Did Greg Bahnsen Have An Argument?

We come now to the very last paragraph in his opening statement, and now it appears he's trying to get back on track to meeting the first of his confessional burdens. He makes the conclusion of his argument very clear: "The transcendental proof for God's existence is that without Him, it is impossible to prove anything." Now, this is an assertion which needs a defense. It's certainly not self-evidently true, and Bahnsen does not give us any reason why we should accept this claim as opposed to the claim that "without Geusha, it is impossible to prove anything." Does Bahnsen present an argument for his claim? No. Immediately he turns the spotlight back onto "the atheist world-view," claiming that it "is irrational and cannot consistently provide the preconditions of intelligible experience, science, logic or morality." So, not only does Bahnsen not present an argument for his conclusion, he manages to lay another burden on his wagon. It's getting pretty heavy 'bout now. Has Bahnsen proven that his god exists? Not yet. Has Bahnsen proven that "the atheist world-view cannot account for our debate tonight"? No, not yet. He hasn't even presented an argument yet. He's simply asserted the very position he's called to prove, and he's added some more claims to his proof deficit. It seems that Bahnsen doesn't offer a proof here. Rather, we should call this the "Transcendental Poof of the existence of God," for it seems that Bahnsen presumes to have the power to say "poof!" and voilá, “God exists.” That is, Bahnsen's god exists because he wants his god to exist. Where's the argument?

It seems, in the case of his debate with Gordon Stein, Bahnsen fails to present an argument, just as Nick has indicated.

Dawson Bethric

These are the words of Dawson Bethric over at Incinerating Presuppositionalism. Dawson is interacting with Greg Bahnsen’s debate with Gordon Stein. Dawson labels this post, the meat of which you see above in a manner that leads one to believe this is his answer to Bahnsen’s TAG. TAG stands for transcendental argument for God. The idea is that TAG successfully refutes, not each and every other worldview as they come along opposing Christianity, but instead, TAG refutes the non-Christian approach before it can even get started. The argument is takes the form of a disjunction of a contradictory. A v ~A, ~~A, therefore A. Either Christian theism or not Christian theism, not not Christian theism, therefore, Christian theism. Now, the opponent will object and claim that the argument should not be construed as a disjunctive of a contradiction. Hence, the approach to TAG employs a false dilemma. [See Mike Butler’s paper on The Transcendental Argument for God’s Existence] What the opponent then must do is show that there are other alternatives available, other paths we can take. But for the Christian, it is either Christ or not Christ. It isn’t either Christ or Baal, or Mohammed, or etc. This is the power of the TAG. It takes the exclusive claims of Christian theism seriously and applies them not only to philosophy but also employs them in reason and in apologetics. It is this that Dawson and every other critic of presuppositionalism must deal with.

Dawson conveniently ignores this argument structure, opting rather to criticize other forms of argumentation employed by presuppositionalism. For example, here Dawson thinks he has something when he mockingly changes modus ponens to Geusha. Bahnsen employs Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens to argue for God. The argument would be framed thus:

Human predication --> God

Human predication

/ God

or

Human predication --> God

~God

/ ~Human predication

But there is perhaps a better way to frame the argument. After all, A presupposes B is not the same as A implies B.

Human predication presuppose God
~God
/ Human predication * ~Human predication

This latter argument form demonstrates that in order for any truth value to be assigned to human predication or no human predication, God must be presupposed. The transcendental argument is saying that if there is no God, there is no truth value where human predication is concerned. All this is simply to point out that there is a difference in traditional arguments which trade on implication and transcendental arguments which trade on presupposition. Collect is helpful in summary: "However, if God's existence is a necessary condition for the both the truth or falsity of causality, then denying God's existence while results in a failure to predicate anything at all." [Don Collett: Van Til and Presuppositionalism Revisited. See also Strawson, An Introduction to Logical Theory]

Now, Dawson claims that Bahnsen has not made an argument. It is hard to imagine that anyone could listen to the Bahnsen-Stein debate or read Greg Bahnsen and conclude that he has not made an argument. Perhaps Dawson has picked up on Ayn Rand’s method of choosing not to actually engage with opposing views but rather to employ emotion-filled rhetoric in an attempt to counter his detractors. When you read Dawson, ask yourself if he is really dealing with the issues or if it sounds like he is talking to others, making short flashy statements designed to impress the less informed. I am not saying this is the case, but I am saying it is worthy analysis.

