Peeping Thomists, Classical Foundationalism, and Classical Apologetics

 Thinking Critically & Biblically about the Foundations of Christian Theism

Is belief in God intellectually irresponsible, irrational, and philosophically rash? It seems inescapably true that no belief should be acknowledged as true belief or genuine knowledge unless it is accompanied by sufficient evidence. This raises several questions about the nature of knowledge, true belief, and the notion of sufficient evidence. Much has been made over the difference between belief that God exists and belief in God. Plantinga writes, “So belief in God must be distinguished from the belief that God exists.” I am not convinced that Plantinga is not guilty of overstating the case.

When Christian theism speaks about belief in God, it speaks about belief in a very specific personal being. Christian theism speaks of the self-contained triune God of the Christian Scripture. This is the God that created all that exists. He is the God of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and Moses. He is the God that became flesh in the person of Jesus Christ. He is Lord of heaven and earth, maker of all things and the giver of life. When Christian theism speaks about belief in God, this is the God it has in mind. It follows then that statements about belief in God are statements encompassing existential beliefs. Christian theism is not satisfied to hold God out as a meagre idea or concept. Christianity is not merely a noetic structure by which to organize and make sense of one’s experience. Christian theism is the only rational worldview available to humanity. The other worldview, specifically, the non-Christian worldview is reduced to absurdity when it is subjected to an internal critique of its propositions. This is true regardless of whether or not the non-Christian worldview comes in the form of a militant atheism or a false religion such as Islam.

The issue I am discussing belongs to the branch of philosophy known as epistemology. This branch deals with our theory of knowledge. What does it mean to know something about reality? When we say we know something, we mean, as Halverson says, (1) it is actually the case, (2) we believe that it is actually the case, and (3) we have reasonable grounds for believing it is actually the case. [Halverson, A Concise Introduction to Philosophy, 26] The controversy enters at point 3. I may state the case as it actually is. I may even believe the case as it actually is. But unless I have reasonable grounds for believing the case as it actually is, it cannot be said that I possess true knowledge. My belief may be a lucky guess or based on bad reasoning with the right answer. The controversy in epistemology between Christians, Non-Christians, and various schools of apologetics concerns “reasonable ground.” This is the age-old philosophical problem of the criterion. What do we mean by reasonable ground?

“Many philosophers have endorsed the idea that the strength of one’s belief ought always to be proportional to the strength of the evidence for that belief.” [Plantinga, Reason and Rationality, 24] Many Christian apologists have embraced a variety of these concepts from enlightenment and contemporary philosophies and integrated them into gospel proclamation and Christian apologetics. The problem with the approach at hand is located in the phrase “strength of the evidence.” W.K. Clifford wrote, “To sum up: it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.” [W.K. Clifford, The Ethics of Belief, 183] Of course it would be irresponsible if we did not inquire what sort of evidence could be offered up for this belief. And this is the heartbeat of the issue. Beliefs are supported by evidence, which is based on other beliefs, which are themselves supported by evidence and so on and so forth. The chain of beliefs, sooner or later inevitably attaches to some belief that requires no evidence for its support. This leads us to the question, what is the sort of belief that requires no evidence? For unless we land upon this ground, we never land at all. Skepticism carries the day in light of this infinite regress. Where do beliefs begin? What is the origin of human knowledge? Where is the fountainhead of human predication? How is it possible for inquiry to exist if we are not able to locate the source of human knowledge?

Should we, as Anthony Flew once said, begin the discussion without the assumption of God? Is it ever ethically proper for a Christian theist to pretend, for argument’s sake, that God does not exist? Alvin Plantinga thinks we can and should: “the debate cannot start from the assumption that God exists.” [Plantinga, Reason and Rationality, 26] Is such an assumption necessary to the proclamation and defense of the gospel? Is such an assumption necessary for the defense of Christian theism? Classical apologists answer in the affirmative. I am convinced by Scripture alone that no Christian ever has to submit to this kind of demand. Regrettably, in the name of being rational, and in the name of credibility, and in the name of respectability, classical apologetics, the predominant form of evangelical apologetics, makes such concessions. For the remainder of this post, I will explore why such concessions are not only unnecessary, but actually weaken the Christian apologetic and potentially compromise the gospel. At a minimum, the rationalism that seeps into the discussion brings with it an array of unnecessary confusion because of the glaring inconsistencies it has with sound biblical theology.

