Reflections on Russell's Value of Philosophy

The value of philosophy must begin with a clear understanding of what it is not. Philosophy is not hair-splitting trifles forever relegated to the abstract with little to offer by way of practical value. Russell thinks that the true value of philosophy is more directly experienced by those who study philosophy and only indirectly beneficial to others whose lives come into contact with the philosophy student. One has to wonder if Russell thinks that philosophy is only philosophy if it is formally studied at the academy. Russell is clear that he thinks there is great value in philosophy. He remarks, "If all men were well off, if poverty and disease had been reduced to their lowest possible point, there would still remain much to be done to produce a valuable society; and even in the existing world the goods of the mind are at least as important as the goods of the body."[1] Clearly Russell held that what was good for the mind was good indeed and philosophy, according to Russell is good for the mind.

Russell admits that even though philosophy has not experienced any great success in its attempts to provide definite answers to its questions, it remains a valuable discipline. The aim of philosophy is knowledge. Perhaps Russell is saying the necessary components required to attain knowledge are in and of themselves virtues to be acquired. Critical examination and the goal to purge biases and unfounded beliefs are surely noble practices, or so it would seem to Russell.

Russell believes that as soon as some knowledge becomes definite, it no longer belongs to the field of philosophy. He remarks, "It is true that this is partly accounted for by the fact that, as soon as definite knowledge concerning any subject becomes possible, this subject ceases to be called philosophy, and becomes a separate science."[2] In this sense there is little required to see the value of philosophy. It seems to stand on it's own two feet. I find this sort of reasoning contradictory. If philosophy adds to scientific or historical knowledge, then it does add value in that way and should receive credit for its contributions. Russell's view raises serious questions for the relationship between philosophy and theology. It also creates questions around where philosophy ends and how we might identify that point. Russell comments, "Hence, once more, the value of philosophy must not depend upon any supposed body of definitely ascertainable knowledge to be acquired by those who study it."[3]

I must confess that I am skeptical regarding this fellow's skepticism. I cannot help but ask if Russell's claims are philosophical in nature, and it seems to me they must be. Moreover, how can Russell be so dogmatic about philosophy's inability to provide answers to these questions? And how can he know that there is any value at all attached to a field that, in his own words, fails to deliver knowledge.

Russell tells us that the value of philosophy resides in its uncertainty. The consequence of such uncertainty is to free our thoughts from the tyranny of custom so that they may explore the many possibilities that exist. But what good does it do us to explore, if we are virtually assured that we will make little to no progress along they way. I fail to see how the state of 1,000 unanswered questions is any more valuable than the state of 100 unanswered questions. Why should wonder occupy such a high perch? If it produces nothing but more wonder, I fail to see the benefit. Russell has to demonstrate why critical exploration in and of, itself, is virtuous.

Russell, as any good skeptic would be apt to do, views doubt as a virtue. He remarks, "it removes the somewhat arrogant dogmatism of those who have never travelled into the region of liberating doubt, and it keeps alive our sense of wonder by showing familiar things in an unfamiliar aspect."[4] We can certainly follow Russell to the place of wonder and to the land of critical examination and analyses. We can follow him to the land of acknowledging our biases and prejudices. And in some cases, we can agree that custom founded upon nothing other than custom is the sort of uncritical behavior that we would all do well to put off. However, we cannot follow Russell into his full-orbed skepticism. Indeed, curiosity about life's important questions, about God's creation and revelation is one thing. But doubt, well, that is another matter altogether. One can make far more progress from the vantage point of curiosity than they can from doubt. Doubt is like chasing the end of the rainbow. Once embraced, it is hard to shake. Curiosity on the other hand offers true hope that we can actually arrive at the destination we seek even if the ride gets a little bumpy along the way. God made us curious, sin makes us doubt.

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[1] Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, (Kindle Edition) 1649/1750.

[2] Ibid. 1654/1750.

[3] Ibid. 1669/1750.

[4] Ibid. 1683/1750.

A Manual for Creating Atheist: Strict Rejoinder

At the very heart of MCA rests an unspoken assumption. It is an assumption that Boghossian never mentioned throughout the entire project. And yet, it is so excruciatingly obvious that if the project were going to be a success, this assumption could not remain an assumption. Somewhere along the way, Boghossian had the duty to deal with the one very critical issue that he never bothered to address. That critical issue is basically this: Christian faith is never placed beneath or subjected to the authority of human reason. In case you are wondering, this is the philosophical problem of the criterion. It is a legitimate problem that Boghossian prefers to ignore. According to Christian theism, human reason does not set itself up as the magistrate over faith. Since when is Christian epistemology under any obligation to subject itself to rationalism or empiricism? Neither of these systems is willing to submit to a distinctly Christian epistemology, are they? Boghossian assumes that the Biblical faith of Christian theism is subject to the standards of human reason that he wishes to place upon them. He never bothers to show us why his standards are superior or absolute. Rather than show us how Christian theism must pass the test of his version rationalism or empiricism, or a combination of the two, Boghossian assumes that it is so. He could not be more wrong. Christian theism actually argues that human reason must serve as the minister of faith, not her magistrate. Human reason is in service of Biblical faith, not the other way around. I believe so that I may understand, not I must understand in order to believe. This is Biblical Christianity. This is Christian theism. (Think of Leonidas in 300: this is Sparta!)

In “Loc. 452” Boghossian makes this statement: “If a belief is based on insufficient evidence, then any further conclusions drawn from the belief will at best be of questionable value.” Frist, there are some critical questions that this statement must answer. Second, we want to examine what results when we turn this statement on Boghossian’s claims. From a critical perspective, Boghossian has to distinguish in detail, without ambiguity, what he means by sufficient evidence so that we understand what he means by insufficient evidence. He also needs to help us understand what qualifies as evidence. Finally, it would be helpful for him to provide some understanding of how he defines value in terms of argumentation. What happens when we use this single statement to criticize Boghossian’s view of religion? The answer is really quite simply. Since Boghossian rests the success or failure of his entire project on his belief that the accurate characterization of faith is “pretending to know something you do not know” we are in a sound position to be able to assess the quality of his project and determine if it in point of fact adds value to the conversation. This will not be a small criticism that I will level against Boghossian’s argument.

