. This did not make those words any less authoritative at all. Is simply means that God is a rational God and He has not left us without a standard by which we can know when He is speaking and when He is not.

Storms’ argument cannot see the forest for the trees. He enters the conversation with a bias against the cessationist position. I was saved in the Pentecostal churches. I was a licensed minister in the Church of God in Cleveland, TN. I come to this subject with both an experiential and theological perspective. I know what Pentecostal prophecy looks like. I have experienced the experience they claim is God revealing things to them. It is highly subjective and arbitrary. It is driven by pure emotion. Angels are not standing in front of them talking to them. God is not appearing to them in dreams. They have dreams that they claim are from God but the truth is they could just as much be from Papa John’s Pizza. There is no way to really tell. When we compare modern claims with ancient facts, the two are remarkably different. Give me Scripture, give me grace to understand it, give me grace to live it and I shall know Him and the power of His resurrection. Then and only then will my soul be satisfied!


Wednesday, January 29, 2014

Sam Storms on Fallible Prophecy: Point 2

Second, a related point is found in Paul’s exhortation to the Thessalonians that they not “quench the Spirit” by “despising prophecies” (1 Thess. 5:19-20). Rather, they are to “test everything,” i.e., they are to weigh, judge, evaluate, or assess what purports to be a prophetic word and then “hold fast what is good” and “abstain from every form of evil” (vv. 21-22). -


“A good part of the meaning of these five imperatives is lost if we do not first understand the relations between them. The first clear distinction is between the two negative commands of verses 19–20 and the positive commands of verse 21–22. In Greek the two groups are separated by an adversative “but” (omitted in many manuscripts, probably accidentally incorporated into the next word). Within each group, Paul moves from the generic to the specific; despising inspired messages is a special case of restraining the Holy Spirit. Keeping what is good and avoiding every kind of evil are the two consequences of putting all things to the test.”[1]

With every text, there is a context. Storms seems to be looking at this text through the lens of the modern Pentecostal phenomenon of prophecy. But the text is a little more specific than Storms wants to acknowledge. The immediate context of these commands must be understood in light of v. 12 where Paul commands the Thessalonians to appreciate those that labor among them and have charge over them. As is typically the case with modern non-cessationists, the classification of prophecy is too narrowly defined. BDAG defines prophecy here as the gift of interpreting divine will or purpose. Storms assumes it is a reference to the very same phenomenon in which modern Charismatics and Pentecostals engage. There is no exegetical basis for this assumption.

Paul wrote the Thessalonian correspondence to (1) encourage the church during persecution; (2) defend the purity of his mission; (3) urge the church to live holy lives characterized by sexual purity; (4) define a Christian work ethic; (5) correct confusion around the coming of Christ; (6) prompt the church to respect its leaders. [Koestenberger, The Cross, The Cradle, and The Crown, 444] There are two basic areas that we must understand if we are to understand Paul’s command to the Thessalonians. The first one is in point (6) above, that the Thessalonians were having issues with respecting their leaders, those most likely to be the ones giving inspired utterances.

The word “despise” means to despise someone or something on the basis that it is worthless or of no value. This command and the challenge around respect for godly leaders must be viewed in light of the decrees of Caesar regarding prophetic utterances.

These decrees are actually used as the basis for the persecution of Paul and Jason in Acts 17:7. “Augustus decreed that the seers were forbidden to prophesy to any person alone or to prophesy regarding death even if others should be present. The emperor Tiberius gave another decree: But as for all the other astrologers and magicians and such as practiced divination in anyway whatsoever, he put to death those who were foreigners and banished all the citizens that were accused of still employing the art at this time after the previous decree [dogma] by which it had been forbidden to engage in any such business in the city.” [Burge, Cohick, & Green, The New Testament in Antiquity, 283] Caesar had issued a decree that forbad prophecy. From Acts 17, we know that the Thessalonians were deeply familiar with and had embraced the decree. That Paul was dealing with an element in the Church that had continued to embrace this ungodly decree must be given very serious consideration.  

