A Presuppositionalist
Responds
I live in Charlotte, NC, not far from Southern Evangelical
Seminary. In fact, I took my very first course in Christian Apologetics at SES
when Norman Geisler, the founder of SES, was the professor, back in the early
days. Every year, SES sponsors a large conference on apologetics right here in
the Charlotte area. That time has recently come and gone with the usual program
designed to help Christians defend the beliefs of Christianity. Apparently, one
of those lectures was put on by Dr. Gary Habermas, not a newcomer to the
conference by any stretch of the imagination. Dr. Habermas has distinguished
himself over the years in his focus on evidential apologetics, specifically
around the resurrection of Christ. He has so distinguished himself that the
article by the Christian Post that I am about to spend some time referencing,
called him an “expert” in the resurrection event. I cannot help but wonder what
credentials one has to possess in order to be an acknowledged expert on the
resurrection of Jesus Christ. At any rate, the Christian Post has given us a
glimpse into Habermas’ approach to the defense of the resurrection and I wanted
to share my response with you in the hope that it may help you see some of the
problems that I think Habermas’ approach presents.
Habermas believes that a generation of skeptics is now open
to the evidence for the resurrection of Jesus Christ. Habermas’ method is
interesting. He apparently uses only the evidence that his critics will allow
in order to make the strongest possible case for the resurrection. Habermas
throws out the evidence that the critics reject. In other words, if a critic
denies the authenticity of a Pauline letter or a gospel account, Habermas
concedes and allows the critic to set the parameters for the discussion. In
fact, in the Christian Post article here
we see that Habermas has tossed out nearly 50% of the Pauline corpus. We have
to ask if this is a good strategy and whether it is in keeping with Christian
principles.
Should Christian apologists allow the critic to set the
standards for what evidence is acceptable and what evidence is not? Is it ever
okay for the Christian to “pretend” that the unbelieving skeptic is right in
their view of epistemic justification? Can we dismiss Isaiah or Job, or Genesis
1-11 even to pretend with the critic that they are not what they claim to be?
Christians are bound to defend the entire corpus of
Christian teachings, not just one aspect of it. If we permit the critic to
dismantle or disallow any of the biblical evidence, why would we think they
would stop at any point along the way until they have destroyed or disallowed
all of it?
There are many problems with Habermas’ method but I only
want to talk about the two that I think are most obvious. The first is the
underlying presupposition that facts are neutral, even and especially the
historical fact of the resurrection. The second is that Christians somehow have
the luxury of defending Christian theism piecemeal. Christian theism is a very
broad system and must be defended as a whole from the foundation up. The
teachings of Christianity are part of a system that makes sweeping claims about
reality, epistemology, and ethics and those claims are interdependent on one another
and as such they must be defended within the entire system of which they are a
part. In other words, Christians are not to defend the historical event of the
resurrection apart from its theological implications. And without the
theological implications, the resurrection is nothing more than a fascinating
story of how the atoms worked differently in the case of this fellow known as
Jesus Christ.
To begin with, Habermas’ appeal to historical evidence
assumes that both skeptics and Christians operate under the same philosophy of
fact and that assumption is categorically false. Under Habermas’ assumption, we
all interpret the resurrection of Christ the same. And that is simply not the
case. It does not follow that if there was something like a resurrection that
that event must be interpreted the way Christian theism interprets it. And if
it is possible for there to exist more than one interpretation of that agreed
on historical event, then we end up with the possibility of a resurrection
outside of its theological context. And what good will such a resurrection do
the skeptic or the critic? For that matter, what good will it do anyone other
than the curious scientist bent on trying to develop a naturalistic explanation
for it? John Frame says as much when he writes, “For theistic proofs will not,
any more than historical evidences, accomplish their purpose without the
presupposition of a biblical worldview. As I mentioned in my reply to Craig,
without the biblical God there is no reason to suppose that there is a
rational, causal order leading to a first cause.” [Five Views, 133]
The resurrection is only meaningful within the framework of
its Christian theistic interpretation. Habermas seems to think that critics
espousing a non-theistic framework will be forced to cry uncle and abandon
their worldview for Christianity. Such a view assumes there is no ethical
component in the unbeliever’s outright rejection of the Christian gospel. And
that is precisely the objection that we seem to ignore in these conversations,
and it matters more than any of the ancillary objections we hear from the
skeptic and the critic alike.
