In his book, The Varieties of Belief, Paul Helm deals with four paradigms of
belief. He deals with belief as a judgment of probabilities, based on certain
natural analogies or empirical data. Secondly, he deals with belief as
certainty grounded in the self-authenticating character of a document. He then
deals with belief as a moral or regulative principle. Finally, he considers
belief as an immediate awareness of God, akin to knowledge by acquaintance or
persons and material objects.
The question of belief is as much a moral
question as it is a spiritual and an intellectual question. Indeed, it is as
much a theological question as it is a philosophical one. In fact, we must
confess that the worldview of a particular individual informs their paradigm of
belief as much, if not more, than their paradigm of belief informs their
worldview. What should humans believe? What motivates us to believe certain
claims and reject others? Do we have a right to believe some things and an
obligation to reject others? Do we have an obligation to believe some things
and a right to reject others? And why should we believe such things about belief to begin with? To be sure, the
question of belief is not short on controversy or complexity.
William James, in his article, “The Will to
Believe,” says “It is wrong always, everywhere, and for every one, to believe
anything upon insufficient evidence.”[1] If
we place James’ assertion within the context of Helm’s first model of belief,
we would conclude that the probability of a proposition is what informs the
ethical disposition of belief. In this case, the revelation upon which belief
rests must be determined to be most probably a revelation from God. Even though
a proposition may be claim to be revelation from God, that proposition must be
accompanied by evidence such that human reason can determine if in fact it s
more probably true than not that it is a revelation from God. The point here is
that belief that is based on revelation that is proven by human reason remains
a most reasonable sort of belief. Stated a different way, John Locke asserts
“that the same truths may be discovered and conveyed down from revelation,
which are discoverable to us by reason, and by those ideas we naturally may
have. Locke thought that a revealed proposition, once it is determined that it
is in fact a revealed proposition, that believing that proposition is matter of
faith. However, whether or not it is a fact that a proposition is a revealed
proposition or not, is not a matter of faith, but one for reason to decide.
The second paradigm addressed by Helm is the
view that belief is certainty grounded in the self-authenticating character of
a document. Religious belief, in this sense, involves assent and/or acceptance.
Calvin says, “When we call faith ‘knowledge’ we do not mean comprehension of the
sort that is commonly concerned with those things which fall under human sense
perception.”[2]
This kind of assurance or assent is impossible to change. Calvin goes on to
say, “But they are more strengthened by the persuasion of divine truth than
instructed by rational proof.”[3] The
former is the work of God while the latter is the work of men.
The connection between the assent or
acceptance of the believer about God and His revelation rests entirely on the
self-authenticating documents of sacred Scripture. Contrary to Locke’s opinion
that reason must determine the status of something as it concerns divine
revelation before belief in it’s content is wholly embraced; no such scheme can
be employed here. Locke is arguing for the self-authentication of human reason,
which is obviously contrary to Calvin and Owen’s view of the
self-authenticating nature of Scripture. The ‘reasons’ for the
self-authenticating character of Scripture are internal to Scripture. Indeed,
they must be internal if they are self-authenticating. Some will insist that
the Christian ground this belief in something other than Scripture in order to
avoid circularity. However, upon close examination, it is clear that
Christianity is not unique in the sense that it’s ground is within it’s own system.
“The framework propositions of the system are not put to the test, not backed
up by evidence”[4]
The point that Wittgenstein rightly make is that the moment we subject
something to the test of justification, we are presupposing something that is
not tested. However, the Christian is in a very enviable position because for
him, the ground of belief for the self-authenticating character of Scripture is
in God communicating and acting in Scripture. In other words, Christian
theism’s ground for belief is in the personal, self-contained ontological
Trinity speaking in Scripture.
“What is distinctive about this view of
religious belief is that the proposition believed is certainly true, and that
the believer is certain that it is certainly true.”[5]
The objective of this sort of religious faith is truth from God. Knowledge is
not used here because knowledge involves what is known comprehensively. God is
incomprehensible from that perspective. Hence, reformed theologians prefer the
use of belief rather than knowledge. The Christian faith is not grounded in
propositions that are probably true. That view of belief belongs to different
model than the one we are now discussing. Rather, the Christian faith is
grounded in propositions that are “God speaking,” and hence, are reflective of
the very authority of God Himself. The Christian model of belief is unique, not
just in it’s claims, it’s view of reality, it’s epistemology, but it is
particularly unique in that it sheds the multifarious problems around epistemic
justification that other models are unable to solve.
In distinction to the first two models,
Immanuel Kant held that religious belief is unique from the standpoint that it
has a distinctly regulative character about it. Kant denies that religious
faith has anything to do with knowledge. “The objects of religious faith must
therefore be objects of pure reason, that is to say, pure practical reason.”[6] The
issue for Kant is how he sees the objects of faith versus the objects of
cognition. Ecclesiastical and historical faith belongs to the latter while pure
religious faith belongs to the former. Kant believed that morality made the
postulate of the existence of God necessary. The human reaches for the summum bonum, which cannot be obtained
apart from things like duty, virtue, and wholesome living. However, without
God, it seems that man could never secure “the systematic unity of the ends of
morality.” Hence, in Kant religion is reduced to morality. According to Kant,
the duties of morality are present in the commands of God.
Finally, Helm deals with John Hick’s view of
belief as acquaintance. To be more precise, “The knowledge of God that it is
claimed the believer has is not that he sees God but that he has a direct
non-sensory but cognitive experience of God which provides not anyone, but the
one who has the experience, with the grounds to claim ‘I know God.’”[7] Unlike
Kant, who contends that religious belief is a matter of pure reason, Hick
locates religious belief in human experience. We do not only experience God when
feeling the duty of the divine command, but we also may sense Him in the
solitude and beauty of the mountains and the sea. Additionally, Hick argues
that our knowledge of God, being experiential, is always subject to
interpretation and is therefore free. In fact, Hick argues that is must be deus absconditus, or obscure and hidden
if indeed we are free to know Him. This brings us back to the idea that
knowledge of God, being an interpretive act, is located in the will. Whether or
not the experience reflects a cognitive knowledge of God depends on how the
object of a particular experience voluntarily decides to interpret that
experience.
The model of historical Christian orthodoxy is
that belief is based on the self-authenticating authority and testimony of the
documents we call sacred Scripture. The propositions that are believed
supernaturally are regarded by the believer as certain. The ground for our
belief is internal to the proposition.
[1] Baruch A. Brody, ed., Readings in the
Philosophy of Religion: An Analytic Approach, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice Hall, ©1992), 39.
[2] John Calvin, Institutes
of the Christian Religion (Louisville, KY: John Knox Press, 1960),
III.14.559.
[3] Ibid., 560.
[4] Baruch A. Brody, ed., Readings in the
Philosophy of Religion: An Analytic Approach, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice Hall, ©1992), 65.
[5] Paul, Helm, Varieties of Belief: 4
(Muirhead Library of Philosophy), Reprint ed. (Humanities Press, New York,
NY, 2013), 112.
[6] Ibid., 120.
[7] Ibid., 140.
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