Notice that immediately after Paul commands the Church not to quench the Spirit and not to despise prophecy, he immediately contrasts this command by issuing a second command. Rather than immediately despising prophecy itself, not the content of the prophecy, Paul says but examine everything carefully, hold fast to the good and abstain from every form of evil.

In summary then, it seems fairly obvious to me that Paul was not commanding the Thessalonians not to despise godly prophecy, but rather, to purge themselves of the decree of Caesar, which had led to an ungodly attitude toward the gift of prophecy and those that prophesy, namely, the leaders. In addition to purging themselves of this ungodly bias against this gift of God, they were also commanded not to be naïve to the content of prophecy and have the pendulum swing to the other extreme. On the one hand, the Thessalonians were commanded to abandon Caesar’s decree against the practice of prophecy, but to do so while making sure that everyone claiming to speak in the name of God was actually speaking in the name of God. They were to examine these claims by comparing and contrasting them with the divine truth that they had received from Paul and his associates. In light of the background of Paul’s commands to the Thessalonians, we can conclude that Paul was far more specific than Sam Storms has understood him to be.



[1] Paul Ellingworth and Eugene Albert Nida, A Handbook on Paul’s Letters to the Thessalonians, UBS Handbook Series (New York: United Bible Societies, 1976), 123.

Saturday, January 25, 2014

Sam Storms and Fallible Prophecy: A Critical Response


Back in November of 2013 Sam Storms came to the defense of the modern fallible prophecy movement in the charismatic churches. In that defense, he lists ten arguments that he is convinced refutes John MacArthur’s “Strange Fire” assessment of the practice and Doug Wilson’s criticism of it as well. I am going to provide some condensed posts in response to what I see as a surplus of fallacies in Storms’ arguments. You should keep in mind, however, that my criticism is not necessarily a defense of MacArthur and Wilson’s view as much as it is of my own, which may or may not be slightly nuanced in comparison to the former men.
 

Mr. Storms begins with the following statement:

First, this view fails to reckon with what would undoubtedly have been thousands of prophetic words circulating in the first century, none of which are part of canonical Scripture and thus none of which are binding on the conscience of Christians throughout history.

Storms makes this statement in response to the view that such prophecies equal divine revelation and as such are the authoritative word of God and should be included in the canon. Storms takes the curious and fallacious position that there is a distinction in the authority of God’s word included in the canon and that word that never made it into the canon.

My mind travels back to that time when Moses was commanded by God to strike the rock once! This word was not part of the canon, the Torah, and yet Moses suffered the judgment of God for not obeying God’s personal word to Him. I am also reminded of Saul, whom Samuel told to destroy everything from the Amalekites. Saul disobeyed and lost the kingdom. These words were not part of the Torah nor were they given to everyone in Israel. They were given to Saul. God’s word is by nature authoritative. God’s word was just as authoritative prior to canonization as it is now that we have the canon. The canon does nothing to make God’s word more or less authoritative. In addition, putting God’s divine communication in writing does not add to its authority, nor does it diminish it in any way. God’s word is authoritative precisely because it is God’s word, not because it takes a particular form.

Since God’s word is by nature authoritative, it only follows that the recipient of that word is under absolute obligation to obey it. Refusal to obey God’s word, regardless of its form, is a serious sin. God’s word is not more or less authoritative depending on its form or its messenger. Storms makes no effort to demonstrate why anyone should think otherwise. He simply assumes we should take his point to be the gospel truth so to speak.

Finally, Storms makes a serious error in his presumption regarding the number and content of NT prophecies. Storms says, “there would undoubtedly have been thousands of prophetic words circulating in the first century.” This may or may not have been the case. The truth is that we do not know how often this gift was engaged in the ancient church. Nevertheless, even if Storms is right in his speculation on this point, he is likely wrong in his speculation on the latter one. Storms presumes that the content of these numerous prophecies during the ancient church never made its way into the canon. How does he know this? Indeed, how could he possibly know this to be the case? The fact of the matter is that he does not. The truth is that these prophecies could have very well been a combination of Old Testament and New Testament Scripture in prophetic form. The ancient church represents the most interesting transition periods in all of human history. That God would be doing unique work during such a unique period should not surprise us in the least.