Boghossian’s appeal to human reason to argue for human reason is viciously circular. One would assert that Christian theism does the very same thing with faith. But this statement does not actually represent the facts, as they exist within Christian theism. Christian theism does not appeal to faith as its final authority. Instead, Christian theism appeals to Scripture as its final authority and its criterion for what qualifies as the only consistent worldview, the only valid epistemology. Scripture sets itself up as the authority to which all human predication must submit. The skeptic may claim this too is circular. In response we say it is not viciously circular because as far as Christian theism is concerned, we are speaking of God’s rightful claim of absoluteness in this case. If God does exist as the ultimate source of all knowledge, then what other source could He appeal to but Himself since he is the highest authority to which appeal could be made? In other words, Christian theism is consistent to appeal to their final resting point, namely God, in support of all human predication. To rest the argument on other grounds would be terribly inconsistent even if some Christians actually do so. Should it surprise anyone that opposing systems would appeal to two different authorities for their criterion of belief, and would actually hold to differing epistemological schemes? Boghossian ignores the problem of the criterion and instead pretends that philosophy has it all figured out and that philosophers are in complete agreement on how human knowledge works. Apparently he is unfamiliar with Michael Williams work on “Problems of Knowledge – a critical introduction to epistemology.” Williams says, “The problem of unity poses the question: is there just one way of acquiring knowledge, or are there several depending on the sort of knowledge in question?” [Williams, Problems of Knowledge, 2] Boghossian does not even acknowledge that there are different kinds of knowledge, and hence, different methods for knowing them. 

This is not a small problem in his project. It is one of the first questions a good Christian thinker will ask if you attempt to engage him/her on the question of Christian theism. The problem of the criterion is a most thorny problem. You see, in order to create a criterion by which beliefs may be justified, you must already have some idea about it before you create it. This is a problem. What you are searching for is something that transcends, a standard that comes from out there somewhere. You are looking for a reliable and dependable judge. But if you create the judge, how objective is that? This is the problem of the criterion that Boghossian ignores entirely. The atheist needs to understand that the Christian thinker will not ignore that problem. The minute you ask us to justify our beliefs, we are going to ask you to justify your idea of justification without appealing to your own idea of justification. But don’t let this dissuade you from engaging Christians. I hope you engage lots of Christians, real ones, the type that actually know how to think well about Christian theism.

The second problem with Boghossian’s project is his insistence on giving faith a philosophical or rational definition as opposed to allowing the faith community to define their own terms. “If facts alone are at stake, on overdose of emotionally tinged language can only be a hindrance and should be regarded with suspicion. Even eloquence should be shunned where information is the sole purpose. For facts are most effectively conveyed when they are stated in a plain and objective manner.” [Engel, With Good Reason, 71] When defining faith Boghossian should have just stuck with the plain facts of how Christian theism defines faith rather than not only assigning to it a wrong definition but an emotionally charged one at that. The common Hebrew words for faith are ‘aman, the act of believing or trusting, batah, the idea of being secure, trust in, hasah, seek or take refuge, shelter, and hesedh, faithfulness, loyalty. [McManis, Biblical Apolgetics, 381-383] There are others but you get the idea. The NT encapsulates the idea of faith in the word, pistis. In Christian theism, faith means laying hold on the promises of God in Christ, relying entirely on the finished work of Christ for salvation, and on the power of the indwelling Holy Spirit of God for daily strength. Faith implies complete reliance on God and full obedience to God. [Morris, Illustrated Bible Dictionary, 498] Given that Boghossian’s aim is to refute faith, and given that his entire definition of faith is categorically false, I could end my review here and conclude with any rational person that Boghossian’s project is an embarrassing failure. But I have a few more things to say.

The third challenge with Boghossian’s project is that it is far too broad. It is an illegitimate practice to lump all the religions of the world into the same category just as much as it is to lump all philosophies and philosophers into the same category. I suppose this move would make the task at hand much easier, but it simply does not work. For example, to compare Mohamed with Christ and radical Islam with Christianity is an ad hominem attempt to polarize the conversation. If a person is familiar with radical Islam and unfamiliar with Christian theism, they would be tempted to think that Christians are also strapping bombs to their chest in certain parts of the world and murdering innocent people all under the guise of religion. This tactic is despicable and reflects the desperation and weakness in Boghossian’s arguments. My experience has been that only the weakest arguments resort to ad hominem. Anyone that knows anything about world religions knows that they tend to be radically different from each other in very basic ways.

Another serious problem with Boghossian’s skepticism is that it contains far too much certainty. He speaks as if philosophy has attained absolutely epistemic certainty when in reality the state of affairs is just the opposite. The consensus necessary to arrive at some of the absolute statements that Boghossian makes simply does not exist. The truth is that rationalists and empiricists do not agree even among themselves on the exact nature, definition, limits, and even value of human knowledge. How is it, then, that Boghossian can lead his readers to believe that philosophy has arrived at uncontroversial views in epistemology and metaphysics?

In addition, Boghossian’s insistence on referring to faith as a virus or mental condition to be cured is one of the most bizarre and extreme ad hominem arguments I have encountered. There is no question that this view of faith represents only a small portion of skeptics and the rest would do well to avoid it and him. Every noetic structure, be they primarily rational, empirical, or something else, at the end of their chain beliefs, arrives at faith. Because we are not omniscient, this reality is impossible to avoid and it is one we cannot afford to ignore. As Boghossian himself boasts, there are a lot of things we simply do not know or understand. Christian theism affirms that God created the world from the beginning. At the same time, Christian theism confesses that it does not know how God could do such a thing. We just don’t know. We also do not know how God could bring us the Scriptures as a product of both man and God Himself. We know He did it, but we do not know how that worked. Quite frankly, it is borderline insane to refer to faith as a virus or mental illness. In addition, for a state employee to encourage professors to punish kids with faith, as part of his strategy to purge faith from society, suggests a totalitarianism that should frighten not only the Christian. It should frighten everyone. What is the next item on Boghossian’s list? What else does he not like about society that makes it less than the perfect society according to his ideas? Seems to me that there was a monster in Europe not that long ago who also thought there were elements in society that made it less than desirable.

The final challenge I wish to point out is the lack of coherence in Boghossian’s philosophy, or noetic structure. His system is self-referentially incoherent and I now wish to list the reasons why this is the case. In the first place, Boghossian promotes the idea of creating skeptics. But his own system displays a level of certainty about things that no skeptic could hold. Boghossian pretends that human reason is neutral, that it is simply there. It is as if there is nothing upon which human reason rests, no ground. But this cannot be the case. Even human reason requires a ground. And that ground cannot be its own self. A thing that rests upon its own self is at once absolute and self-sufficient. Human reason has been wrong far too often and admits to far too many limitations for it to be absolute and self-sufficient. “A complete demonstration of each of our beliefs by means of other independent beliefs cannot be given.” [Bahnsen, Always Ready, 198] In order for Boghossian’s system to work, he must supply a set of standards to which all humanity can appeal as absolute and self-sufficient. But this he cannot do, and he does not attempt to do. Perhaps he realizes how irrational such an attempt might be. Boghossian requires neutrality on the subject of God and faith before he can get his project going. However, neutrality on such matters is impossible. Boghossian has an ax to grind and it emerges at the very inception of his project. In fact, it is the catalyst for his project. Boghossian requires the very thing he denies in order to make his project meaningfully intelligible: a certain standard. He criticizes faith for lacking evidence, but cannot provide any evidence for the very logic he uses to make his criticism. He defines faith incorrectly as pretending to know what you do not know and then proceeds himself to do just that! 