Now, the direction in which I am heading is that of classical foundationalism. Thomism is best understood as a version of classical foundationalism. It denies that belief in God is properly basic. “The existence of God, furthermore, is not among the propositions that are properly basic; hence a person is rational in accepting theistic belief only if he has evidence for it.” [Plantinga, Faith and Rationality, 48] Now, foundationalism establishes norms for what qualifies as rational. It is a system that imposes rules and standards around what justifies belief. Any belief that fails to live up to these standards ought to be rejected as irrational. Hence, one can see that sufficient evidence as defined by Thomism or classical foundationalism serves as the ultimate authority for justified true belief. And this standard is unhesitatingly directed toward belief in the existence of God. Such theistic beliefs should only be accepted if they pass the bar of human reason.

As Plantinga points out, classical foundationalism is best understood in comparison with a noetic structure. A noetic structure is a way in which the human mind organizes experience to make sense out of the world. Within that structure there are basic beliefs and non-basic beliefs. Non-basic beliefs are accepted on basic beliefs. Any non-basic belief that does not follow from basic beliefs is deemed irrational. Hence, since belief that God exists is deemed a non-basic belief, it must be tested and shown to follow from some basic belief. According to Aquinas, scientific knowledge of the existence and immateriality, unity, simplicity, and perfection of God is possible. It is possible because, following Aristotle, scientific knowledge is self-evident or basic. Hence, from these basic beliefs, we can know that God exists. In case it is not obvious, we are moving now toward natural theology.

Classical foundationalism then, says that belief in God is not properly basic because the proposition that God exists is not self-evident, or evident to the senses or incorrigible. In other words, belief that God exists is arrived at from other more basic beliefs. Now, we may agree for argument’s sake that properly basic beliefs are beliefs that are self-evident, or evident to the senses or incorrigible. But as Plantinga points out, why do we have to accept the belief that these and only these types of beliefs are properly basic? I have to ask if such a belief itself is self-evident, evident to the senses, or incorrigible. I must confess that I cannot see how it is. From this fact, it seems to me that classical foundationalism rests upon flimsy grounds itself. In other words, it seems to me that classical foundationalism runs the risk of being what Plantinga calls, self-referentially incoherent. We presuppositionalists would say that it is reduced to absurdity when it is subjected to an internal critique.

This is precisely where the conflict between Aristotelian Philosophy collides with Reformed Theology and where Classical Apologetics crashes into Presuppositional Apologetics. The former has embraced a rationalistic epistemology while the latter has adopted a revelational epistemology. Contrary to Norman Geisler’s view that it is impossible for authority to serve as our ultimate criterion for knowledge, Reformed theology affirms that the only way to know God is by way of an ultimate standard that is thoroughly revelational in nature. Geisler contends this is impossible because “it is always possible to ask why we should believe any authority.” [Geisler, Introduction to Philosophy, 105] Paul assured us that just because we could answer back to God that did not mean it is wise to do so. (Rom. 9) I think it is good to remind the reader at this time about the promise of the serpent in the garden. Satan’s assertion was that man could know reality just as God knows reality, independently, self-sufficiently. This was in fact the promise of Satan. Satan promised man he could attain knowledge independently from God.

The reformed theologian approaches epistemology, not with Aristotle’s Metaphysics in his hand, but with a Bible. Bavinck says, “Instead, “implanted theology” was viewed as a natural fitness and inclination implanted in the human mind, enabling it to attain to knowledge of God “apart from any discursive thought and reasoning of the mind,” and to back up this knowledge with an incontrovertibly certain testimony.” [Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, Vol. II, 66] Human knowledge is, according to Scripture, revelational in nature. Moreover, according to Scripture, man does not have to go looking for God. By all accounts, God comes to man as soon as the capacity for rational thought arrives. With reason there is God. When the mind is ready to reason, God is. I think it right to say that God is the one conditioning the mind, preparing each mind for the process of rational thought. Rather than coming in at the end of some reasoning process or scientific or historical investigation, knowledge of God is there from the very beginning.