In summary then, Storms basic presupposition is that canonical revelation is more authoritative and normative than personal, prophetic revelation. This point of view is completely lacking exegetical warrant. Second, Storms view that there were thousands of prophetic words in the NT is based upon sheer conjecture and speculation. Even if it was true, and it may be, it is entirely irrelevant to the argument. Third, Storms’ contention that these prophecies contained divine revelation that is not contained in the Scripture is without exegetical warrant. Moses and Saul were given direct personal revelations from God, they both disobeyed, and they both suffered grave consequences as a result. The fact that these NT prophecies could have contained OT revelation not previously disclosed to Gentile audiences or NT revelation that would eventually make it into the canon is enough to accuse Storms of fallacious reasoning.


I conclude that Storms then must be wrong about his view that these NT prophecies were on a different authority scale than the NT canon and that the content of these prophecies never made it into the canon. On the former there is exegetical proof that Storms is wrong. On the latter, it is far more congruent with Christian theology to presume that whatever these prophetic revelations were in this transition period, they were based on the very same principles and even content that did make it into the canon.

Friday, January 24, 2014

Authentic Fire: A Most Bizarre Movement Indeed

Michael Brown's latest book titled, “Authentic Fire,” claims to defend something genuinely spawned by the Holy Spirit. It claims to defend biblical truth. The book is Brown’s apologetic to John MacArthur’s book, “Strange Fire.” Before you waste your time thinking this is a review of Brown’s book, I want you to know it is not. This post is a criticism of the very notion that there is such a thing as authentic fire in the sense in which Brown and modern Charismatics define it. I limit my method to a review of the practices that fall into the category of authentic fire, and subject them to biblical scrutiny.

Speaking in Tongues



Dancing in the Spirit



Slain in the Spirit



The Mystical Sensation of the Spirit



The Laughing Revival



Kathryn Kuhlman in Being Filled and Controlled By the Spirit


Ladies and gentlemen, if observing these sad, shocking, and perverse videos are not enough to provoke you to anger at how Christian theism is mocked and displayed by these groups, no amount of reason, biblical or otherwise, is capable of convincing you that these groups are in possession of authentic fire (whatever that might be). I applaud Fred Butler and Mennoknight for their labors and excellent research on the subject. The notion that Matthew 3:11-12 has anything to do with bizarre mystical encounters like those experienced in modern day Pentecostal churches is without a shred of exegetical warrant. All on has to do to understand what John the Baptist meant by fire is read v. 12. The Coming One will baptize the repentant with the blessing of the Holy Spirit. But the unrepentant, those who are not receptive to the Coming One, will be baptized with the judgment of eternal fire.[1] The prophecy John references is Joel 2:28-32. This prophecy also contains the promise of reconciliation and of judgment, to be carried in the end under the new covenant. Review the videos in light of Scripture and plain human reason. If they cannot convince you, it is unlikely that anything will.

1. Clinton E. Arnold, Zondervan Illustrated Bible Backgrounds Commentary: Matthew, Mark, Luke, vol. 1 (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2002), 25.





Thursday, January 23, 2014

TESTIMONIUM SPIRITUS SANCTI INTERNUM

“The basic structure of Christian theology is simple. Its every teaching should be taken from the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament as being the words of prophets and apostles spoken on the authority of Jesus Christ, the Son of God and Son of Man, the Savior of sinners.”[1] Since the discipline of Christian apologetics rightly comes under the rubric of Christian theology, it is only logical to see this disciple as also relying exclusively on Scripture as its sole authority. How could it be otherwise? Contrary to numerous Christian philosophers, Christian apologetics does not belong to the field of philosophy. It belongs to theology and with theology it must remain. The constituents of contemporary apologists, if they demonstrate anything at all, they show us what happens to a thoroughly biblical practice when the philosophers are finished with it. It is the conviction of this writer that we must begin with Scripture, employ Scripture continually, and end with Scripture if our apologetic method has any hope at all of approaching the cadence and model of the apologetics of the ancient church.