I want to turn now to an argument against TAG that Dawson makes elsewhere. And that argument is that TAG commits the fallacy of Petitio Principii, or Begging the Question. In his interaction with another presuppositionalist, Dawson makes the following criticism: “If on the one hand knowledge and logic presuppose the existence of the Christian god, then Premise 1A and Premise 2B contain elements which assume the truth of their respective Conclusions A and B (the existence of the Christian god, or the truth of Christian theism, which assumes the existence of the Christian god), and thus the two models of TAG which Chris has presented are by definition circular.”

Is Dawson’s criticism correct? Does the argument structure assume God in order to prove God? It is one thing for the presuppositionalist to presuppose God as he goes about arguing for God's existence, and quite another for his argument to be structured in that way. The difference is that the former is known as a pragmatic presupposition while the latter is known as a semantic presupposition. There is a clear distinction between the two. [See presupposition in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy] What TAG does is begin with human experience, in this instance, human predication, and from human experience it argues that God is the necessary precondition for the experience of human predication and in order to prove this to be the case, it shows that the contradiction of this view is impossible. What is being argued is that S' is a condition of the truth or falsity of S. This means that to show S false one must presuppose S' and to show that S is true, one must presuppose S'.

Now, Bahnsen would call it the impossibility of the contrary, but by contrary he means contradictory. Additionally, that this is an argument is, as Mike Butler puts it, beyond debate. Whether it is a good argument is a different matter. To answer Dawson’s charge of circularity, however, is not too difficult. As Craig admits, there is more to it than that. TAG is an epistemological transcendental argument. Characterizing it as having vicious circularity or begging the question simply means that one does not truly understand what TAG is doing.
   

I will structure the argument above a little differently:

If God did not exist, human predication would not be possible.

Human predication is possible.

Therefore, God exists.

What Dawson has done is confused a presupposition of an argument with a premise of an argument. This is just a different way of saying what I have already said about Dawson. Rather than criticizing the argument, he has drifted outside the argument to criticize the presupposition that lies outside the argument. One has to wonder if Dawson thinks that all arguments are free from presuppositions in back of them. If that is the case, then it is hard to imagine any argument surviving the accusation of circularity. And that seems to be something that Dawson has missed entirely. In fact, one does not have to look very far to recognize that Dawson bring his own presuppositions that serve to inform his own argumentation. Funny how that Tiger that has been let out of its cage is entirely indifferent toward the one that let him out. He will tare the man with the key apart just as quickly as he will the one that jeers his captivity. Dawson ends up being mauled by his own Tiger. And if that is not the case, then we are both faced with a toothless, classless pussycat.

In fact, I would say that Dawson Bethric's grasp of what Van Til was doing and Bahnsen after him, by employing a transcendental argument for is terribly confused. As Collet rightly points out in his excellent paper, Van Til and Transcendental Argument Revisited, Van Til was concerned to make sure that Christians employ the sort of apologetic argument that preserves the logically primitive and absolute character of God's existence. This can only be done by starting with the premise that God's existence is the necessary precondition for argument itself. That's right, God's existence is the necessary precondition for argumentation itself. What this means is that the concept of God should function as a logically primitive proposition rather than a logically derived one.

What Dawson never seems to deal with is the "man behind the curtain" of Presuppositional Apologetics. What does that mean? It means that Dawson does not interact much, if at all, with the doctrines of divine aseity and transcendence. If he did, perhaps he could connect those dots. What Dawson, and many, many others fail to understand is that one cannot truly understand Presuppositional Apologetics unless they understand why it exists and what it seeks to accomplish. Van Til's apologetic is designed to protect reformed doctrine and more precisely God's self-contained, independent, and transcendent nature. If this doctrine is correct, and surely it is, then no axiom can be more ultimate than God's existence. Hence, traditional approaches unwittingly argue for God's existence as a logically derivative status, elevating other principles to an unacceptable primitive status inconsistent with basic Christian doctrine.

Once again, Don Collett is helpful: "Indeed, one may go further and raise the question whether finite creatures can begin any argument without making assumptions of some sort or other. The real question is not whether initial assumptions can be avoided, but whether subsequent argument confirms their soundness."

