At the very heart of MCA rests an unspoken assumption. It is
an assumption that Boghossian never mentioned throughout the entire project.
And yet, it is so excruciatingly obvious that if the project were going to be a
success, this assumption could not remain an assumption. Somewhere along the
way, Boghossian had the duty to deal with the one very critical issue that he
never bothered to address. That critical issue is basically this: Christian
faith is never placed beneath or subjected to the authority of human reason. In
case you are wondering, this is the philosophical problem of the
criterion. It is a legitimate problem that Boghossian prefers to ignore.
According to Christian theism, human reason does not set itself up as the
magistrate over faith. Since when is Christian epistemology under any
obligation to subject itself to rationalism or empiricism? Neither of these
systems is willing to submit to a distinctly Christian epistemology, are they? Boghossian
assumes that the Biblical faith of Christian theism is subject to the standards
of human reason that he wishes to place upon them. He never bothers to show us
why his standards are superior or absolute. Rather than show us how Christian
theism must pass the test of his version rationalism or empiricism, or a
combination of the two, Boghossian assumes that it is so. He could not be more
wrong. Christian theism actually argues that human reason must serve as the
minister of faith, not her magistrate. Human reason is in service of Biblical
faith, not the other way around. I believe so that I may understand, not I must
understand in order to believe. This is Biblical Christianity. This is Christian
theism. (Think of Leonidas in 300: this is Sparta!)
In “Loc. 452” Boghossian makes this statement: “If a belief
is based on insufficient evidence, then any further conclusions drawn from the
belief will at best be of questionable value.” Frist, there are some critical
questions that this statement must answer. Second, we want to examine what
results when we turn this statement on Boghossian’s claims. From a critical
perspective, Boghossian has to distinguish in detail, without ambiguity, what
he means by sufficient evidence so that we understand what he means by
insufficient evidence. He also needs to help us understand what qualifies as
evidence. Finally, it would be helpful for him to provide some understanding of
how he defines value in terms of argumentation. What happens when we use this
single statement to criticize Boghossian’s view of religion? The answer is
really quite simply. Since Boghossian rests the success or failure of his
entire project on his belief that the accurate characterization of faith is “pretending
to know something you do not know” we are in a sound position to be able to
assess the quality of his project and determine if it in point of fact adds
value to the conversation. This will not be a small criticism that I will level
against Boghossian’s argument.
Boghossian’s appeal to human reason to argue for human
reason is viciously circular. One would assert that Christian theism does the
very same thing with faith. But this statement does not actually represent the facts,
as they exist within Christian theism. Christian theism does not appeal to
faith as its final authority. Instead, Christian theism appeals to Scripture as
its final authority and its criterion for what qualifies as the only consistent
worldview, the only valid epistemology. Scripture sets itself up as the
authority to which all human predication must submit. The skeptic may claim
this too is circular. In response we say it is not viciously circular because
as far as Christian theism is concerned, we are speaking of God’s rightful claim
of absoluteness in this case. If God does exist as the ultimate source of all
knowledge, then what other source could He appeal to but Himself since he is
the highest authority to which appeal could be made? In other words, Christian
theism is consistent to appeal to their final resting point, namely God, in
support of all human predication. To rest the argument on other grounds would
be terribly inconsistent even if some Christians actually do so. Should it
surprise anyone that opposing systems would appeal to two different authorities
for their criterion of belief, and would actually hold to differing
epistemological schemes? Boghossian ignores the problem of the criterion and
instead pretends that philosophy has it all figured out and that philosophers
are in complete agreement on how human knowledge works. Apparently he is
unfamiliar with Michael Williams work on “Problems of Knowledge – a critical
introduction to epistemology.” Williams says, “The problem of unity poses the
question: is there just one way of acquiring knowledge, or are there several
depending on the sort of knowledge in question?” [Williams, Problems of
Knowledge, 2] Boghossian does not even acknowledge that there are different
kinds of knowledge, and hence, different methods for knowing them.
This is not
a small problem in his project. It is one of the first questions a good
Christian thinker will ask if you attempt to engage him/her on the question of
Christian theism. The problem of the criterion is a most thorny problem. You
see, in order to create a criterion by which beliefs may be justified, you must
already have some idea about it before you create it. This is a problem. What
you are searching for is something that transcends, a standard that comes from
out there somewhere. You are looking for a reliable and dependable judge. But
if you create the judge, how objective is that? This is the problem of the
criterion that Boghossian ignores entirely. The atheist needs to understand
that the Christian thinker will not ignore that problem. The minute you ask us
to justify our beliefs, we are going to ask you to justify your idea of
justification without appealing to your own idea of justification. But don’t
let this dissuade you from engaging Christians. I hope you engage lots of
Christians, real ones, the type that actually know how to think well about
Christian theism.
The second problem with Boghossian’s project is his
insistence on giving faith a philosophical or rational definition as opposed to
allowing the faith community to define their own terms. “If facts alone are at
stake, on overdose of emotionally tinged language can only be a hindrance and
should be regarded with suspicion. Even eloquence should be shunned where
information is the sole purpose. For facts are most effectively conveyed when
they are stated in a plain and objective manner.” [Engel, With Good Reason, 71]
When defining faith Boghossian should have just stuck with the plain facts of
how Christian theism defines faith rather than not only assigning to it a wrong
definition but an emotionally charged one at that. The common Hebrew words for
faith are ‘aman, the act of believing or trusting, batah, the
idea of being secure, trust in, hasah, seek or take refuge, shelter, and
hesedh, faithfulness, loyalty. [McManis, Biblical Apolgetics, 381-383]
There are others but you get the idea. The NT encapsulates the idea of faith in
the word, pistis. In Christian theism, faith means laying hold on the
promises of God in Christ, relying entirely on the finished work of Christ for
salvation, and on the power of the indwelling Holy Spirit of God for daily
strength. Faith implies complete reliance on God and full obedience to God.
