Chapter three of “A Manual for Creating Atheists” is truly a
very difficult chapter for intelligent people of faith to read. This is not
because it offers some profound intellectual challenge to faith. Rather, it is
because Boghossian waxes extremely insulting in the chapter. However, the
Christian must resist the temptation to be drawn into Boghossian's unkind ad
hominem. Instead, we must critically examine the truthfulness of his
propositions, all the while pointing out his philosophical bias, his wild
conjectures, and his unproven philosophical assumptions.
Boghossian begins this chapter by setting a priori knowledge
and analytic statements over against synthetic statements and a posteriori
knowledge. This is an old argument between rationalists and empiricists and one
that will likely never be settled. Specifically, he attacks certainty. He
writes, “Certainty is an enemy of truth: examination and reexamination are
allies of truth.” One cannot help but wonder how knowledge advances or
progresses if it has no foundation upon which to advance. I shall return to
this criticism later in the post.
Boghossian asserts that, “Faith taints or at worse removes
our curiosity about the world.” Seemingly, faith leads to certainty about facts
of the world and such certainty allays curiosity. Boghossian thinks, “Faith
immutably alters the starting conditions for inquiry by uprooting a hunger to
know and sowing a warrantless confidence.” The author of this project speaks
with the strangest level of confidence for a man that thinks such confidence is
the enemy of knowledge and truth. It is odd to read someone criticize the idea
of certainty with such a high degree of, well, certainty.
Boghossian then makes this very puzzling statement, “Once we
understand that we don’t possess knowledge, we have a basis to go forward in a
life of examination, wonder, and critical reflection.” This statement would be humorous
if it wasn’t so disturbing. The critical thinker has to wonder what the basis
of our examination and critical thinking might be if we are all ignorant of it.
How can one know that we have any basis at all for the pursuit of knowledge?
How can one understand that they are knowledge-less? To understand implies a
degree of knowledge. And to have adequate understanding to know that
exploration is needed and desirable seems like a healthy degree of knowledge. Apparently
Boghossian hasn’t the foggiest notion that knowledge depends upon knowledge,
and so too does the very notion of examination, wonder, and critical
reflection. The necessary precondition for knowledge is knowledge. I must
confess that I find Boghossian’s line of reasoning here utterly absurd. At a
minimum, knowing that one does not know is knowing. What then is the basis for that
knowledge? Boghossian will eventually be forced to disclose his own foundation
of beliefs and it is there that we shall find his faith.
From here, the author makes an ethical statement, which is
also quite puzzling given his epistemological proclivity: “Wonder, curiosity,
honest self-reflection, sincerity, and the desire to know are a solid basis for
a life worth living.” I cannot help but ask how Boghossian knows that there is
such a thing as “a life worth living.” What does “a life worth living actually
look like?” Additionally, is there only one “life worth living” or are there
more? Furthermore, what justification can he provide for such a sweeping and
universal claim? I wonder if there isn’t an element of faith somewhere in
Boghossian’s own worldview. Indeed, if it can be shown that such is the case,
the implications for Boghossian’s project could turn out to more than just a
little hysterical. After all, his entire thesis, the unreliability of faith as
an epistemological method, would rest upon the very thing he so desperately
wants to avoid: faith.
The goal of the Street Epistemologist is to “help people destroy
foundational beliefs, flimsy assumptions, faulty epistemologies, and ultimately
faith.” We cannot tell if Boghossian is speaking of the notion of
foundationalism or if he means specific beliefs. As far as it goes, everyone
enters this discussion with foundational beliefs. They are impossible to destroy.
They can only be replaced with competing foundational beliefs. In addition, I
intend to show that every epistemological position is, at bottom, a faith
position. The only different is the object in which the faith is placed.
As we move through this particularly offensive, closed-minded,
and arrogant chapter, the author once against makes one more outlandish
statement about faith: “After all, faith is by definition the belief in
something regardless or even in spite of the evidence.” The idea is that
Christian faith has absolutely no evidence to offer and in fact, it exists in
spite of the evidence against it. Boghossian then points to the Gervais &
Norenzyan 2012 study that supposedly concludes that analytic thinking promotes
religious disbelief. What Boghossian does not tell us is that most of the
subjects in that study came from a liberal Canadian university, hence, highly
underrepresenting the typical North American population. Suffice it to say that
the study to which Boghossian refers is a real howler.
Boghossian spends a lot of time on what he calls “Doxastic
Closure.” This is what happens when a person holds to a belief that is
resistant to revision, supposedly regardless of the evidence. Boghossian says, “This
puts people in a type of bubble that filters out ideologically disagreeable
data and opinions.” I wonder if “doxastic closure” is the same thing as
dismissing the reliability of faith as an epistemology from the start, because
it does not meet one’s ideas of their criteria for justification.