We are just getting started in our review of Dawson Bethric’s blog “Incinerating Presuppositionalism.” I anticipate a few more posts over the next month or two. I am disappointed to find that Bethric's arguments so far have proven to be better rhetoric than they are arguments.

For an excellent response to the criticism of circularity, see James Anderson’s post here.

The Impossibility of the Contrary

We must point out to them that univocal reasoning itself leads to self-contradiction, not only from a theistic point of view, but from a non-theistic point of view as well. It is this that we ought to mean when we say that we must meet our enemy on their own ground. It is this that we ought to mean when we say that we reason from the impossibility of the contrary. The contrary is impossible only if it is self-contradictory when operating on the basis of its own assumptions.^[1]

I realize that philosophy students will argue that just because Christian theism rules out other views, that does not mean that Christian theism is vindicated. After all, two contrary propositions may both be false. Moreover, others are ready to inform us that the proposition God exists is in fact not an analytic statement and therefore predicate logic would show that two contraries can both be false, and hence proving the impossibility of the contrary essentials proves nothing. In addition, others will unwittingly take up Kant's position that existence is not a property and argue along these lines. But I think all this rambling is philosophical poppycock. It is the product of an undue influence of pagan philosophy on a subject that rightly belongs to biblical theology. Moreover, I do not think that Christians are under an ethical obligation to answer the philosopher in a way that meets with the philosopher's approval. In other words, we need not unduly concern ourselves with the fact that philosophers and skeptics insist on a philosophical approach to our answer. Our concern is with God's imperative in such matters, not the respect of pagan philosophers. That being said, I would like to provide a different sort of defense for how Presuppositional Apologetics employs the transcendental argument.

First, I wish to talk about what the argument is not claiming. Presuppositional apologetics is not claiming that the reason we believe Christian theism is true is because of the impossibility of the contrary. Logic is not the basis for faith. The basis for our faith is the divine revelation given in Scripture. We place our faith in Christ, in God, on the basis of the authority of His word as the Holy Spirit opens our eyes to know and understand it.

Second, PA is not using logic to demonstrate the existence of God. The argument is using God to demonstrate why logic is even possible. Transcendental arguments take on (roughly) the following form: For x to be the case, y must be the case because y is the necessary precondition of x; since x is the case, y must be the case.[2] For logic to be the case, God must exist because God is the necessary precondition of logic. Since logic is the case, God must be the case. We can apply this to the whole of human experience and state it this way: in order for there to be intelligibility of human experience, God must exist since God is the necessary precondition of all human experience. Human experience is intelligible; therefore God must be the case. In other words, the only plausible explanation for the phenomenon of laws of logic is Christian theism.

What the transcendental argument asks of the non-Christian worldview is that it provide a rational basis for its understanding of human experience. What must be true in order for the non-Christian worldview's claims that human experience is intelligible apart from Christian theism? The transcendental argument in Presuppositional apologetics uses a reductio ad absurdum to demonstrate that the non-Christian worldview reduces to self-contradiction. It eventually becomes rationally indefensible.

The solution to this problem is not located in philosophy. Repeatedly, for some reason, Christian apologists think that it is. As a matter of fact, it is not. The solution to this problem is revealed in Scripture, believe it or not. Now, I realize to those intellectuals concerned with academic respectability and for the rest that simply relish the idea of being smarter than the rest of us, my suggestion likely rings hollow, naïve, and far too simplistic to be of any value. In answer to that line of reasoning my response is even simpler: I don't care. All I care about is providing a truthful answer using a method that honors God. If that method happens to be simple, and not wrought with one philosophical complexity after another, then so be it, or maybe, even better!

Romans one and the indefensible position of the non-Christian worldview.

ἀναπολόγητος is a fascinating word used by Paul in Romans 1:20 to describe the status of the arguments among those that either reject the existence of God or corrupt God's existence as revealed in Scripture. The lexical sense of the word means inexcusable. In essence the word is the negation of another Greek word ἀπολογίαν, which we know basically means to "defend oneself" according to BDAG. Essentially, Paul is claiming that all men have been given such clear understanding and knowledge of God's existence that they are without any excuse not to embrace that truth. When Christian apologists encounter non-Christians, the whole point is that the Christian provides an answer or defense of his faith to the non-Christian while the non-Christian is supposedly providing rational argumentation or a defense for why he rejects Christian theism. That is the general thrust of what is taking place in these exchanges be they one on one, or on the street corner, in the tavern over a beer, at lunch, or in a formal debate.