Boghossian pretends to know that faith cannot possibly be accompanied with good reason. But when asked to provide justification for his view on justifiability, he is silent. In order for Boghossian’s system to work, it needs to justify itself apart from the nauseating “that’s just the way it is” non-answer answer we hear so often. If you ever hear someone say, that’s just the way it is, you should know that is not a statement of reason, but rather, a statement of faith. It is not biblical faith mind you, but it is the sort of philosophical or rational definition of faith that is often confused for biblical faith. Boghossian’s view is self-referentially incoherent because he insists that faith has no foundation and that this is good reason to rid it of society when his own system also rests ground that also is without a foundation. By the way, faith is actually grounded in God. “The non-Christian rejects the Christian view out of hand as being contradictory. Then when he is asked to furnish a foundation for the law of contradiction, he can offer nothing but the idea of contingency.” [Van Til, A Survey of Christian Epistemology, 204-5]

A Manual for Creating Atheists: Interventions & Strategies (Pt. II)

I left off my review of MCA with Boghossian setting the strategy for separating people from their faith by attempting to undermine their confidence in how they claim to know what they know as opposed to what a person believes exists. I should say that Boghossian’s strategy may work just fine on people who really don’t have the kind of faith that exists in Christian theism, but it will not be effective with genuine believers. I will explain why this is so in a later post.

I now want to spend some time interacting with Boghossian’s assertion that “There’s nothing virtuous about pretending to know things you don’t know or in lending one’s belief to a particular proposition.” In other words, the faithful believe it is impossible to separate faith and morality. Boghossian is attempting to establish the idea that faith is morally neutral. There is essentially nothing right or good about having faith. But Boghossian adds, “or in lending one’s belief to a particular proposition.” [Loc.1388] He continues, “The belief that faith is a virtue and that one should have faith are primary impediments to disabusing people of their faith.” And yet, the belief that faith is a virtue, as well as a gift from God, is a primary element in Christian theism. Boghossian is now striking at one of the heartbeat issues of Christian faith. Saying faith isn’t a virtue doesn’t make it so.

Boghossian claims that by redefining faith and by pointing out that people without faith are just as moral as people with faith he can effectively prove there is nothing virtuous about faith. Boghossian points to the atheist Pat Tillman and to Bill Gates as examples of virtuous men without faith. However, giving your life in battle and donating money to good causes does not make one moral or virtuous. Immoral people are capable of doing good deeds just as moral people are capable of doing immoral things. Christian theism teaches that we are all equally sinners in need of a Savior. In truth, if there is nothing virtuous about believing propositions, then there is nothing virtuous about one being willing to revise their beliefs either. I wonder if Boghossian thinks there is anything good about creating Street Epistemologists to go out and talk people out of their faith. Why is this project such a significant passion for him? What is so virtuous about getting at truth? Should people be attempting to know the truth about reality? If there is nothing virtuous about discovering truth, then why does he make all this fuss? Why not just go about your business and leave off this virtue-less initiative?

Boghossian then discusses a tactic that he employs when he has little time to engage the faithful. He refers to these tactics as two powerful dialectical shortcuts. First he asks, “How could your belief [in x] be wrong?” The second question he asks is, “How would you differentiate your belief from a delusion?” Not for nothing, but I love the Socratic Method. I love critical thinking. The only problem with it is that what works for the atheist also works for the Christian. What every Christian thinker has to remember is that he cannot allow the atheist to establish what counts as evidence or as good reasons for belief. The Christian standard and criteria for belief are fundamentally different from those the atheist uses. That being the case, the answer to Boghossian’s questions is simply this: God would have to not exist in order for me to be wrong. The answer to the second question is that my belief is anchored in the unchanging truth of God’s word. I realize this will not satisfy Boghossian’s standards. But satisfying Boghossian’s standards is not our goal. Our goal is giving an account for the hope that is in us to anyone that asks.

There are a number of problems with Boghossian’s attempts to create a morally neutral idea of faith. Not the least of which is his definition of faith as “pretending to know something you do not know.” He assumes that Christian theists will simply let him get away with this definition. I assure you, we will not. The Christian will always insist on the biblical definition of faith. They most certainly will not permit an atheist to redefine it for them. To think otherwise is simply absurd. Since Boghossian’s redefinition of faith will not hold, his attempt to decouple faith from morality is significantly weakened. The second problem is Boghossian’s reasoning that faith has nothing to do with morality. This argument is patently false and it involves fatally fallacious reasoning. The argument looks like this: Some atheists do moral good. No atheists have faith. Therefore, there is nothing virtuous about faith. As anyone can see, the conclusion does not follow from the premises. From the premises above, all we can conclude is that it is possible to go good deeds even if one has no religious faith. I cannot think of any Christian apologist that would disagree with this statement.

I want you to take a different view of Boghossian’s argument. Many Christians do moral good. Many Christians are irrational. Therefore, there is nothing virtuous about rational thinking. Again, the conclusion does not follow from the premises. What Boghossian needs to do is understand the relationship between faith and morality in the Christian worldview. It is evident to this writer that he has not done his homework in this respect. If you are an atheist and you are reading this post, you need to understand that Christianity is a very small religion with very few adherents. Depending on where you live, you may never have encountered an actual Christian. What you have very likely encountered is cultural Christians, or social Christians. These are people who adhere outwardly to some of the teachings of Christianity some of the time. They profess to have faith, but the reality of the case is that they do not. Boghossian’s project is not aimed at biblical Christianity. If it is, I can tell you he misses his mark by a wide margin. Boghossian seems to be aiming at a generic faith, religion in general. You need to understand that true Christians reject the idea of a generic faith. They even reject the notion of theism in general. What Boghossian needs to do is interact with the Christian Scripture if he wants to attack real faith. And this, so far, he has not done.

In order to prove that faith has no virtue, Boghossian needs to understand the Bible’s teaching on the relationship between faith and morality. He needs to know that Christian theism teaches that a lifestyle defined by immorality is a strong indication that a person does not have faith. Conversely, Christian theism teaches that a radical change, to include morality, is the unavoidable consequence of genuine faith. In other words, true faith equals a changed heart and mind. True faith causes a woman to stop lying to her husband, causes a husband to stop cheating on his wife, and causes an unmarried couple to stop sexual activity outside of marriage, just to call out some examples. The kind of faith that Scripture speaks about, true faith, always produces virtuous living wherever it is found. Therefore, there is something virtuous about faith, about trusting in the God who is there.