Second, we have to grapple with the ethical aspect of
Habermas’ approach. At the end of the day, there can be only one ultimate
reference point for human predication. We have a choice to make and it is the
choice that confronted our first parents in the Garden: either man will serve
as the ultimate reference point for what passes as true knowledge or God will
serve as the ultimate reference point. Since Christian theism teaches that man
is a creature, created in the image of God, and that God is the absolute,
independent, self-contained being and source of all that is, we cannot possibly
entertain the notion that finite man could ever sit in judgment of the nature God’s
revelation. Man could NEVER come up with a standard by which to measure the
claims and demands of God placed upon him. Imagine what God’s response to Adam
would have been if Adam, in response to God informing him that he is a created
man, said, well hang on and let me test your definition of me using the
scientific method to make sure that I am what you say I am: a man created in
your image. It is precisely this attitude that we are grappling with when we
are preaching and declaring to the sinner the gospel of God. Fallen man insists
on interpreting the facts according to his philosophy of fact, which places man
in the center, as the autonomous and ultimate reference point for what counts
as a fact and how any fact should be interpreted. Until we deal with this
disagreement, we shall not have dealt with the critic’s objection to any fact
of Christian theism, to include the fact of the resurrected Christ.
In summary then we must ask what makes for a strong case?
Allowing the critic to outline what evidence will be permitted and what
evidence will be rejected? This places the critic in the driver’s seat as the
ultimate reference point, as the final authority for what should be believed
and what should be rejected. Essentially, this contradicts Paul’s argument in 1
Corinthians 1. Paul tells us that the word of the cross is foolish to the
debater, the pagan philosopher, and the experts. Habermas seems to think it is
right for us to remove the thing that makes the gospel foolish so that it will
be more acceptable. However, the very thing that make the gospel foolish is
also the thing that makes it powerful: the supernatural work of God on the
heart and mind. The gospel is infused with the power of light and it enlightens
all those whom God opens their eyes to see. As a result, our faith stands in
the power of God, not in the sophisticated philosophical arguments or the rational
evidences as a result of the cleverness of men.
The Christian must communicate the gospel in a way that the
demands of the Creator are felt rather than allowing the creature to lighten
the load by serving as their own reference point for what should be believed
even when it comes to “this saith the Lord.”
Cornelius Van Til wrote, “It is only to be expected that, in
matters of ultimate commitment, the intended conclusion of one’s line of
argumentation will also be the presuppositional standard that governs one’s
matter of argumentation for that conclusion – or else the intended conclusion
is not his ultimate commitment after all.
It seems to me that Habermas’ ultimate commitment is not to
the inscripturated revelation of God as it is. Otherwise he would be unwilling
to pretend that some of “thus says the Lord” is not really “thus says the Lord”
for argument’s sake. It is never a stronger argument to throw out evidence just
because it is evidence the skeptic rejects. Think about that and let it sink
in. Habermas has unwittingly said that if we cut out parts of evidence derived directly from divine revelation we actually strengthen our argument. Nothing
could be farther from the truth. It is God, not man, who determines what passes
for evidence. We never strengthen our arguments when we pretend that some parts
of God’s evidence is not actually good evidence. We only compromise the
evidence and the truth it reveals when we do that. And we lesson the demands of
a sovereign and holy God upon the lives of fallen, rebellious, and arrogant
man. Essentially, we weaken and downgrade the thunderous message of “repent,
for the kingdom of heaven is at hand.”
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