Gary Habermas: A Generation of Skeptics Are Open To The Resurrection

A Presuppositionalist Responds

I live in Charlotte, NC, not far from Southern Evangelical Seminary. In fact, I took my very first course in Christian Apologetics at SES when Norman Geisler, the founder of SES, was the professor, back in the early days. Every year, SES sponsors a large conference on apologetics right here in the Charlotte area. That time has recently come and gone with the usual program designed to help Christians defend the beliefs of Christianity. Apparently, one of those lectures was put on by Dr. Gary Habermas, not a newcomer to the conference by any stretch of the imagination. Dr. Habermas has distinguished himself over the years in his focus on evidential apologetics, specifically around the resurrection of Christ. He has so distinguished himself that the article by the Christian Post that I am about to spend some time referencing, called him an “expert” in the resurrection event. I cannot help but wonder what credentials one has to possess in order to be an acknowledged expert on the resurrection of Jesus Christ. At any rate, the Christian Post has given us a glimpse into Habermas’ approach to the defense of the resurrection and I wanted to share my response with you in the hope that it may help you see some of the problems that I think Habermas’ approach presents.

Habermas believes that a generation of skeptics is now open to the evidence for the resurrection of Jesus Christ. Habermas’ method is interesting. He apparently uses only the evidence that his critics will allow in order to make the strongest possible case for the resurrection. Habermas throws out the evidence that the critics reject. In other words, if a critic denies the authenticity of a Pauline letter or a gospel account, Habermas concedes and allows the critic to set the parameters for the discussion. In fact, in the Christian Post article here we see that Habermas has tossed out nearly 50% of the Pauline corpus. We have to ask if this is a good strategy and whether it is in keeping with Christian principles.

Should Christian apologists allow the critic to set the standards for what evidence is acceptable and what evidence is not? Is it ever okay for the Christian to “pretend” that the unbelieving skeptic is right in their view of epistemic justification? Can we dismiss Isaiah or Job, or Genesis 1-11 even to pretend with the critic that they are not what they claim to be?

Christians are bound to defend the entire corpus of Christian teachings, not just one aspect of it. If we permit the critic to dismantle or disallow any of the biblical evidence, why would we think they would stop at any point along the way until they have destroyed or disallowed all of it?

There are many problems with Habermas’ method but I only want to talk about the two that I think are most obvious. The first is the underlying presupposition that facts are neutral, even and especially the historical fact of the resurrection. The second is that Christians somehow have the luxury of defending Christian theism piecemeal. Christian theism is a very broad system and must be defended as a whole from the foundation up. The teachings of Christianity are part of a system that makes sweeping claims about reality, epistemology, and ethics and those claims are interdependent on one another and as such they must be defended within the entire system of which they are a part. In other words, Christians are not to defend the historical event of the resurrection apart from its theological implications. And without the theological implications, the resurrection is nothing more than a fascinating story of how the atoms worked differently in the case of this fellow known as Jesus Christ.

To begin with, Habermas’ appeal to historical evidence assumes that both skeptics and Christians operate under the same philosophy of fact and that assumption is categorically false. Under Habermas’ assumption, we all interpret the resurrection of Christ the same. And that is simply not the case. It does not follow that if there was something like a resurrection that that event must be interpreted the way Christian theism interprets it. And if it is possible for there to exist more than one interpretation of that agreed on historical event, then we end up with the possibility of a resurrection outside of its theological context. And what good will such a resurrection do the skeptic or the critic? For that matter, what good will it do anyone other than the curious scientist bent on trying to develop a naturalistic explanation for it? John Frame says as much when he writes, “For theistic proofs will not, any more than historical evidences, accomplish their purpose without the presupposition of a biblical worldview. As I mentioned in my reply to Craig, without the biblical God there is no reason to suppose that there is a rational, causal order leading to a first cause.” [Five Views, 133]

The resurrection is only meaningful within the framework of its Christian theistic interpretation. Habermas seems to think that critics espousing a non-theistic framework will be forced to cry uncle and abandon their worldview for Christianity. Such a view assumes there is no ethical component in the unbeliever’s outright rejection of the Christian gospel. And that is precisely the objection that we seem to ignore in these conversations, and it matters more than any of the ancillary objections we hear from the skeptic and the critic alike.