I am afraid at this point in Boghossian’s project, that the atheist is getting a straw man version of Christianity. Essentially, if you are able to talk someone out of their faith, true Christianity would hold that you have talked them out of something they never really had from the start. Essentially, you are accomplishing nothing, separating men from a shallow mental acceptance of God and not from faith at all.

A Manual for Creating Atheists: Interventions & Strategies (Pt. I)

As we move to chapter four of Boghossian’s project, I think I need to point out to our atheist readers, one very important point that Boghossian has continued to ignore and that you might also think is a flaw in my rebuttal. Christian theism and atheist do not share the same criterion for justification or warrant. So when you read Boghossian’s talk about evidence and warrant, you must understand that I reject Boghossian’s notion that Christian theism must present itself in such a way as to meet his epistemological demands. That is part of our disagreement, and I might add, a critical component that he seems to be happy to ignore. You should know that if you are an atheist who feels as Boghossian does and you take up his charge, when you encounter Christians that refuse to budge in the conversation that it is not due to brain damage, but rather to the fact their criterion for knowledge is radically different from and intensely opposed to yours.

The main thrust of chapter four concerns methods for “deprogramming” the faithful from their religious delusions. Boghossian compares this process to that of a drug intervention. Once again, this tactic produces in the unsuspecting atheist, a false sense of superiority over the faithful. I am always on the lookout for Boghossian’s street epistemologist. The last scientist I encountered was on the verge of rejecting logic so that she could hand on to her empiricism. Atheist, beware, if you are speaking to intelligent and genuine believers who have actually bothered with these subjects, you will be overmatched. However, I encourage you to take up the cause and speak with as many Christians as you can. I will provide a hypothetical interaction with Boghossian at the end of this series so that you can see how a Christian theist should respond to his straw man paradigm.

Boghossian makes a very revealing comment in chapter four: “If you are reading this book you probably already possess attitudes that predispose you to rationality, like a trustfulness of reason.” I said in an earlier post that Boghossian has some faith of his own that he has not discussed in his project. It is here that we are now beginning to see his faith in the power of human reason. We will eventually ask Boghossian to justify his belief in the adequacy of human reason to deal with questions related to the existence of God and any other inquiry into the nature of reality, as far as that goes. We are interested in knowing from Boghossian why he thinks reason is possible in the kind of world he believes exists.

Boghossian instructs the SE to be willing to say to the Christian, “I don’t know.” The SE is informed that they should not worry about that. Well, if the SE approaches the right Christian, they will have the opportunity to say that quite a lot. Moreover, they should be ready to hear answers with which they disagree and reasoning that is fundamentally different from their own. For example, when the Christian says I believe the Bible is God’s word because it claims to be God’s word and on that basis alone I believe it. That kind of reasoning sounds odd to the atheist. But you must think of it from the Christian’s basic belief. If God exists, and He in fact created all that is, and He in fact has spoken to us in the Bible, then it is only reasonable that we take God’s witness of Himself as true. If we attempted to point to something other than God’s own word to show that God’s word is true, we would be saying there is a greater witness to God than God Himself. And if that were actually true, Christianity would be falsified. Now, if you can’t follow that argument, you have more work to do in terms of how you reason. And if you can follow that argument, then you know that breaking through that epistemology is going to take a little more than a small book on creating atheists.

Boghossian says, “Every religious apologist is epistemically debilitated by an extreme form of confirmation bias.” [Loc. 1263] He uses Gary Habermas as an example. Now, here is a critical question from critical thinker: does Dr. Boghossian expect us to believe that he has no bias concerning the claims of the Bible? Has he really found that state of pure objectivity? Boghossian criticizes Habermas for concluding the most outrageous of all claims, specifically, that Jesus indeed rose from the dead. Boghossian has a list of more plausible explanations that Habermas should first believe if he were really objective. But is this a display of pure objectivity? Does not Boghossian bring his own philosophical bias to the discussion? The Romans and Jews wanted to crush Christianity. Could they not have simply hung the rotting corpse of Jesus out for all to see? Or, is it really plausible to believe that the disciples of Jesus stole the corpse and then one by one, were tortured to death for something they knew was a lie? Once we remove Boghossian’s anti-supernatural bias from the equation, the only rational explanation for the empty tomb is that Jesus rose from the dead. Here we have a perfect example of a man engaging in extreme bias while he is in the process of criticizing someone else for being biased. Habermas is only unreasonable because he rejects Boghossian’s basic presuppositions about the possibility of miracles. I think Boghossian calls this doxastic closure.

Boghossian talks about evidence, but then he dismisses the documents of the New Testament out of hand. It is as if they do not exist. You see, what qualifies as evidence is not just an insignificant question. It is at the heartbeat of Boghossian’s project. It is a project that in my opinion is becoming more insubstantial the more we learn about it. Boghossian finally begins to discuss justification. He talks about two primary schools regarding justification for belief (coherentism and foundationalism) and lands on foundationalism.

I agree that a belief structure must rest upon a foundation. In that sense, I am a foundationalist. However, I think Boghossian is wrong when he says that faith is the foundation. It is certainly wrong when it comes to Christian theism. The foundation of Christian theism is Christ Himself. The question is this: can genuine faith in Christ be destroyed by anything, to include naturalistic rationalism? Scripture teaches that it cannot.

Boghossian sees God as the conclusion of a faulty reasoning process. The problem as he sees it is faith. But not all Christian apologist take this approach. In fact, there are many with a high view of Scripture that see God, not as the conclusion of reasoning, but as the necessary precondition for reasoning from the start. In other words, some apologists ask the question, “what else has to be true in order for reason to exist?” The answer is that God is the necessary precondition for both reason and faith. Attempting to destroy either one will do nothing to impede God. If God does not exist, then intelligible experience does not exist (since God is the necessary precondition for intelligible experience). However, intelligible experience does exist. It is not the case that God does not exist. Boghossian seems to be interacting only with those who either, have a false faith or a very thin argument for why they believe.

Boghossian is clearly a foundationalist. Repeatedly he talks about evidence, warrant, and justification. He indicts faith for apparently contributing to the formation of beliefs without the proper justification. While the Christian views Scripture as their epistemic authority, Boghossian contends that human reason is his epistemic authority. Since Boghossian and I are both foundationlists, so to speak, the question remains, why is he a strident atheist while I am a Christian theist? We both believe that a belief structure must have a foundation or an anchor if you will. We both believe in the value of human reason. Our only difference seems to be on the question of faith. The answer to this mystery is not located in our epistemological differences. The answer is ethical. I will address the real reasons for faith in my final review of Boghossian's project.