Paul's approach was to begin with God and then proceed to argue that there is not even evidence to support the conclusion that God does not exist, or more precisely, the God revealed in Scripture does not exist. Paul says that the non-Christian worldview, in whatever shape of form it may take is so weak that it is without a defense, without an apologetic if you will. When the presuppositionalist says that Christian theism is true because of the impossibility of the contrary, it is exactly this that he should mean. God says it is impossible to defend any concept of God that is not distinctly based on His revelation, or the absolute reality of His existence as it is. No man has ever lived that could ever defend the proposition "God does not exist" or "the God revealed in Scripture does not exist." It is impossible to provide an adequate defense for such statement.

Biblical faith and epistemic certainty.

I will forego a discussion of the various concepts of certainty in preference for a biblical view of faith and how a proper understanding of the biblical concept of faith leads to certainty. Moreover, if you are more impressed with the philosophically complex arguments of epistemic and psychological certainty than you are with biblical certainty, I would encourage you to examine your heart and schedule a meeting with your pastor.

Hebrews 11:1 tells us, "Faith is the assurance of things hoped for and the evidence of things not see." Thus, it is best to take the clause in 11:1 to have an objective sense with the meaning “faith gives substance to what is hoped for,” and not a subjective sense that faith is the assurance that what is hoped for will come to pass (although this latter perspective is certainly true).^[3] To understand faith in the objective sense is critical to how we might answer the question of certainty. Allen continues, As Lane pointed out, “faith” is objective because it bestows upon the objects of hope a present reality, enabling the believer to enjoy now the “full certainty of future realization.” Faith is the objective grounds upon which subjective confidence may be based. Such faith springs from a personal encounter with God. This kind of faith enables one to venture into the future “supported only by the word of God.”^[4]

The Hebrew word 'āman is no less significant. The Theological Workbook of the Old Testament defines it in the following way: to confirm, support, uphold in the Qal, but in the Hiphal, it means to be certain, to believe in. This very important concept in biblical doctrine gives clear evidence of the biblical meaning of “faith” in contradistinction to the many popular concepts of the term. At the heart of the meaning of the root is the idea of certainty^[5] In the Hiphil (causative), it basically means “to cause to be certain, sure” or “to be certain about,” “to be assured.” In this sense the word in the Hiphil conjugation is the biblical word for “to believe” and shows that biblical faith is an assurance, a certainty, in contrast with modern concepts of faith as something possible, hopefully true, but not certain.^[6] This is quite contrary to the modern view of faith.

Conclusion

To claim that Christian theism is true because of the impossibility of the contrary is to claim that only Christian theism provides the necessary preconditions for the intelligibility of human experience. One by one, the metaphysic, epistemology, and ethic of every attempt to explain human experience outside of Christian theism reduces to absurdity. What you end up with is philosophers claim things like "stones have a level of perception," and every ethical system ever constructed apart from Christian theism reduces to subjectivist views or are radically arbitrary. We end up with brilliant minds claiming that we can't really know anything about reality and constructing the most convoluted arguments you could imagine to prove it. If that isn't a howler, nothing is.

"The unfolding of Your words gives light; It gives understanding to the simple." Ps. 119:130

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^[1] Cornelius Van Til, A Survey of Christian Epistemology (The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company: Phillipsburg, NJ, 1969).

[2] See Michael Butler's article "The Transcendental Argument for God's Existence."

^[3] David L. Allen, Hebrews, The New American Commentary (Nashville, TN: B & H Publishing Group, 2010), 543.

^[4] David L. Allen, Hebrews, The New American Commentary (Nashville, TN: B & H Publishing Group, 2010), 543.

^[5] Jack B. Scott, “116 אָמַן,” ed. R. Laird Harris, Gleason L. Archer Jr., and Bruce K. Waltke, Theological Wordbook of the Old Testament (Chicago: Moody Press, 1999), 51.

^[6] Jack B. Scott, “116 אָמַן,” ed. R. Laird Harris, Gleason L. Archer Jr., and Bruce K. Waltke, Theological Wordbook of the Old Testament (Chicago: Moody Press, 1999), 51.