“There is within the human mind, and indeed by natural instinct, an awareness of divinity. This we take to be beyond controversy. To prevent anyone from taking refuge in the pretense of ignorance, God himself has implanted in all men a certain understanding of his divine majesty.” [Calvin, Institutes, Vol. I, 43] The source of human knowledge is God alone. The method by which mean know is revelational in nature. “But the knowledge of the deity is immutably in all because there is no nation so barbarous upon whom this persuasion of deity does not rest.” [Turretin, Institutes, Vol. I, 7]

Classical Foundationalism and Thomism following it, along with Classical Apologetics, require the existence of uninterpreted brute facts and the possibility of neutrality in order to build their system. Scripture denies that facts can exist apart from their status as being created by God for God’s purpose. Moreover, such facts must be interpreted according to God’s pre-interpretation of them. Any other view of knowledge collides head-on with biblical revelation. “No fact in the world can be interpreted truly except it be seen as created by God.” [Van Til, Survey of Christian Epistemology, 18-22] The entire enterprise then of Classical Foundationalism collapses not only from within but from without, and with it, classical apologetics. If there are no brute facts from the start, then it seems impossible for the foundation to form at all. We all should remember the words of our Lord when he said he that is not with me is against me. Hence, the notion of neutrality is more than a little naïve given Scripture’s description of man as a hostile enemy of God. Neutrality turns out to be another misguided philosophical conjecture that adds little value to the discussion.

In conclusion then, since God is the source of human knowledge and since it is the fear of God that leads to knowledge, God must be seen as the necessary precondition for human predication. The argument is summed up in the form of Modus Tollens, “If human predication, then God. There is no God. Therefore, there is no human predication.” From this argument if we see that even the attempt to deny God presupposes His existence. The minute we begin predication, God is presupposed. This is because God is the necessary precondition for all experience. We show this by demonstrating the impossibility of the contrary.

Testimonium Spiritus Sancti Internum: The Internal Witness of the Holy Spirit - In Christian Apologetics

In the book, “Five Views On Apologetics,” William Lane Craig makes this statement: “If, by proceeding on the basis of considerations that are common to all parties, such as sense perception, rational self-evidence, and common modes of reasoning, the Christian can show that his own beliefs are true and those of his interlocutor false, then he will have succeeded in showing that the Christian is in a superior epistemic position for discerning the truth about these matters.”[1] In his work, “Christian Apologetics,” Norman Geisler comments, “What is more, an adequate test for truth is a methodological prerequisite to establishing theism.

For unless the Christian apologist has a test by which he can show other systems to be false and theism to be true, then there is no way to adjudicate the conflicting claims of various religions and worldviews.”[2] In His work, “Faith Founded on Fact,” John Warwick Montgomery has said, “Christianity does indeed offer the most comprehensive solution to the human dilemma, but apart from the marshaling of brute facts to prove this, the claim is worth no more than that of any other religion or philosophy leading to maximal comprehensiveness or coherence.”[3]

In their respective comments, it is clear that each man is looking to identify a method and standard by which the truth claims of Christian theism can be shown to accurately reflect the state of affairs as they have obtained in the present world order. Craig uses the expression, “rational self-evidence,” while Geisler points to “an adequate test for truth,” and Montgomery, references “the marshaling of brute facts.” Each man is carefully enmeshed in showing Christian theism to be true. In addition, these men have made vast contributions to Christian scholarship over the course of their respective careers and for that I am grateful. In fact, Norman Geisler was my apologetics professor several years ago at Southern Evangelical Seminary in Charlotte, NC. Nevertheless, there is a very basic difference in my perspective and their perspective concerning what Scripture has to say about apologetic method. That difference is located in the relationship between the Testimonium and the Criterion as it attaches to Christian epistemology.