What Boghossian is actually talking about when he talks about a foundation is a noetic structure. “A person’s noetic structure is the set of propositions he believes, together with certain epistemic relations that hold among him and these propositions.” [Plantinga, Faith and Rationality, 48] Now, the foundation of a noetic structure must rest upon something other than the structure. Beliefs about the validity of reason or the laws of logic cannot rest upon the laws of logic. Humans form beliefs on the basis of other, more basic beliefs until we get to our foundational beliefs. These foundational beliefs are beliefs that are self-evident. We do not believe them because of other beliefs. They are self-justifying. They require no evidence or warrant. They are by definition, properly basic beliefs. This is so far, so good where the Christian theist is concerned. But if I were an atheist, I would be getting quite nervous at this point.

A properly basic belief “must be capable of functioning foundationally, capable of bearing its share of the weight of the whole noetic structure.” [Ibid. 55] What then is Boghossian’s view of a properly basic belief. Typically it is just this: a belief is properly basic if it is a) self-evident, or b) incorrigible, or c) evident to the senses. Now, here is the elephant in the room when it comes to foundationalism: foundationalism itself is self-referentially incoherent. In other words, foundationalism is not self-evident, or incorrigible, or obvious to the senses. Foundationalism that rests upon a non-transcendental foundation then collapses upon itself. If the base is this weak, one has to wonder just how weak the rest of the structure could be. The nature of Christian truth is unlike that of logic or mathematics. Boghossian repeatedly fails to represent Christianity as resting on its own foundation. He reasons that faith must rest upon reason when the truth is that in Christian theology, reason rests upon faith. Christian epistemology is not empirical nor rationalistic in nature. On the contrary, a distinctly Christian epistemology it is revelational in nature. “All knowledge of God rests on revelation. Though we can never know God in the full richness of his being, he is known to all people through his revelation in creation, theater of his glory.” [Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, Vol. 2, 53]

Boghossian’s failure to understand the nature of Christian knowledge of God leads to multifarious errors in his criticism and regrettably for his lofty project. Christians do not come to know God on the basis of argumentation and evidence. The starting point for the Christian is Scripture. Our faith rests in the authority and reliability while Boghossian’s faith rests in his own ability to create a noetic structure that can sustain itself without becoming self-referentially incoherent. The type of belief we are talking about when we talk about belief in God is like belief in the self, other minds, and the external world. In none of these areas do we typically have proof or arguments, or need proof or arguments. [Plantinga, Faith and Rationality, 65]

I must apologize for having to review chapter four in two parts. It is by far the longest chapter thus far.

A Manual for Creating Atheist: Defining Faith

In chapter two of his project, Boghossian wastes no time striking at the center of a Christian Epistemology. Specifically, he begins with two distinct definitions of faith: “belief without evidence,” and “pretending to know things you don’t know.” Boghossian believes that faith claims are knowledge claims and that faith is therefore an epistemology. We will come back to this point of view in the analysis section of this post.

Boghossian accuses the faithful of offering vague definitions of faith, which he calls “deepities.” “A deepity is a statement that looks profound but is not. Deepities appear true at one level, but on all other levels are meaningless.” [loc. 265] Boghossian then points to a number of examples of vagueness, one of which is Heb. 11:1. The rest of his examples seem to be arbitrary selections designed only to prop up his straw man approach at this point. Apparently, “faith is a leap over the probabilities.” He says faith is the word one uses when one does not have enough evidence to justify holding a belief.

The second definition of faith, pretending to know things you don’t know, is like someone giving advice about baking cookies who has never been in a kitchen, says Boghossian. Boghossian then inserts a table with commonly heard phrases that believers use about faith and he inserts the phrase “pretending to know things I don’t know” in place of faith in each instance. It truly is a type of brain washing of the atheist. Boghossian pretends to be equipping atheists to help the faithful cure themselves of their faith but what he is actually doing is attempting to find a better way to protect the atheists during their exchanges with the faithful. This tactic is designed to create a cementing of the atheist’s mind. Do not take the individual’s argument seriously. The atheist should view the faithful’s conversation as an incredible and foolish joke from the outset of the conversation. By taking this approach, Boghossian hopes to shield the atheist from genuinely thinking about the statements of the faithful.

Boghossian then attempts to essentially annihilate the meaning of faith by ripping central components of its meaning away. It seems the author views faith as purely epistemological in nature. But this would be more closely aligned with a philosophical or purely intellectual and even a rationalistic understanding of faith than a theological one. Clearly, Boghossian’s understanding of Christian theism is terribly insufficient to the task he sets out to accomplish. It is a philosophical howler to criticize a view that you do not even understand. For the Christian reading this post, you should take solace in the fact that no godless philosopher, atheist or otherwise, really understands Christian theism. The core ingredient to understanding biblical Christianity is the illuminating work of God the Holy Spirit coupled with the gift of biblical faith. Absent that work, a genuine understanding of Christian theism and its principles and concepts is impossible.

Boghossian defines “atheist” as one who “believes there is insufficient evidence to warrant belief in a divine, supernatural creator of the universe.” As I interact with the author, I will ask questions about these kind of statements. A critical thinker would ask, what would be sufficient evidence? Additionally, what qualifies as evidence? Again, what does Boghossian mean by warrant? If we turn the guns on this belief, we would ask if there is sufficient evidence to warrant the belief that all beliefs should have sufficient evidence in order to be warranted or justified? What evidence could Boghossian provide for the belief that beliefs should come with sufficient evidence? How could the atheist justify such an epistemological structure and then unify that structure with his belief that the universe is a product of chance, a grand accident of accidents?

Boghossian defines an agnostic as one who believes there is not sufficient evidence for the existence of God but who says it is logically impossible to make a definite conclusion, so the agnostic just doesn’t know. This is fair enough as far as a definition goes.

Boghossian claims that, “Faith is an epistemology.” [Loc. 423] The critical task of philosophy is to question truth claims whenever they are put forth. We cannot fault Boghossian for any questions he might ask, so long as they are genuine questions. However, Boghossian has invited the faithful into this discussion. And the faithful are not trained philosophers per se. We are theologians. As theologians, our philosophizing is always theological. Now, the task of the theologian is fundamentally different from the task of the philosopher even if there is a great deal that we have in common. “The task of dogmatic theology, in the final analysis, is nothing other than a scientific exposition of religious truth grounded in sacred Scripture.” [Bavinck, Dogmatics, V. 1, 26.] What Bavinck means by scientific is nothing more than a disciplined inquiry into the revelation that is Sacred Scripture. He is emphasizing a studious process or methodology that for our culture has long been abandoned outside the academy. What the Christian must always guard against is what Bavinck said earlier in his work: “Neither the subjection of dogmatics to philosophical presuppositions nor the dualistic separation of confessional theology from the scientific study of religion is acceptable.” [Ibid. 25] Boghossian does not appear to be asking questions as much as he is making dogmatic affirmations. What is remarkable is that he is making such assertions about a subject in which he is not a specialist: theology. When it comes to the nature and definition of faith, we must turn to the theologian for our education. He is in a much better place to tell us what this word means and how it relates to the field of human knowledge.