Second, we have to grapple with the ethical aspect of Habermas’ approach. At the end of the day, there can be only one ultimate reference point for human predication. We have a choice to make and it is the choice that confronted our first parents in the Garden: either man will serve as the ultimate reference point for what passes as true knowledge or God will serve as the ultimate reference point. Since Christian theism teaches that man is a creature, created in the image of God, and that God is the absolute, independent, self-contained being and source of all that is, we cannot possibly entertain the notion that finite man could ever sit in judgment of the nature God’s revelation. Man could NEVER come up with a standard by which to measure the claims and demands of God placed upon him. Imagine what God’s response to Adam would have been if Adam, in response to God informing him that he is a created man, said, well hang on and let me test your definition of me using the scientific method to make sure that I am what you say I am: a man created in your image. It is precisely this attitude that we are grappling with when we are preaching and declaring to the sinner the gospel of God. Fallen man insists on interpreting the facts according to his philosophy of fact, which places man in the center, as the autonomous and ultimate reference point for what counts as a fact and how any fact should be interpreted. Until we deal with this disagreement, we shall not have dealt with the critic’s objection to any fact of Christian theism, to include the fact of the resurrected Christ.

In summary then we must ask what makes for a strong case? Allowing the critic to outline what evidence will be permitted and what evidence will be rejected? This places the critic in the driver’s seat as the ultimate reference point, as the final authority for what should be believed and what should be rejected. Essentially, this contradicts Paul’s argument in 1 Corinthians 1. Paul tells us that the word of the cross is foolish to the debater, the pagan philosopher, and the experts. Habermas seems to think it is right for us to remove the thing that makes the gospel foolish so that it will be more acceptable. However, the very thing that make the gospel foolish is also the thing that makes it powerful: the supernatural work of God on the heart and mind. The gospel is infused with the power of light and it enlightens all those whom God opens their eyes to see. As a result, our faith stands in the power of God, not in the sophisticated philosophical arguments or the rational evidences as a result of the cleverness of men.

The Christian must communicate the gospel in a way that the demands of the Creator are felt rather than allowing the creature to lighten the load by serving as their own reference point for what should be believed even when it comes to “this saith the Lord.”

Cornelius Van Til wrote, “It is only to be expected that, in matters of ultimate commitment, the intended conclusion of one’s line of argumentation will also be the presuppositional standard that governs one’s matter of argumentation for that conclusion – or else the intended conclusion is not his ultimate commitment after all.

It seems to me that Habermas’ ultimate commitment is not to the inscripturated revelation of God as it is. Otherwise he would be unwilling to pretend that some of “thus says the Lord” is not really “thus says the Lord” for argument’s sake. It is never a stronger argument to throw out evidence just because it is evidence the skeptic rejects. Think about that and let it sink in. Habermas has unwittingly said that if we cut out parts of evidence derived directly from divine revelation we actually strengthen our argument. Nothing could be farther from the truth. It is God, not man, who determines what passes for evidence. We never strengthen our arguments when we pretend that some parts of God’s evidence is not actually good evidence. We only compromise the evidence and the truth it reveals when we do that. And we lesson the demands of a sovereign and holy God upon the lives of fallen, rebellious, and arrogant man. Essentially, we weaken and downgrade the thunderous message of “repent, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand.”

The Disagreement between Classical & Covenantal Apologetics

The non-Christian worldview, in all its forms, affirms that experience can be accounted for along autonomous lines. In back of this statement is the presupposition that human beings, apart from God, can examine a set of brute facts from the standpoint of neutrality and arrive at the truth regarding the state of affairs that has obtained in the world. Classical apologetics, with its full endorsement of natural theology and Aquinas’ second way, wholeheartedly agree with the statement above along with the underlying presuppositions. Covenantal apologetics seeks to show that only Christian theism provides the necessary preconditions for the intelligibility of experience. Human autonomy is a myth. Brute facts do not exist. Instead, only interpretations of facts exist where finite man is concerned. Like human autonomy, neutrality in any part of the human person, is also a myth. Man does not approach life as a blank slate seeking to fill himself with truth. Scripture testifies against such attitudes from beginning to end.

In the Q&A section of the SES debate between Jason Lisle, Richard Howe, and Scott Oliphint, Richard Howe was asked to comment on the difference between conceptual and ontological necessity in Van Til’s TAG. Van Til’s TAG is his Transcendental Argument for the existence of God. I was impressed with the question. I understand what the student was asking. Hence, I waited with baited breath for Howe to interact with this extremely powerful argument. However, much to my chagrin, Howe ignored the question and went off on some other tangent. This lends support to my thesis that Howe has not bothered to interact with Van Til enough to form an educated and concise analysis of presuppositionalism at all. I wish he would stop refuting, what, in my humble opinion, he does not really understand.

