For what seems like dozens of posts at this point, Steve
Hays has criticized John MacArthur, Fred Butler, others, and myself for
rejecting the modern claims by Charismatics that miracles workers still exist
in the Church today. Steve has accused us of adopting the very same
presuppositions employed by naturalistic atheists and skeptics in our
reasoning. Perhaps some readers actually think Hays has a good point. After
all, I realize that many of the young men at Triablogue are simply eager to
follow someone they think is really, really smart. And it appears that Steve
Hays is really, really smart. Richard Dawkins is really, really smart too, but
he constructs some of the dullest arguments I have ever read. What I want to do
in this post is point one, once again, the extraordinary fallacious nature of
Hays’ accusation by pointing out where the differences rest between our
argument and the argument from skepticism.
In order to get started, I want to quickly look at the
skepticism of the famous empiricist, David Hume. Hume argued that there are two
kinds of propositions: Relation of Ideas or Matters of Fact. The first set of
propositions would include things like math while the second set would include
all empirical knowledge, things known through the senses. Hume was convinced
that all empirical knowledge was based on the relation of cause and effect.
Now, this is far more complex than it might appear. My challenge is to simplify
it at the risk of oversimplification. Because Hume denied God as the cause of
all things we witness in the universe, and because he was an empiricist, he was
forced to conclude that the human mind could never find the cause behind the
event. Hume believed that all inferences from experience, therefore, are
effects of custom, not of reasoning. Hence, we know that fire burns through
custom, not reason. The empiricist is unable to account for the uniformity of
nature based solely on his empiricism. He cannot provide an adequate account
for why the universe exists, empirically speaking that is. This is why Hume
concluded that we have no empirical basis to believe that the Sun will rise
tomorrow. Empiricism, by its very nature, has no predictive power.
Empiricism can in no way predict natural phenomena because
it denies that true knowledge of the relationship between the general and the
particular exists. Because miracles are events that are highly improbable, no
one should believe reports that they actually occur. The issue comes down to
one’s procedure for how they reason from the particular facts of experience to
general truths. This is called induction. Hume’s skepticism is anchored in his
empiricism. Because sooner or later, every inductive generalization presupposes
a proposition that can never be proved (empirically speaking), it follows that
logical justification for induction is impossible. Of course Hume is engaging
in inductive skepticism in order to attack the enterprise of
induction. The problem with Hume’s skepticism is his epistemological
presupposition that all knowledge comes through the senses. Why Steve Hays
knowingly associates the cessation argument with skepticism on any level is
curious to say the least. One can only conclude that Hays really doesn’t
understand Hume or the role of such presuppositions in one’s worldview or he
uses these tactics deliberately. The former would be an indictment of gross
ignorance while the latter an indictment of malevolence.
A second form of skepticism is rational skepticism
popularized by Benedict Spinoza (1632-1677). Within this scheme, the argument
against miracles contends that miracles are violations of natural laws. But
natural laws are immutable. It is impossible to violate immutable natural laws.
Therefore, miracles are impossible. But that is not what Christian theism
believes, is it? The truth is that Montaigne is correct in that true knowledge
is impossible in a vacuous empiricism or rationalism. The Epicureans and the
Stoics were both wrong. The answer to Spinoza’s argument is easily discovered.
It is wrong to think of the uniformity of nature as impersonal, natural laws.
Christian theism rejects the idea that there is anything impersonal involved in
the ordering of the universe from its beginning to its future end. Because it
rejects impersonal natural laws, Christian theism embraces the view that the
most minute activities in the universe are ordered and held together continually
by the power of the omnipotent God revealed in Scriptures.
I now want to pick up Hume’s argument where we leave Spinoza.
Hume argues that we simply don’t have enough reliable witnesses, of good moral
character, who testify to a miraculous event. Hume also noted that human beings
love bizarre tales. Finally, Hume notices that miracles are usually reported
among unenlightened people groups. Hume’s issue with miracles has nothing to do
with this arrogant and obnoxious cloak. Hume denies not just miracles, but the
miraculous. Because the miraculous cannot exist in empiricism, it is necessary
to explain these so-called miracles. This is Hume’s way of maintaining his
empiricism. It is Hume doing what Paul said all unbelievers do: they suppress
the knowledge of God within and around them.
Now, what Steve Hays attempts to do is extend Hume’s
argument against human testimony to the cessationist. Hume argues that the
particular reports of miracles should not be believed because these men have
questionable character, or, they love the bizarre, or they are simply unenlightened.
The skeptic argues that enlightened men should not believe in the highly
improbable. Miracles are highly improbable and therefore, enlightened men
should not believe that miracles occur.
You may be asking where Hays is wrong in his accusation that
cessationists are skeptics in sheep’s clothing. Hays is wrong on several
accounts. First of all, cessationism does not deny the possibility of modern miracles.
We believe God can perform miracles today. In fact, when presented with the
right kind of evidence, rather than rejecting a miracle claim and resorting to
some far-fetched naturalistic explanation, we will rejoice that God has
performed a miracle. Suppose a person was cured of terminal cancer. The skeptic
would conclude that mistake took place in the diagnosis or that something
strange had indeed taken place but the cause must have been naturalistic even if
we don’t understand it. The believer will not resort to such outlandish and
foolish explanations. The cessationist will rejoice in the Lord. But there is
quite a long distance between believing that God performs miracles and that
miracle workers are still present in the Church today. Hays continues to forget
this basic distinction.
The skeptics’ worldview and hence his presuppositions are
antichrist. They are set in opposition to God at every junction. Miraculous
causes and supernatural effects are precluded out of hand and exchanged in
preference for outrageous naturalistic rationalizations of all varieties. The
cessationist insistence that the modern claim of miracles be examined for
validity has nothing to do with belief in the possibility of the miracle.
Instead, it has everything to do with biblical discernment, with truth, and
with the public testimony of the Christian community. In short, it has to do
with the reputation of Christ Himself in the world. The fact that we witness
thousands and even millions of false reports of miracles and miracle workers,
in the name of Christ is sufficient cause for the Church to establish a
protocol for validating when God has actually performed something
extraordinary. It is a dishonor to the Christian community and to men like
Steve Hays when we not only sanction, but facilitate hundreds of millions of
Pentecostals and Charismatics making false and outrageous claims about the God of
Scripture across the globe. False reports of miracle workers insult, defame,
and scandalize the Christ we claim to know, to love, and to serve with all our
heart, soul, mind, and body. What Steve Hays calls skeptics in sheep’s clothing,
we call biblical discernment.
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