Boghossian pushes the conversation of faith as epistemology to a place of confusion. He calls faith a method and a process people use to understand reality. This is a thoroughly rationalistic perspective of faith. Now, it is certainly true that Scripture asserts that we understand by faith, that the world was created by the very words of God. In other words, faith is the instrument by which we arrive at our knowledge that the world was created by the very words of God. However, faith is not, strictly speaking, an epistemology. Faith is closer to the idea of trusting God’s word to accurately inform us. We may ask if it is possible to think of the role of faith as providing the necessary preconditions for epistemology to get going in certain respects. At any rate, faith is far more than Boghossian seems to consider thus far in his project.

Boghossian writes, “Knowledge claims purport to be objective because they assert a truth about the world. Subjective claims are not knowledge claims and do not assert a truth about the world; rather, they are statements about one’s own unique, situated, subjective, personal experiences or preferences.” [Loc. 422] If knowledge is justified true belief or warranted belief, then it follows that subjective claims can be knowledge claims so long as they rise to the level of warranted belief. For instance, my belief that I had a dream last night about the Browns winning the Super Bowl is a knowledge claim even if it is an insignificant one. Boghossian’s reduction of knowledge claims to external, objective claims seems to be driven more by his not so obscure agenda than by anything else. His definition of knowledge precludes the possibility of experiential knowledge and we know that such a scenario is utterly absurd. I know that I love my wife and kids. But according to Boghossian, such knowledge really isn’t knowledge at all. Knowledge claims are more than just propositions about the world.

Boghossian says that faith claims about the world are knowledge claims about the world. I wholeheartedly agree. Boghossian then asserts that the knowledge claims of faith are unreliable because there are so many different faiths and these faiths have serious disagreements about the state of affairs that has obtained. However, one has to wonder how disagreements among differing faiths proves that faith is unreliable as an epistemological method any more than disagreements among atheists about epistemological methodology means their respective methods are unreliable. If rationalists can disagree without compromising rationalism, then so too can faiths. Boghossian writes, “If a belief is based on insufficient evidence, then any further conclusions drawn from the belief will at best be of questionable value.” [Loc. 440] I believe he is right. Indeed, before I am finished evaluating Boghossian’s project, I shall subject his basic beliefs to this belief to see if his own system can withstand his own scrutiny. This is the process that presuppositional apologetics employs to show the unbeliever the internal contradictions of his own system. After all, the difference between us comes down to warrant. What do we mean by the expression, “insufficient evidence?” If we can pinpoint the meaning of this expression, we can then pinpoint our difference. Is it as simple as faith? I think the answer might be yes and no. I will come back to this point as I work through Boghossian’s project.

Boghossian writes, “faith claims have no way to be corrected, altered, revised, or modified.” Surely he is not correct. In this respect, there is a way for just such a process within Christian theism, which is the sort of faith that I defend. In concluding the chapter on faith, Boghossian writes, “The only way to figure out which claims about the world are likely true, and which are likely false, is through reason and evidence. There is no other way.” [Loc. 456]

The Christian Rejoinder

Before you read this section, I would encourage you to go back to the beginning of this post and read it again. The goal of this section is to respond to the major claims put forth by Boghossian’s second chapter on faith and to provide you with a method for interacting with the atheist or street epistemologist (hereafter SE).

We first have to ask the SE to justify his definition of faith. Remember, the SE defines faith as “belief without evidence” and as “claiming to know things you do not know.” The first point is that the Christian is not interested in defending “religious belief” or “generic faith.” The Christian theist is only interested in discussing the faith of Christian theism and no other. Unless you make this distinction, your defense of “faith” and “religious belief” is sure to stumble. We are not interested in a generic conversation about religion. We are interested in giving an account for the hope that is in us. We are interested in giving the gospel of Jesus Christ. By it, we know that blind eyes are opened, and true knowledge is imparted to the sinner. We must avoid the temptation to wax philosophical even though we know a thing or two about the discipline. Our focus must be on the gospel, that gospel which alone possesses the capability to do what we are seeking to do in the grand scheme of things: persuade the sinner to believe the gospel and to embrace the Christ of the gospel.

This is a good time to contradict Boghossian’s perspective and definitions of faith. Bruce Malina writes, “In American culture, faith has a strong intellectual character. It is an act of the mind. Because this culture is so strongly rational, faith takes on the further nuance that a person believes something or someone merely on a word of authority, even – perhaps even especially – when the evidence doesn’t necessarily add up.” [Malina, Bruce. Handbook of Biblical Social Values, 75] The NIDNTT defines faith as “the trust a man may place in men or the gods, credibility, credit in business, guarantee, proof, or to trust something or someone.” [Michel, NIDNTT, 594] Louw-Nida inform us that faith is “to believe to the extent of complete trust and reliance—‘to believe in, to have confidence in, to have faith in, to trust, faith, trust.” S.S. Taylor writes, “The biblical concept of faith/faithfulness stands at the heart of the relationship between the God of the Bible and his people, a relationship which, in its essential bi-polarity, is intensely personal, dynamic, and multiform.” [Taylor, New Dictionary of Biblical Theology, 488] Returning to Malina, “In sum, faith primarily means personal loyalty, personal commitment to another person, fidelity and the solidarity that comes from such faithfulness.” [Malina, Handbood, 74] Having challenged Boghossian’s definition of faith, and having offered a theological understanding of the term, and having established the limits of our discussion to involve a discussion of Christian theism, we are now in a better position to speak with him concerning the hope that is in us. It is absolutely critical that the Christian engage in critical thinking from the start, taking nothing for granted, and remembering exactly that their calling in this situation is both high and holy. The next question the Christian asks Boghossian concerns his belief in the principle of justification. 

When Boghossian says that beliefs based on insufficient evidence produce other beliefs that are of questionable value, we have to focus on this principle of justification. The basic problem with justification is that it is not self-justifying. If every belief requires sufficient evidence, then where is the evidence for this belief? In the end, and at bottom, the Christian will eventually hear the retort, “well, that is just the way things are.” Seriously then, the principle of justification cannot survive its own demands. When it is asked to provide sufficient evidence for itself, there is nothing but silence. If you use this question on an atheist that understands your question, I promise you the initial look on their face will be priceless. If absurdity has not entered the conversation by this time, fasten your seatbelt because it is about to begin.

