In chapter two of his project, Boghossian wastes no time
striking at the center of a Christian Epistemology. Specifically, he begins
with two distinct definitions of faith: “belief without evidence,” and “pretending
to know things you don’t know.” Boghossian believes that faith claims are
knowledge claims and that faith is therefore an epistemology. We will come back
to this point of view in the analysis section of this post.
Boghossian accuses the faithful of offering vague
definitions of faith, which he calls “deepities.” “A deepity is a statement
that looks profound but is not. Deepities appear true at one level, but on all
other levels are meaningless.” [loc. 265] Boghossian then points to a number of
examples of vagueness, one of which is Heb. 11:1. The rest of his examples seem
to be arbitrary selections designed only to prop up his straw man approach at
this point. Apparently, “faith is a leap over the probabilities.” He says faith
is the word one uses when one does not have enough evidence to justify holding
a belief.
The second definition of faith, pretending to know things
you don’t know, is like someone giving advice about baking cookies who has
never been in a kitchen, says Boghossian. Boghossian then inserts a table with
commonly heard phrases that believers use about faith and he inserts the phrase
“pretending to know things I don’t know” in place of faith in each instance. It
truly is a type of brain washing of the atheist. Boghossian pretends to be
equipping atheists to help the faithful cure themselves of their faith but what
he is actually doing is attempting to find a better way to protect the atheists
during their exchanges with the faithful. This tactic is designed to create a
cementing of the atheist’s mind. Do not take the individual’s argument
seriously. The atheist should view the faithful’s conversation as an incredible
and foolish joke from the outset of the conversation. By taking this approach,
Boghossian hopes to shield the atheist from genuinely thinking about the
statements of the faithful.
Boghossian then attempts to essentially annihilate the
meaning of faith by ripping central components of its meaning away. It seems
the author views faith as purely epistemological in nature. But this would be
more closely aligned with a philosophical or purely intellectual and even a
rationalistic understanding of faith than a theological one. Clearly,
Boghossian’s understanding of Christian theism is terribly insufficient to the
task he sets out to accomplish. It is a philosophical howler to criticize a
view that you do not even understand. For the Christian reading this post, you
should take solace in the fact that no godless philosopher, atheist or
otherwise, really understands Christian theism. The core ingredient to
understanding biblical Christianity is the illuminating work of God the Holy
Spirit coupled with the gift of biblical faith. Absent that work, a genuine understanding
of Christian theism and its principles and concepts is impossible.
Boghossian defines “atheist” as one who “believes there is
insufficient evidence to warrant belief in a divine, supernatural creator of
the universe.” As I interact with the author, I will ask questions about these
kind of statements. A critical thinker would ask, what would be sufficient
evidence? Additionally, what qualifies as evidence? Again, what does Boghossian
mean by warrant? If we turn the guns on this belief, we would ask if there is
sufficient evidence to warrant the belief that all beliefs should have
sufficient evidence in order to be warranted or justified? What evidence could
Boghossian provide for the belief that beliefs should come with sufficient
evidence? How could the atheist justify such an epistemological structure and
then unify that structure with his belief that the universe is a product of chance,
a grand accident of accidents?
Boghossian defines an agnostic as one who believes there is
not sufficient evidence for the existence of God but who says it is logically impossible
to make a definite conclusion, so the agnostic just doesn’t know. This is fair
enough as far as a definition goes.
Boghossian claims that, “Faith is an epistemology.” [Loc.
423] The critical task of philosophy is to question truth claims whenever they
are put forth. We cannot fault Boghossian for any questions he might ask, so
long as they are genuine questions. However, Boghossian has invited the
faithful into this discussion. And the faithful are not trained philosophers
per se. We are theologians. As theologians, our philosophizing is always
theological. Now, the task of the theologian is fundamentally different from
the task of the philosopher even if there is a great deal that we have in
common. “The task of dogmatic theology, in the final analysis, is nothing other
than a scientific exposition of religious truth grounded in sacred Scripture.”