When Christian apologists agree that non-Christian worldviews can account for experience apart from God, they unwittingly adopt non-Christian thinking. Since Christian theism stands or falls as a unit, this practice, at a minimum, could result in some very embarrassing encounters in evangelism. At the very least, it reflects poorly constructed argumentation, lacking consistency with sound theology. What is worse is that Christian apologetics must be guided by Christian ethics and the Christian ethic demands that Christians remain faithful to the truth. Therefore, inconsistency in our apologetic method runs afoul of our obligation to remain faithful to biblical truth. Moreover, depending on our motives for this inconsistency, we could rightly be accused of compromising the truth. This occurs when we formulate apologetic method in order to maintain respectability from the unbeliever. We desire to provide an answer that is either not so offensive or one that comports with their criteria for justification of beliefs.

Covenantal apologetics argues from the start that argumentation itself, is impossible apart from God. The conditions necessary to make argumentation possible are what they are only because the state of affairs that has obtained is what Scripture says it is. This is where covenantal and classical apologetics differ greatly. And this is the concept that never made its way into the discussion at the SES conference.

Covenantal apologetics refuses to surrender the criteria of justification for belief to the demands of the unregenerate. The fact is that there is a radical difference between unbelieving criteria for justification of belief, and believing criteria for justification of belief. Hence, what is necessary to qualify as knowledge in the non-Christian worldview is radically different from what is necessary to qualify as knowledge in the Christian worldview. Classical apologetics inherently fails to make this basic distinction, and this leads to unnecessary confusion and inconsistency in the field of Christian apologetics.

In summary then, Richard Howe’s inference that use of human language justifies granting to the unbeliever a natural born neutrality when it comes to such things as evidence, criteria, and justification is just plain wrong. Neutrality is a myth. The state of affairs that has obtained is such that all men, being created in the image of God, are born with an innate and clear knowledge of the Creator. This knowledge is so perspicuous that Paul informs us in Romans one that all unbelievers are without an apologetic for their non-Christian worldview. They are without excuse. Unbelief is indefensible according to Scripture. Yet, it seems to me that classical apologetics legitimizes the unbelieving apologetic to a very large degree by surrendering ground where it should not. At a minimum, classical apologetics seems far too sympathetic with the Satanic question: does God exist? It is not a fair nor reasonable question. In fact, it is a question that is thoroughly wicked from end to end. Not only is it a wicked question where morality is concerned, it is a profoundly irrational question. Christians used to be shocked by such foolish speculations. How dare the creature ask such audaciously arrogant questions like this one! But today, we extend respectability to such an inquiry. It is a virtue of the enlightened mind, after all, to ask critical questions, to give oneself to critical reflection. Indeed, the intellectual endeavors of human speculation are boundless to listen to some even in the Christian camp.

For Richard Howe to presume that the rules of human language presuppose neutrality in not only what those rules are, but also, how those rules are employed, is in my opinion, unjustifiable. The fact is that the rules for human language are absolutely unintelligible absent Christian theism. To argue that our use of those rules justifies the neutral employment of logic and evidence is simply quite a fallacious argument and it demonstrates that Howe simply misses the point of covenantal apologetics. The experience of language, logic, and evidence only makes sense in Christian theism. Every other attempt to explain these phenomena falls short because every other non-Christian worldview collapses in on itself when it is subjected to internal critique.

Man knows God exists. God has made certain of it. Therefore, I do not need to prove to anyone that God exists. When I accept the claim that a person does not know if God exists or does not believe that God exists, I am rejecting what God says about that person’s knowledge of Himself. This is neither right nor safe and it is not in keeping with biblical apologetics. All men pervert the revelation of God they have been given, suppressing the knowledge of God within and around them. Absent the work of grace on the heart, by the person of the Holy Spirit, man will always approach the subject of God from the position of an affirmed and hostile antagonist. Unregenerate man is a God hater by nature. This is the basic theological commitment of covenantal apologetics. Hence, it is wildly antithetical to the classical notion that unregenerate men actually are not sure if God exists. Moreover, these men are capable of approaching the question of God in a neutral fashion. Furthermore, these men can be persuaded that God exists if given the right evidence in just the right way. From there, they may be convinced to accept the rest of the teachings of Christian theism and decide to follow Christ. The disparity between these two schools is indeed overwhelming.