Finally, Boghossian’s accusation that faith provides for no self-corrective feature is simply not true. Apparently, Boghossian is unfamiliar with Christian theism’s view of the authoritative and corrective nature of Scripture. It is against the standard and teaching of Scripture that our beliefs are measured. At the end of this chapter, Boghossian provides a picture perfect view of viciously circular reasoning. He informs us that the only way to get at truth is through evidence and reason. And of course he knows this is true because of reason and evidence. In other words, the proof for reason is reason and the proof for evidence is evidence. But as far as it goes, where is the evidence that evidence is the best way to establish truth? Where is the reason for reason? These are both synthetic statements (statements about the word) that Boghossian claims to know a priori. How is it possible to insist on evidence for such a priori knowledge since such knowledge by nature, exists apart from human experience? We will come back to this concept of knowledge later in our interactions I am sure. It is enough to say that there are different types of truth claims, different ways of knowing, and different kinds of evidence about which we must all be aware as we provide answers to those who ask us to provide an account for the hope that is in us.

10 Myths and 10 Truths About Atheism: Rejoinder to Sam Harris

Sam Harris, in a recent article carried by the Los Angeles Times, has made, what I consider, an obviously unremarkable attempt to clear up some basic misunderstanding concerning the teachings of atheism. Apparently Harris is disturbed by the degree of stigma attached with atheism and this is his attempt to change the image of the godless and god-hating philosophy. This is my attempt to discuss whether or not I think Harris is successful. Harris lists 10 myths people believe about atheists and then tries to set the record straight.

Myth 1: Atheists believe that life is meaningless.

“Our relationships with those we love are meaningful now; they need not last forever to be made so.” Harris makes no argument for meaningful lives. He simply makes a statement. Atheism often hides its true colors and avoids the rational implications of its dearly prized presuppositions. Harris unwittingly reveals his true feelings about meaning in his last sentence: Atheists tend to find this fear of meaninglessness … well … meaningless. Harris is so unconcerned with meaninglessness that he makes it his first “myth” that others believe about atheists. That sure sounds like it bothers him to me.

Myth 2: Atheism is responsible for the greatest crimes in history.

Note that Harris personalizes atheism in myth 1 and depersonalizes it in myth 2. This is because it is a fact of history that atheists like Hitler, Stalin, and Mao were responsible for the greatest crimes in history. It is what we call a historically documented fact! Harris, in a bizarre move, attempts to blame this fact on religion, interestingly enough. Apparently, if these atheists had not borrowed dogmatic thinking from religion, they would not have been such monsters.

Myth 3: Atheism is dogmatic.

“Jews, Christians and Muslims claim that their scriptures are so prescient of humanity’s needs that they could only have been written under the direction of an omniscient deity. An atheist is simply a person who has considered this claim, read the books and found the claim to be ridiculous.” In reply to Harris, one could rightfully point out that the claims of Christian theism are only ridiculous if one dogmatically holds to the autonomous epistemology espoused by atheism. In other words, Christianity and Atheism have criteria by which beliefs are deemed rational. Both are guilty of dogmatically holding to that criteria. Christianity is just honest about it.

Myth 4: Atheists think everything in the universe around by chance

“No one knows why the universe came into being.” Reply, In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth. There are only two options in terms of why something exists as opposed to nothing. Either the universe was caused by something other than itself, or it arose somehow by pure chance. It is impossible to miss the level of discomfort Harris feels at this point in his attempt to defend what is obviously indefensible, namely, that something arose from nothing without a cause.

Myth 5: Atheism has no connection with science

“Although it is possible to be a scientist and still believe in God — as some scientists seem to manage it — there is no question that an engagement with scientific thinking tends to erode, rather than support, religious faith. Taking the U.S. population as an example: Most polls show that about 90% of the general public believes in a personal God; yet 93% of the members of the National Academy of Sciences do not. This suggests that there are few modes of thinking less congenial to religious faith than science is.” I am always fascinated that men who pride themselves on being scientific or really intellectual fall into such basic informal fallacies like this one. This is the fallacy of appeal to authority, specifically, the authority of the many. Scientists supposed represent the best thinkers, making them the authority in “thinking.” Christianity does not accept scientific criteria as its final authority for faith or justified belief. And that is the very squabble that Harris ignores.

Myth 6: Atheists are arrogant

“Pretending to know things one doesn’t know is a profound liability in science. And yet it is the life-blood of faith-based religion.” Notice that Harris, in his attempt to disown arrogance actually engages in an extremely arrogant statement, pretending that Christians have no good reason for their beliefs. Hello, Mr. Harris, perhaps someone else should have taken up the atheist’s banner on this one.

Myth 7: Atheists are closed to spiritual experience

“There is nothing that prevents an atheist from experiencing love, ecstasy, rapture and awe; atheists can value these experiences and seek them regularly. What atheists don’t tend to do is make unjustified (and unjustifiable) claims about the nature of reality on the basis of such experiences.” What atheists cannot do is provide any rational justification for these experiences and for why they value them. If we are truly molecules in motion, it only begs the question as to how atheists can be open to spiritual experience as if being so is virtuous somehow. Once again, Harris claims that Christians make unjustifiable claims about the nature of reality is simply wrong. What Christians do is justify their claims to knowledge on the basis of divine revelation. What Harris should do, in the name of intellectual honesty, is simply say that he doesn’t like how Christians justify their claim to knowledge.

Myth 8: Atheists believe that there is nothing beyond human life and human understanding

Incredibly, Harris does not offer anything more than baseless speculations about the possibility of advanced extraterrestrial life, that such life would be atheistic of course, and that such life would be even less impressed with the Bible than human atheists would. What a waste of time this myth turned out to be.

Myth 9: Atheists ignore the fact that religion is extremely beneficial to society

“In any case, the good effects of religion can surely be disputed. In most cases, it seems that religion gives people bad reasons to behave well, when good reasons are actually available.” I would love to hear Harris defend the idea of “good.” What does he mean when he says that people should behave well? Moreover, what can he possibly mean by “good reasons?” These statements have morality unavoidably embedded in them. How do we go from slime to fine? How does a biological accident move from nothing to something of value? Atheism has no logical ground for acts of kindness, for nobility, or even for heroes. An atheist who lives a good life does a good thing without a good reason.

Myth 10: Atheism provides no basis for morality

“We decide what is good in our good books by recourse to moral intuitions that are (at some level) hard-wired in us and that have been refined by thousands of years of thinking about the causes and possibilities of human happiness.” Notice that Harris’s answer gives us no good reason to condemn Stalin, Hitler, or Mao. Apparently their decision about morality was different from ours. In addition, what about all the crime, and injustice, and hate that is present in human society. The philosophical problem with Harris’ view is the lack of criteria to get started. How can humanity improve morality without having something “better” to compare it with? By what standard would we look at murder thousands of years ago and contemplate that it should be immoral rather than moral?

