Chapter 6 in MCA purports to be a chapter designed to help
the faithful (unfaithful actually) who have come to the self-realization that they really didn’t have
faith after all, fill the void left when they confess what has already been the case for some time. In other words, these faithless individuals are
trying to figure out how to exchange one delusion for another delusion. They
want to replace their old delusion, the one where they thought they had faith
with a new delusion, one where they now think they don’t believe that God
actually exists. Both of these beliefs, the former and the current, are
delusions of different kinds. What is very interesting to me is that Boghossian
includes an email from one of these individuals asking for help now that he has
decided he does not believe that God exists. In the same paragraph he says the
following: “I just stopped believing in God. It’s an unbelievable feeling…I
just feel lost. Anything you can suggest will help.” I don’t know about you,
but it certainly seems to me that this individual made an emotional decision,
not a rational one. After all, if he had really examined the evidence, weighed
all the facts, looked at the voluminous research available on the question of
God, it seems the last thing he would have felt is “lost.”
Does Boghossian offer this man any answers? Yes, he does. He
offers him the answer that we just don’t know. Stop searching for answers, for
purpose, for meaning. Accept the ignorance that comes with atheism. Learn to
embrace it. The real meaning in life is there is no meaning and if there were,
we really could never find it out to begin with. There is no real purpose in
life so stop searching for it. Gee Pete; thanks for the help…I think. What a
nightmare!
Boghossian wants us to be free to wonder. What he fails to
realize is that skepticism is not a necessary precondition for wonder.
Christian theism is filled with wonder because it is filled with the infinite
God. Has Boghossian ever thought about why the idea of wonder is so attractive,
so inviting, so fascinating? In a world of chance, where human existence is
arbitrary, how could wonder ever exist or how could we ever make sense out of it? How could wonder ever be intelligible under the atheist's scheme for reality? We love wonder because we are finite.
We know there is more to reality than we can imagine. God created us to wonder. Wonder is wired into the human person by the Creator. God is the only plausible explanation for wonder. God must be true in order for wonder to be meaningfully intelligible. Wonder is not something that can be explained empirically. It is not something that the laws of logic can speak to. But it is there, despite the lack of empirical evidence and despite our inability to make a rationally compelling argument for it. It exists and we know it exists despite our inability to adequately account for it upon empirical or rational grounds. Additionally, we are not being irrational for our "belief" that wonder exists. I cannot help but wonder how Boghossian accounts for the existence and intelligibility of wonder.
Boghossian asks, “What comfort does reality-based reasoning
offer someone suffering in this life or perhaps even facing death?” His answer is startling: “I don’t
know.” If we are all just accidents, here by chance for a few years and then
gone, why does any of this matter, really? When it is all said and done, why
not let people live with their delusions? Boghossian says that it harms us. But
does it really? What does the medical research say about those who have some
sort of faith? There is no indication at all that there is psychological harm
to the typical person of faith so long as they are not militants looking for 70
virgins when they get to heaven. In fact, the medical research indicates just the opposite: faith is healthy. It makes a positive contribution to our emotional, psychological, and even physical lives. Boghossian offers a life of reason, but also
of despair. He offers a life of doxastic openness but one without significance.
He promises a life of truth, but one that has many more questions than it has
answers. Sounds like a really good deal to me.
Boghossian seems to be very specific in the types of things he
thinks people need to be okay “not knowing.” I wonder how one would fare on one
of his exams if they just wrote down, “I don’t know.” What Boghossian does not
want people to know is if God exists or does not exist. He does not want them to know if
morality transcends human opinion. He does not want them to know that Jesus
Christ is the Savior of humanity. But he is perfectly fine with people not
knowing what happens when they die. He is fine with people not knowing if life,
or suffering or pleasure really has meaning. He is fine with philosophers not
being able to explain how they can rely on the validity of induction even if no
one can provide any evidence for it or provide a rational case for its
adequate defense. Boghossian seems perfectly fine in assuming that the human
mind exists, and that there is a real external world about which we can truly
know certain things. But when it comes to God, when it comes to faith, when it
comes to questions that transcend human limitations, Boghossian insists that we
must be okay not knowing.
The howler in all of this is that if there really is that
much that Boghossian and his atheist friends do not know, then how is it that
he can so confidently dismiss faith, or God, or life beyond death. Since there
is much he does not know, how can he confidently affirm that no one else can
know either? Isn’t it possible that there is an epistemological method that
others have discovered about which Boghossian is still unaware? If it is not
possible, I fail to see how a logical case can be made against it. It seems such a case would require an all-knowing agent. What is Boghossian’s rational basis for not
only saying he does not know, but for also insisting that no one else can know
either, since he has already confessed to so many other things he is fine not
knowing? He offers none. If Boghossian were consistent with his “doxastic openness” it seems to
me that he would be perfectly fine to say, “I don’t know how that person knows
that God exists, but I am fine not knowing that.” Boghossian’s doxastic closure
to the possibility that others actually know something that he does not is
inconsistent with his basic doctrine at best and smacks of hypocrisy at worse. Boghossian’s
entire noetic structure is self-referentially incoherent. I hope that you, the
reader, can see the obvious gaps in his arguments at this point. It will only
become more and more obvious that MCA does nothing of the sort.
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