Richard Howe’s Criticism of Covenantal Apologetics

If you have had the opportunity to watch the debate between Jason Lisle, Richard Howe, and Scott Oliphint at the SES Apologetics conference you are familiar with Richard Howe’s basic rejoinder against Covenantal Apologetics (CVA), aka, Presuppositional Apologetics. Howe argues that every approach to theology and apologetics uses extra biblical sources to acquire and defend knowledge of the truth. In fact, it is impossible not to use extra biblical sources to do so. Therefore, when classical apologetics employs natural theology in its defense of the faith, it is doing what every other discipline does as well, to include CVA. Howe points us to the field of biblical hermeneutics, and specifically, to the philosophy of language. He contends that proponents of CVA are just as guilty of relying on concepts and principles that are external to Scripture as are the classical folks. Is Howe correct in his criticism? Personally, after hearing Howe talk about the subject on a few occasions now, with all due respect to his academic standing as a professor of philosophy, I am suspicious of his ability to understand CVA. I do not think this is a reflection of his intellectual ability. I think it is more likely attributable to his lack of interaction with CVA.

I hear the breezes of autonomy in Howe’s criticism. This is precisely the fundamental difference between a biblical apologetic that remains faithful to God’s revelation and one that compromises with the autonomous desires of fallen man. I am not accusing Howe of compromising Scripture. I am accusing him of employing an apologetic method that is less than consistent with sound biblical theology. Does the Bible provide rules for its own interpretation? Howe and Frank Turek answer in the negative. They argue that it does not. Are they correct in their assessment? I do not think so.

First, there is a difference between understanding the uniformity of human language and adopting a biblical hermeneutic. A person’s philosophy of language could never provide for the very first rule of interpreting Scripture: the Scripture is the Word of God. How do we know this? There are only two ways we can truly know that Scripture is the Word of God. First, Scripture claims to be the Word of God. Second, through the regenerative work of the Holy Spirit on our sinful hearts, we now have eyes to see, and ears to hear and understand this fundamental principle of hermeneutics. Without this understanding, interpreting Scripture rightly is a fruitless endeavor.

The second foundational principle of hermeneutics is what we call analgia fidei. This principle, translated the analogy of faith states that Scripture interprets Scripture. We come to the text in need of correction and we always will. It is a very comforting fact of Christian theism that we can trust God the Holy Spirit to continue to purge error from our thinking as we interact with the Sacred Text. These are the two most basic principles of hermeneutics in Christian theism. Abandon these principles and heresy instantly gains a foothold. And is not this the very problem we are experiencing in even some of our most conservative evangelical churches today? In fact, did we not hear Howe say that we would not lose anything from Christian theism if we lost Nahum? Indeed, we did. Oliphint issued a stern rebuke in response to that statement and rightfully so. Nevertheless, the statement is an excellent illustration that the fellows over at SES simply don’t get it. Now, one does not derive these two basic principles of hermeneutics from a philosophy of language course. What Howe is searching for is justification for the CVA presuppositions necessary for biblical interpretation. In addition, what he really wants is for CVA to provide justification that meets his personal criteria for principles of interpretation. What he fails to understand is that Aristotelian logic and natural theology will not provide the sort of justification he seeks.

Howe, without saying so, is arguing for neutrality in human communication. He is seeking to show that hermeneutical method, or the rules of interpreting human communication, is free from the effects of sin. Such an enterprise proves utterly ridiculous. We have to look no further than the profusion of miscommunication in the world today as proof that Howe's view seems naive at best. In addition, we can look to Babel and recognize that human communication is especially cursed. Human language became cursed with the fall of man, and then it became the specific target of divine wrath at Babel. Therefore, it is more than a little naïve to think that human language resides on the ground of neutrality. Human language, like logic, is nothing more than a tool we use to accomplish certain tasks. Neutrality is impossible because the user of human language is never neutral. Without a user, language cannot exist. Language only exists in relationship to a user. Metaphysically speaking, if there is no human, there can be no human language. Howe’s view of language seems to ignore this connection even though I am sure he is aware of it. Perhaps he has not thought this one through as well as he has other ideas.

The existence of human language and our ability to understand one another, albeit imperfectly, is part of God’s general revelation. It has nothing to do with natural theology, which is altogether different. All human knowledge is revelational in nature. We know what Scripture means when it uses numbers because we know the laws of mathematics. Does this mean that we are employing something outside of God’s revelation in order to understand it? That would only be true if the state of affairs that has obtained is different from what Scriptures affirms it to be. Covenantal apologetics does not contend that general revelation is useless. It does not assert that there are no principles of general revelation that help us interpret and understand special revelation. For Howe to suppose it does is more than a little foolish on his part. That is not where our differences rest and if Howe does not understand that, then he knows less about covenantal apologetics than I had imagined. The objection from CVA is that classical apologetics tends to elevate the autonomous employment of logic, language, and science in order to interpret the truth about reality. Man supposedly can use these tools in a neutral fashion and discover truth autonomously, independent from God's revelation. Brute facts do exist.