The fool has said in his heart, “There is no God.” (Ps. 14:1) The fool has said in his heart, “There is no God,” They are corrupt, and have committed abominable injustice; There is no one who does good. (Ps. 53:1)

Cessationism, Miracles, and Atheism: Understanding the Difference

For what seems like dozens of posts at this point, Steve Hays has criticized John MacArthur, Fred Butler, others, and myself for rejecting the modern claims by Charismatics that miracles workers still exist in the Church today. Steve has accused us of adopting the very same presuppositions employed by naturalistic atheists and skeptics in our reasoning. Perhaps some readers actually think Hays has a good point. After all, I realize that many of the young men at Triablogue are simply eager to follow someone they think is really, really smart. And it appears that Steve Hays is really, really smart. Richard Dawkins is really, really smart too, but he constructs some of the dullest arguments I have ever read. What I want to do in this post is point one, once again, the extraordinary fallacious nature of Hays’ accusation by pointing out where the differences rest between our argument and the argument from skepticism.

In order to get started, I want to quickly look at the skepticism of the famous empiricist, David Hume. Hume argued that there are two kinds of propositions: Relation of Ideas or Matters of Fact. The first set of propositions would include things like math while the second set would include all empirical knowledge, things known through the senses. Hume was convinced that all empirical knowledge was based on the relation of cause and effect. Now, this is far more complex than it might appear. My challenge is to simplify it at the risk of oversimplification. Because Hume denied God as the cause of all things we witness in the universe, and because he was an empiricist, he was forced to conclude that the human mind could never find the cause behind the event. Hume believed that all inferences from experience, therefore, are effects of custom, not of reasoning. Hence, we know that fire burns through custom, not reason. The empiricist is unable to account for the uniformity of nature based solely on his empiricism. He cannot provide an adequate account for why the universe exists, empirically speaking that is. This is why Hume concluded that we have no empirical basis to believe that the Sun will rise tomorrow. Empiricism, by its very nature, has no predictive power.

Empiricism can in no way predict natural phenomena because it denies that true knowledge of the relationship between the general and the particular exists. Because miracles are events that are highly improbable, no one should believe reports that they actually occur. The issue comes down to one’s procedure for how they reason from the particular facts of experience to general truths. This is called induction. Hume’s skepticism is anchored in his empiricism. Because sooner or later, every inductive generalization presupposes a proposition that can never be proved (empirically speaking), it follows that logical justification for induction is impossible. Of course Hume is engaging in inductive skepticism in order to attack the enterprise of induction. The problem with Hume’s skepticism is his epistemological presupposition that all knowledge comes through the senses. Why Steve Hays knowingly associates the cessation argument with skepticism on any level is curious to say the least. One can only conclude that Hays really doesn’t understand Hume or the role of such presuppositions in one’s worldview or he uses these tactics deliberately. The former would be an indictment of gross ignorance while the latter an indictment of malevolence.

A second form of skepticism is rational skepticism popularized by Benedict Spinoza (1632-1677). Within this scheme, the argument against miracles contends that miracles are violations of natural laws. But natural laws are immutable. It is impossible to violate immutable natural laws. Therefore, miracles are impossible. But that is not what Christian theism believes, is it? The truth is that Montaigne is correct in that true knowledge is impossible in a vacuous empiricism or rationalism. The Epicureans and the Stoics were both wrong. The answer to Spinoza’s argument is easily discovered. It is wrong to think of the uniformity of nature as impersonal, natural laws. Christian theism rejects the idea that there is anything impersonal involved in the ordering of the universe from its beginning to its future end. Because it rejects impersonal natural laws, Christian theism embraces the view that the most minute activities in the universe are ordered and held together continually by the power of the omnipotent God revealed in Scriptures.

I now want to pick up Hume’s argument where we leave Spinoza. Hume argues that we simply don’t have enough reliable witnesses, of good moral character, who testify to a miraculous event. Hume also noted that human beings love bizarre tales. Finally, Hume notices that miracles are usually reported among unenlightened people groups. Hume’s issue with miracles has nothing to do with this arrogant and obnoxious cloak. Hume denies not just miracles, but the miraculous. Because the miraculous cannot exist in empiricism, it is necessary to explain these so-called miracles. This is Hume’s way of maintaining his empiricism. It is Hume doing what Paul said all unbelievers do: they suppress the knowledge of God within and around them.

Now, what Steve Hays attempts to do is extend Hume’s argument against human testimony to the cessationist. Hume argues that the particular reports of miracles should not be believed because these men have questionable character, or, they love the bizarre, or they are simply unenlightened. The skeptic argues that enlightened men should not believe in the highly improbable. Miracles are highly improbable and therefore, enlightened men should not believe that miracles occur.

You may be asking where Hays is wrong in his accusation that cessationists are skeptics in sheep’s clothing. Hays is wrong on several accounts. First of all, cessationism does not deny the possibility of modern miracles. We believe God can perform miracles today. In fact, when presented with the right kind of evidence, rather than rejecting a miracle claim and resorting to some far-fetched naturalistic explanation, we will rejoice that God has performed a miracle. Suppose a person was cured of terminal cancer. The skeptic would conclude that mistake took place in the diagnosis or that something strange had indeed taken place but the cause must have been naturalistic even if we don’t understand it. The believer will not resort to such outlandish and foolish explanations. The cessationist will rejoice in the Lord. But there is quite a long distance between believing that God performs miracles and that miracle workers are still present in the Church today. Hays continues to forget this basic distinction.

The skeptics’ worldview and hence his presuppositions are antichrist. They are set in opposition to God at every junction. Miraculous causes and supernatural effects are precluded out of hand and exchanged in preference for outrageous naturalistic rationalizations of all varieties. The cessationist insistence that the modern claim of miracles be examined for validity has nothing to do with belief in the possibility of the miracle. Instead, it has everything to do with biblical discernment, with truth, and with the public testimony of the Christian community. In short, it has to do with the reputation of Christ Himself in the world. The fact that we witness thousands and even millions of false reports of miracles and miracle workers, in the name of Christ is sufficient cause for the Church to establish a protocol for validating when God has actually performed something extraordinary. It is a dishonor to the Christian community and to men like Steve Hays when we not only sanction, but facilitate hundreds of millions of Pentecostals and Charismatics making false and outrageous claims about the God of Scripture across the globe. False reports of miracle workers insult, defame, and scandalize the Christ we claim to know, to love, and to serve with all our heart, soul, mind, and body. What Steve Hays calls skeptics in sheep’s clothing, we call biblical discernment.