[Morris, Illustrated Bible Dictionary, 498] Given that Boghossian’s aim is to
refute faith, and given that his entire definition of faith is categorically
false, I could end my review here and conclude with any rational person that
Boghossian’s project is an embarrassing failure. But I have a few more things
to say.
The third challenge with Boghossian’s project is that it is
far too broad. It is an illegitimate practice to lump all the religions of the
world into the same category just as much as it is to lump all philosophies and
philosophers into the same category. I suppose this move would make the task at
hand much easier, but it simply does not work. For example, to compare Mohamed
with Christ and radical Islam with Christianity is an ad hominem attempt to
polarize the conversation. If a person is familiar with radical Islam and unfamiliar
with Christian theism, they would be tempted to think that Christians are also
strapping bombs to their chest in certain parts of the world and murdering
innocent people all under the guise of religion. This tactic is despicable and
reflects the desperation and weakness in Boghossian’s arguments. My experience
has been that only the weakest arguments resort to ad hominem. Anyone that
knows anything about world religions knows that they tend to be radically
different from each other in very basic ways.
Another serious problem with Boghossian’s skepticism is that
it contains far too much certainty. He speaks as if philosophy has attained
absolutely epistemic certainty when in reality the state of affairs is just the
opposite. The consensus necessary to arrive at some of the absolute statements
that Boghossian makes simply does not exist. The truth is that rationalists and
empiricists do not agree even among themselves on the exact nature, definition,
limits, and even value of human knowledge. How is it, then, that Boghossian can
lead his readers to believe that philosophy has arrived at uncontroversial views
in epistemology and metaphysics?
In addition, Boghossian’s insistence on referring to faith
as a virus or mental condition to be cured is one of the most bizarre and
extreme ad hominem arguments I have encountered. There is no question that this
view of faith represents only a small portion of skeptics and the rest would do
well to avoid it and him. Every noetic structure, be they primarily rational,
empirical, or something else, at the end of their chain beliefs, arrives at
faith. Because we are not omniscient, this reality is impossible to avoid and
it is one we cannot afford to ignore. As Boghossian himself boasts, there are a
lot of things we simply do not know or understand. Christian theism affirms
that God created the world from the beginning. At the same time, Christian
theism confesses that it does not know how God could do such a thing. We just
don’t know. We also do not know how God could bring us the Scriptures as a
product of both man and God Himself. We know He did it, but we do not know how
that worked. Quite frankly, it is borderline insane to refer to faith as a
virus or mental illness. In addition, for a state employee to encourage
professors to punish kids with faith, as part of his strategy to purge faith
from society, suggests a totalitarianism that should frighten not only the
Christian. It should frighten everyone. What is the next item on Boghossian’s
list? What else does he not like about society that makes it less than the
perfect society according to his ideas? Seems to me that there was a monster in
Europe not that long ago who also thought there were elements in society that
made it less than desirable.
The final challenge I wish to point out is the lack of
coherence in Boghossian’s philosophy, or noetic structure. His system is
self-referentially incoherent and I now wish to list the reasons why this is
the case. In the first place, Boghossian promotes the idea of creating
skeptics. But his own system displays a level of certainty about things that no
skeptic could hold. Boghossian pretends that human reason is neutral, that it
is simply there. It is as if there is nothing upon which human reason rests, no
ground. But this cannot be the case. Even human reason requires a ground. And
that ground cannot be its own self. A thing that rests upon its own self is at
once absolute and self-sufficient. Human reason has been wrong far too often
and admits to far too many limitations for it to be absolute and self-sufficient.
“A complete demonstration of each of our beliefs by means of other independent
beliefs cannot be given.” [Bahnsen, Always Ready, 198] In order for Boghossian’s
system to work, he must supply a set of standards to which all humanity can
appeal as absolute and self-sufficient. But this he cannot do, and he does not
attempt to do. Perhaps he realizes how irrational such an attempt might be.
Boghossian requires neutrality on the subject of God and faith before he can
get his project going. However, neutrality on such matters is impossible.
Boghossian has an ax to grind and it emerges at the very inception of his
project. In fact, it is the catalyst for his project. Boghossian requires the
very thing he denies in order to make his project meaningfully intelligible: a
certain standard. He criticizes faith for lacking evidence, but cannot provide
any evidence for the very logic he uses to make his criticism. He defines faith incorrectly
as pretending to know what you do not know and then proceeds himself to do just
that!
Boghossian pretends to know that faith cannot possibly be accompanied
with good reason. But when asked to provide justification for his view on
justifiability, he is silent. In order for Boghossian’s system to work, it
needs to justify itself apart from the nauseating “that’s just the way it is”
non-answer answer we hear so often. If you ever hear someone say, that’s just
the way it is, you should know that is not a statement of reason, but rather, a
statement of faith. It is not biblical faith mind you, but it is the sort of
philosophical or rational definition of faith that is often confused for
biblical faith. Boghossian’s view is self-referentially incoherent because he
insists that faith has no foundation and that this is good reason to rid it of
society when his own system also rests ground that also is without a foundation.
By the way, faith is actually grounded in God. “The non-Christian rejects the
Christian view out of hand as being contradictory. Then when he is asked to
furnish a foundation for the law of contradiction, he can offer nothing but the
idea of contingency.” [Van Til, A Survey of Christian Epistemology, 204-5]
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