Boghossian tell us that doxastic openness is a willingness
and ability to revise beliefs. One has to wonder what sort of evidence Boghossian
would need in order to justify a belief. Suppose someone asks him to be open to
changing his criteria for justification, how do we think he might respond? Boghossian’s
view of his ability to be purely objective about these matters seems more than
a little naive.
I could continue my review of chapter three, but I will stop
with one more Boghossian assertion that is nothing short of outrageous. He
writes, “This section will unpack two primary reasons for this appearance of
failure: either (1) an interlocutor’s brain is neurologically damaged, or (2)
you’re actually succeeding.” He continues, “In Short, if someone is suffering
from a brain-based faith delusion your work will be futile.” If Boghossian means
for people to take his project serious, then he should leave aside such
insulting conjectures and ad hominem and explain to his atheist colleagues that
it could be due to the fact that their arguments rest upon a hopeless irrationalism,
are not supported by the evidence, and most of all, contradict the truth of God
revealed in Scripture, which is actually why intelligent Christians reject them.
One has to do more than link together a bunch of ad hominem statements if they
hope to persuade others of the validity concerning their point of view.
The Christian response to Boghossian then is to ask him to
justify the certainty with which he condemns certainty. Boghossian claims that
certainty is an enemy of the truth and about this he seems to be quite certain.
Boghossian’s whole enterprise seems to be that faith aims for certainty. His argument
goes something like this: examination and reexamination are allies of truth.
Certainty endangers examination. Without examination truth is endangered. Faith
produces certainty. Therefore, faith endangers truth. But one has to ask why
truth ceases to be truth once we become certain of it. I am certain that 2+2 =
4. I do not need to examine the equation again. I do not need to reexamine the
equation again. I am certain it is true. Boghossian tells us that truth is
threatened by certainty, but he fails to illustrate for us just why he thinks
this is the case.
Boghossian’s claim that faith removes our curiosity about
the world is manifestly misleading. The fact that Christian theism asserts that
there are some things, about which we can be certain, does nothing to quell intellectual
adventure or curiosity about the many things we do not and even cannot be
certain about. It does not follow that certainty about the existence of God
leads to certainty about all of reality. The fact of God’s existence does
nothing to eliminate mystery, adventure, or curiosity of all of the facts of
God’s universe and of the revelation of Himself both in nature and in
Scripture. Apparently Boghossian is unfamiliar with the voluminous materials
and documents produced by theologians over the centuries, all designed to inform,
to question, to wonder, and to search for the truth.
Boghossian implies that he believes there is a life worth
living. This implies that life has value, worth, and meaning. It also implies
that not just any life has value, worth, and meaning, but rather, a specific
kind of life. Moreover, without saying so, it implies that there is at least
one kind of life that is not worth living. Now, apparently, the life worth
living is a life filled with wonder, curiosity, honest self-reflection, sincerity,
and the desire to know. But why isn’t a life filled with certainty, apathy, insensitive
selfishness, insincerity, and epistemological disinterest? In addition, why isn’t
the life that mixes these traits worth living? Are there more than one lives
worth living? Why this life and not that life? Boghossian opens Pandora’s Box
and closing it is not a task I would desire.
Over and over again Boghossian claims that faith is based on
a lack of evidence. Or he tells us that faith is unreliable and unreasonable
all because of its apparent lack of evidence. What Boghossian has not done so
far is tell us what type of evidence he means. One man is convicted for
murder because there were two credible eyewitnesses that saw him do it. Another
man is convicted of murder because of the forensic evidence gathered at the
scene and his inability to provide a legitimate alibi. What exactly constitutes
evidence? This is the problem of the criterion. If Boghossian is going
to assert that faith is not rational, then the burden of proof is on him. And
such proof must begin with what he means when he uses such terms as evidence,
reasonable, justification, warrant, and rational. We know that self-evident
propositions exist. They do not require evidence to be rational. We do not
require justification in order to believe them. And we know that other
propositions are not self-evident. Boghossian needs to explain to us sooner
rather than later, precisely what is the nature of these propositions that
require warrant and exactly what that warrant must look like in order to be
rational.
The problem so far with Boghossian’s epistemology is that it
is guilty of epistemic circularity. Epistemic circularity is a malady from
which an argument for the reliability of a faculty or source of belief suffers
when one of its premises is such that my acceptance of that premise originates
in the operation of the very faculty or source of belief in question.
[Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, 119] When Boghossian asks us to accept his
standard for what is rational in order to determine what is rationally justifiable,
he is asking us to accept what is essentially an epistemologically circular
argument. Epistemic circularity is only curable in Christian theism where the
source of all knowledge is transcendent. On to chapter four.
I've been looking for a presupp reply to the book! Thanks for the post!
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