The most common Hebrew word translated witness is עֵד. “This word, appearing some sixty-seven times in the ot, is also derived from the root ʿûd meaning “return” or “repeat, do again.” The semantic development apparently is that a witness is one, who by reiteration, emphatically affirms his testimony. The word is at home in the language of the court.”[2] Another Hebrew word that catches our attention is עֵדָה, “used only of things posited to establish permanence and unequivocal facts such as ownership (Gen 21:30), an agreement (Gen 31:52). and a covenant with God (Josh 24:27).[3] One cannot over-emphasize the significance that a witness played in ancient Hebrew culture. The law placed great significance on the qualities of a witness.
Among those not qualified to be witnesses were the near relations of the accuser or the accused, friends and enemies, gamesters, usurers, tax-gatherers, heathen, slaves, women and those not of age (Ṣanhedhrīn 3:3, 4; Rō’sh Ha-shānāh 1:7; Bābhā Ḳammā’ 88a; cf Ant, IV, viii, 15). No one could be a witness who had been paid to render this service (Bekhōrōth 4:6). In cases of capital punishment there was an elaborate system of warning and cautioning witnesses. Each witness had to be heard separately (Ṣanhedhrīn 5; cf 3:5). If they contradicted one another on important points their witness was invalidated (Ṣanhedhrīn 5).[4]
“On the evidence of two witnesses or three witnesses, he who is to die shall be put to death; he shall not be put to death on the evidence of one witness. “The hand of the witnesses shall be first against him to put him to death, and afterward the hand of all the people. So you shall purge the evil from your midst.”[5]

In the New Testament, the significance of the witness is not diminished. The Greek word translated witness is μαρτυρία. The work of the witness was to testify on behalf of another. John 1:7 captures the essence of the role of the witness: “He came as a witness, to testify about the Light, so that all might believe through him.”[6] Louw & Nida explain that the word means, “to provide information about a person or an event concerning which the speaker has direct knowledge—‘to witness.”[7] BDAG explains that it is confirmation or attestation on the basis of personal knowledge or belief, testimony. The witness possesses information that the object of his testimony does not. Why would I need someone to testify to me about an event of which I possessed knowledge? The idea behind the witness is that he possesses information that the non-witness does not. Moreover, it is implied that this information is vital to the circumstances surrounding the event. This point cannot be overemphasized.

In summary then, from this information on witnesses and testimony, we can conclude four things about the concept of witness. Frist, the qualities of a witness are vitally important. Second, the role of the witness is to testify about an event of which he possesses intimate knowledge. Third, the content of the testimony is unknown to the recipients of the testimony. Fourth, the content is not only relevant to the case, it is vital to the circumstances surrounding the case otherwise the testimony would be superfluous. 

My aim in this short post is simply to turn your attention to the significance of the witness in Scripture. Once we understand the significant role the witness played Hebrew culture, we can then begin to grasp the nature and role of the Holy Spirit as the witness to the truth of divine revelation. It my hope that that understanding will influence your approach to Christian apologetics.



[1]. Cornelius Van Til, The Defense of the Faith (United States: Presbyterian and Reformed, n.d.), 7.
2. Carl Schultz, “1576 עוּד,” ed. R. Laird Harris, Gleason L. Archer Jr., and Bruce K. Waltke, Theological Wordbook of the Old Testament (Chicago: Moody Press, 1999), 648.
3. Carl Schultz, “1576 עוּד,” ed. R. Laird Harris, Gleason L. Archer Jr., and Bruce K. Waltke, Theological Wordbook of the Old Testament (Chicago: Moody Press, 1999), 649.
4. Paul Levertoff, “Witness,” ed. James Orr et al., The International Standard Bible Encyclopaedia, Volumes 1–5 (Chicago: The Howard-Severance Company, 1915), 3099.
5. New American Standard Bible: 1995 Update (LaHabra, CA: The Lockman Foundation, 1995), Dt 17:6–7.
6. New American Standard Bible: 1995 Update (LaHabra, CA: The Lockman Foundation, 1995), Jn 1:7.
7. Johannes P. Louw and Eugene Albert Nida, Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament: Based on Semantic Domains (New York: United Bible Societies, 1996), 417.

The Myth of Grey Areas

 In this short article, I want to address what has become an uncritically accepted Christian principle. The existence of grey areas. If you ...