[Bavinck, Dogmatics, V. 1, 26.] What Bavinck means by scientific is nothing
more than a disciplined inquiry into the revelation that is Sacred Scripture. He
is emphasizing a studious process or methodology that for our culture has long
been abandoned outside the academy. What the Christian must always guard
against is what Bavinck said earlier in his work: “Neither the subjection of
dogmatics to philosophical presuppositions nor the dualistic separation of
confessional theology from the scientific study of religion is acceptable.”
[Ibid. 25] Boghossian does not appear to be asking questions as much as he is
making dogmatic affirmations. What is remarkable is that he is making such
assertions about a subject in which he is not a specialist: theology. When it
comes to the nature and definition of faith, we must turn to the theologian for
our education. He is in a much better place to tell us what this word means and
how it relates to the field of human knowledge.
Boghossian pushes the conversation of faith as epistemology
to a place of confusion. He calls faith a method and a process people use to
understand reality. This is a thoroughly rationalistic perspective of faith.
Now, it is certainly true that Scripture asserts that we understand by faith,
that the world was created by the very words of God. In other words, faith is
the instrument by which we arrive at our knowledge that the world was created
by the very words of God. However, faith is not, strictly speaking, an
epistemology. Faith is closer to the idea of trusting God’s word to accurately
inform us. We may ask if it is possible to think of the role of faith as
providing the necessary preconditions for epistemology to get going in certain
respects. At any rate, faith is far more than Boghossian seems to consider thus
far in his project.
Boghossian writes, “Knowledge claims purport to be objective
because they assert a truth about the world. Subjective claims are not
knowledge claims and do not assert a truth about the world; rather, they are
statements about one’s own unique, situated, subjective, personal experiences
or preferences.” [Loc. 422] If knowledge is justified true belief or warranted
belief, then it follows that subjective claims can be knowledge claims so long
as they rise to the level of warranted belief. For instance, my belief that I
had a dream last night about the Browns winning the Super Bowl is a knowledge
claim even if it is an insignificant one. Boghossian’s reduction of knowledge
claims to external, objective claims seems to be driven more by his not so
obscure agenda than by anything else. His definition of knowledge precludes the
possibility of experiential knowledge and we know that such a scenario is
utterly absurd. I know that I love my wife and kids. But according to
Boghossian, such knowledge really isn’t knowledge at all. Knowledge claims are
more than just propositions about the world.
Boghossian says that faith claims about the world are knowledge
claims about the world. I wholeheartedly agree. Boghossian then asserts that
the knowledge claims of faith are unreliable because there are so many different
faiths and these faiths have serious disagreements about the state of affairs
that has obtained. However, one has to wonder how disagreements among differing
faiths proves that faith is unreliable as an epistemological method any more
than disagreements among atheists about epistemological methodology means their
respective methods are unreliable. If rationalists can disagree without
compromising rationalism, then so too can faiths. Boghossian writes, “If a
belief is based on insufficient evidence, then any further conclusions drawn
from the belief will at best be of questionable value.” [Loc. 440] I believe he
is right. Indeed, before I am finished evaluating Boghossian’s project, I shall
subject his basic beliefs to this belief to see if his own system can withstand
his own scrutiny. This is the process that presuppositional apologetics employs
to show the unbeliever the internal contradictions of his own system. After
all, the difference between us comes down to warrant. What do we mean by the
expression, “insufficient evidence?” If we can pinpoint the meaning of this
expression, we can then pinpoint our difference. Is it as simple as faith? I
think the answer might be yes and no. I will come back to this point as I work
through Boghossian’s project.
Boghossian writes, “faith claims have no way to be corrected, altered, revised, or modified.” Surely he is not correct. In this respect, there is a way for just such a process within Christian theism, which is the sort of faith that I defend. In concluding the chapter on faith, Boghossian writes, “The only way to figure out which claims about the world are likely true, and which are likely false, is through reason and evidence. There is no other way.” [Loc. 456]
The Christian Rejoinder
Before you read this section, I would encourage you to go
back to the beginning of this post and read it again. The goal of this section
is to respond to the major claims put forth by Boghossian’s second chapter on
faith and to provide you with a method for interacting with the atheist or
street epistemologist (hereafter SE).