The thesis of this post is that Christian apologetics is a discipline that necessitates both the force of the truth of God in its expression and the work of God’s Spirit in its function if it is to be harmonious with divine revelation. Unless the gospel of God is presented in concert with the work of the Spirit, the discipline of Christian apologetics becomes much more rationalistic, much more natural, much more the product of the human intellect.

The objective of this post is to trace the contours of the witness of the Holy Spirit in the proclamation and vindication of the gospel as it appears to us in the New Testament revelation. The particular aim is to demonstrate the nature of the ancient church’s dependence on that witness in both its proclamation and defense of the Christian gospel. The apologist must look to the revelation of Scripture for both his cadence and his model for apologetic methodology. It is there that he will find safety from error, pride, and the fruitless rationalism that has come to dominate the discipline.

My aim is to call apologists back to a reliance on the work of the Holy Spirit in the field of Christian apologetics. Christian theism is a supernatural religion from top to bottom. From its Head, to its revelation, to its members, to its message, Christian theism has a spiritual and supernatural base. In fact, there is nothing in the Christian religion that is purely naturalistic in character. Beginning with the creation of the physical universe to the divine revelation of the law, to the arrival of God incarnate, to the completion of divine revelation in the New Testament, there is no component of Christian theism that does not transcend human reason. It seems perfectly right then, that the discipline that purports to defend the claims of this supernatural religion would also be fully persuaded that its approach would require reliance on the very supernatural truth claims it seeks to defend. It is only reasonable to think that the Christian apologist would embrace, without hesitation, the supernatural witness of the Holy Spirit in the work of vindicating the Christian worldview.

“The New Testament is primarily concerned with telling the story of Jesus and with drawing the consequences of that story for belief, for worship, and for practical conduct of human life.”[4] Indeed, in his gospel at 20:31, John informs us that he wrote his gospel so that the hearer might believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that believing, the hearer might have eternal life. Kostenberger points to Matt. 16:13-20 as Matthew’s central thesis.[5] This section contains Peter’s great confession that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of the Living God. Mark begins his project by telling us this is the beginning of the gospel of Jesus Christ, the Son of God. He continues in 10:45 by telling us that Jesus, the Son of Man came not to be served but to serve and give His life a ransom for many. And in 15:39 he records the words of the centurion, “truly, this man was the Son of God.” Luke is essentially a treatise of the historical record of Jesus Christ so that Theophilus might know the exact truth about the things, which he had been taught. The task of Christian apologetics is to provide a defense to anyone that 1) asks us to give a reason for the hope that is in us; and 2) to refute those that aspire to challenge and contradict the truth of God we have in His divine communication. This task requires the Christian to employ both the Spirit and the Word in their preparation for and their engagement in the discipline of Christian apologetics.

If one were to survey the material available on the subject of Christian philosophy and apologetics today, they would discover an astounding and embarrassing deficiency of exegesis and theology in those materials. In addition, very little space is dedicated to the phenomenon of the witness and work of the Spirit in the field of Christian apologetics. It is the primary aim of this series of posts to point out the vital role of the Spirit in the work and practice of Christian apologetics. Christian apologetics is better served when it is in the hands of the exegete, the theologian, and the elder. The philosopher seems to be continually seduced by the intellectually complex, the obscure, and the sophisticated. But the gospel and its defense is more simple than the philosopher wants it to be.

---

[1]. William Lane Craig, “Classical Apologetics,” in Five Views on Apologetics, ed. Steven B. Cowan and Stanley N. Gundry (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2000), 44.

[2]. Norman L. Geisler, Christian Apologetics, paperback ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1976).

[3]. John Warwick Montgomery, preface to Faith Founded on Fact: Essays in Evidential Apologetics (Newburgh, IN: Trinity Press, 1978), xi.

[4]. Avery Cardinal Dulles, A History of Apologetics, 2nd ed. (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 1999), 1.

[5]. Andreas J. Kostenberger, L. Scott Kellum, and Charles L. Quarles, The Cradle, the Cross, and the Crown (Nashville, TN: B&H Publishing Group, 2009), 179.