In closing, I will address the one example Howe used to attempt to refute CVA. In keeping with his view that CVA proponents employ an obvious contradiction between their apologetic and their hermeneutic, Howe pointed to Joshua 10. He argued that it is impossible for a CVA to reject geocentricism if they wish to maintain consistency between their hermeneutic and apologetic principles. Personally, I think Howe should have located his criticism elsewhere because this highlights the fact that he is no exegete for sure, and even less is he a theologian. Why is it that philosophers think they can grab an exegetical bull by the horns and walk away unscathed? That would be like grabbing a Jiu Jitsu instructor, or even practitioner, and thinking you can somehow avoid serious injury. It's just not a very smart thing to do.

The response to Howe is about as simple as one could be. I was hoping that Dr. Lisle or Dr. Oliphint would have pointed it out but they did not. So, I will take a few words to help you understand why Howe’s criticism was more than a little silly. The book of Joshua was written in the second half of the 15^th century BC. Joshua was attempting to convey the miraculous event of God which led to the providential destruction of the enemies of the children of Israel. Now, given that we are talking about this audience, at this time, and their knowledge or lack therefore of the universe, and the sun and the moon, what would be the best way to express this miraculous event? Would they have understood it if God had inspired Joshua to record the event only in terms that a modern person would understand? What would an ancient Israelite have thought if Joshua had stated, “And the earth stood still?” If Howe thinks CVA is inconsistent because in its hermeneutic it recognizes the phenomena of accommodation in the divine revelation, he is mistaken. Human language is simply the use of symbols in an attempt to communicate. God was communicating to a different people at a different time. He used language they understood, just as he uses language we understand. In fact, our knowledge of their knowledge at that time helps us understand what God was communicating at the time, and why He communicated the way He did. When we apply this principle to Genesis 1, the opposite happens. If God did not intend for His audience to understand 6 real days, why did He choose to communicate it in such simple fashion? The audience understood what day meant. It seems somewhat deceptive for God to intentionally use ordinary language with the audience knowing full well that they would not have really received His meaning. When accommodation is necessary, God does not hesitate to use it. We must make sure we are not classifying language as accommodative in some way simply because it is consistent with our philosophical or theological agenda.

The fundamental difference between classical apologetics and
covenantal apologetics is not our hermeneutic, per se. It is our respective difference on the subject of neutrality. It is how we view the fall. It is how we view Romans one to be blunt. Classical apologetics holds that the facts of general revelation are brute facts, waiting to be interpreted by the very capable minds of autonomous human beings. All we have to do is construct really good arguments, and since we all employ language, logic, and science from a neutral starting point, we can persuade men that God exists, and then move to the arguments for Christianity. Covenant apologetics, in contradistinction to this, believes that neutrality is a myth. Logic, science, and even language are nothing more than tools in the hands of unregenerate men who are anything but neutral where God is concerned. CVA contends that unregenerate men are natural born enemies of God, that they are hostile to God, that they suppress the truth of God in any and all circumstances. Romans one tells us that all men know God and that all men universally respond the same way to God but for grace. Therefore, it is irrelevant how perfectly one uses logic, science, or language. Unless God changes the black heart of His dead enemies, they will reject his grace and love and seek to destroy Him wherever they find Him. This is not to say that we should not employ the tools of logic, language, and science well. Rather, it is to say that we must make sure we keep them in their proper place. The power of the Holy Spirit to change hearts through the gospel is no excuse for intellectual slothfulness on our part. We are diligent in these matters not for pragmatic reasons, but because it honors and glorifies God!

The principles for interpreting Scripture begin with Scripture. Scripture is self-justifying. There can be no scheme for justifying Scripture, apart from Scripture, that does not at the same time result in the entire collapse of Christian theism. For CVA, human language is one more phenomenon among many that demonstrates that the only plausible explanation for its existence and uniformity, is Christian theism. Atheism surely has no way of justifying this phenomenon. The existence of human language is only intelligible if Christian theism is true.

There is much more that can be said along these lines, but space dictates that I save that for another post.