We first have to ask the SE to justify his definition of
faith. Remember, the SE defines faith as “belief without evidence” and as “claiming
to know things you do not know.” The first point is that the Christian is not
interested in defending “religious belief” or “generic faith.” The Christian theist
is only interested in discussing the faith of Christian theism and no other.
Unless you make this distinction, your defense of “faith” and “religious belief”
is sure to stumble. We are not interested in a generic conversation about
religion. We are interested in giving an account for the hope that is in us. We
are interested in giving the gospel of Jesus Christ. By it, we know that blind
eyes are opened, and true knowledge is imparted to the sinner. We must avoid
the temptation to wax philosophical even though we know a thing or two about
the discipline. Our focus must be on the gospel, that gospel which alone possesses
the capability to do what we are seeking to do in the grand scheme of things:
persuade the sinner to believe the gospel and to embrace the Christ of the
gospel.
This is a good time to contradict Boghossian’s perspective
and definitions of faith. Bruce Malina writes, “In American culture, faith has
a strong intellectual character. It is an act of the mind. Because this culture
is so strongly rational, faith takes on the further nuance that a person
believes something or someone merely on a word of authority, even – perhaps even
especially – when the evidence doesn’t necessarily add up.” [Malina, Bruce.
Handbook of Biblical Social Values, 75] The NIDNTT defines faith as “the trust
a man may place in men or the gods, credibility, credit in business, guarantee,
proof, or to trust something or someone.” [Michel, NIDNTT, 594] Louw-Nida
inform us that faith is “to believe to the extent of complete trust and
reliance—‘to believe in, to have confidence in, to have faith in, to trust,
faith, trust.” S.S. Taylor writes, “The biblical concept of faith/faithfulness
stands at the heart of the relationship between the God of the Bible and his
people, a relationship which, in its essential bi-polarity, is intensely
personal, dynamic, and multiform.” [Taylor, New Dictionary of Biblical
Theology, 488] Returning to Malina, “In sum, faith primarily means personal
loyalty, personal commitment to another person, fidelity and the solidarity that
comes from such faithfulness.” [Malina, Handbood, 74] Having challenged
Boghossian’s definition of faith, and having offered a theological
understanding of the term, and having established the limits of our discussion
to involve a discussion of Christian theism, we are now in a better position to
speak with him concerning the hope that is in us. It is absolutely critical
that the Christian engage in critical thinking from the start, taking nothing
for granted, and remembering exactly that their calling in this situation is
both high and holy. The next question the Christian asks Boghossian concerns his belief in the principle of justification.
When Boghossian says that beliefs
based on insufficient evidence produce other beliefs that are of questionable
value, we have to focus on this principle of justification. The basic problem
with justification is that it is not self-justifying. If every belief requires
sufficient evidence, then where is the evidence for this belief? In the end,
and at bottom, the Christian will eventually hear the retort, “well, that is
just the way things are.” Seriously then, the principle of justification cannot
survive its own demands. When it is asked to provide sufficient evidence for
itself, there is nothing but silence. If you use this question on an atheist
that understands your question, I promise you the initial look on their face
will be priceless. If absurdity has not entered the conversation by this time,
fasten your seatbelt because it is about to begin.
Finally, Boghossian’s accusation that faith provides for no
self-corrective feature is simply not true. Apparently, Boghossian is
unfamiliar with Christian theism’s view of the authoritative and corrective
nature of Scripture. It is against the standard and teaching of Scripture that
our beliefs are measured. At the end of this chapter, Boghossian provides a
picture perfect view of viciously circular reasoning. He informs us that the
only way to get at truth is through evidence and reason. And of course he knows
this is true because of reason and evidence. In other words, the proof for
reason is reason and the proof for evidence is evidence. But as far as it goes,
where is the evidence that evidence is the best way to establish truth? Where
is the reason for reason? These are both synthetic statements (statements about the word) that Boghossian
claims to know a priori. How is it possible to insist on evidence for
such a priori knowledge since such knowledge by nature, exists apart from
human experience? We will come back to this concept of knowledge later in our
interactions I am sure. It is enough to say that there are different types of
truth claims, different ways of knowing, and different kinds of evidence about
which we must all be aware as we provide answers to those who ask us to provide
an account for the hope that is in us.
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